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ABSTRACT

A DEFENSE OF HUME’S DICTUM
SEPTEMBER 2019
CAMERON GIBBS
B.A., CALVIN COLLEGE
M.A., WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHYSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker

Is the world internally connected by a web of necessary connections or is everything
loose and independent? Followers of David Hume accept the latter by upholding Hume’s
Dictum, according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences. Roughly put, anything can coexist with anything else, and anything can fail to
coexist with anything else. Hume put it like this: “There is no object which implies the
existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves.”
Since Hume’s day, Hume’s Dictum has played a major role in philosophy, especially in
vi

contemporary metaphysics. In ruling out necessary connections, Hume’s Dictum implies that
causal relations and the laws of nature are contingent. It makes other demands on our
metaphysics of science as well; for example, it places restrictions on our metaphysics of
counterfactuals, dispositions, and explanation. The principle has applications in other areas
too. Hume’s Dictum places constraints on our theories of abstract objects and moral properties.
For example, Hume’s Dictum rules out the view that moral properties are distinct from, but
necessarily connected to, non-moral properties.
While Hume’s Dictum is a prominent principle in metaphysics, few Humeans have
defended the principle at length. It is assumed more often than it is argued for. As a result,
Hume’s Dictum no longer enjoys the reputation it once did. It’s common to hear complaints
about the lack of arguments in support of Hume’s Dictum. Moreover, philosophers are
increasingly willing to defend views that are at odds with Hume’s Dictum. A striking example
of this is the recent explosion of interest in views that take causal relations and the laws of
nature to be necessary. Humeans can no longer afford to be complacent. An extended defense
of Hume’s Dictum is called for, and that’s what this dissertation aims to offer. This dissertation
has three parts. In the first part, I lay out some preliminaries and offer a precise formulation of
Hume’s Dictum. In the second part, I develop three arguments in favor of Hume’s Dictum. In
the final part, I defend Hume’s Dictum against objections.

vii
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CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARIES

According to David Hume “There is no object, which implies the existence of any
other if we consider these objects in themselves.”1 The most prominent contemporary
disciple of Hume, David Lewis, put it like this: “Anything can coexist with anything else,
… Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else.”2 Both of these prominent
Davids of philosophy committed themselves to the principle Hume’s Dictum (HD). We
can capture this principle with the slogan: there are no necessary connections between
distinct existences.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance that this thesis has had in philosophy.
The principle plays a key role for both Hume and Lewis. The applications of this
principle are vast. In the next chapter, I’ll discuss several prominent applications of this
principle. Despite the importance and prominence of Hume’s Dictum, its reputation has
been in decline. According to Fraser MacBride (2005: 127), “it is a curious fact that the
proponents of the contemporary Humean programme − Lewis included − having
abandoned the empiricist theory of thought that underwrites Hume’s rejection of
necessary connections provide precious little by way of motivation for the view.” In a
similar vein, Jessica Wilson (2010a: 594) says that “arguments for HD are in short
supply.” Wilson then proceeds to argue that the few arguments put forward in support of
HD fail. In a later paper, Wilson strikes a harsher tone: “it has not been good for

1
2

Hume (1975: Book I, Part III).
Lewis (1986: 88).

1

philosophical progress that so many philosophers have spent decades laboring in the
imaginary legoland of Hume’s Dictum”3
The effects of the growing suspicion of HD can be seen in recent work in
metaphysics. Metaphysicians are increasingly happy to accept un-Humean necessary
connections. As a case in point, any form of necessitarianism about laws of nature or
causation used to be clearly a minority opinion, but is now plausibly a contender for the
majority view among those working on the topic.

Markus Schrenk’s recent book

Metaphysics of Science surveys the recent history of thinking about the metaphysics of
laws of nature, causation, dispositions, counterfactuals, and natural kinds. In many ways,
the book is a history of the gradual acceptance of un-Humean necessary connections.
Humeans can no longer afford to be complacent. If the Humean metaphysics is to
be a viable contender, then a serious defense of HD is required. This dissertation aims to
offer that defense. I aim to show that HD is not merely a relic of a philosophical stone
age, but a plausible principle with deep and far-ranging consequences. This dissertation
has three major parts. First, I develop a precise formulation of HD. On my view, there
are serious mistakes in the literature regarding how to formulate HD. These mistakes
explain some of the recent skepticism towards HD. In the second part, I offer three
arguments in favor of HD. In the final part, I consider objections to the HD, arguing that
they are not convincing.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out some preliminaries that we will need for
the rest of the dissertation. There are two key notions that I require. The first is the

3

Wilson (2017: 100).

2

notion of necessity with which to formulate Hume’s Dictum. Second, I’ll need the notion
of a perfectly natural or fundamental property. In this chapter, I clarify each of these
notions and state some assumptions about them.

1.1 Modality

The Humean denies necessary connections; in other words, possibility extends far
enough to rule out any alleged necessary connection between distinct existences. But
there are different kinds of necessity: nomological, narrowly logical, doxastic,
conceptual, and so on. So which kind of possibility should we use to formulate Hume’s
Dictum? Metaphysicians are often interested in a particular modality called ‘broadly
logical possibility,’ ‘metaphysical possibility,’ and ‘absolute possibility.’ While I doubt
that everyone has always meant the same thing by these different names, the notion of
possibility that I’m interested in can be reasonably referred to by all three. The name
‘broadly logical possibility’ conveys the idea that the sense of possibility is a logical
notion, in the sense of being topic neutral. This contrasts with many other senses of
possibility which are tied to particular topics, such as laws of nature (nomological
possibility), logical constants (narrow logical possibility), or concepts (conceptual
possibility). The name ‘metaphysical possibility’ conveys the idea that the sense of
possibility is an objective, worldly notion. It isn’t tied to our representational resources
in any way, either linguistic or mental, nor is it tied to our beliefs in any way. Lastly, the
name ‘absolute possibility’ conveys the idea that the sense of possibility is especially

3

expansive. If a proposition is absolutely necessary, then there is no genuine sense in
which it could have been false. For reasons that will emerge, my preference is to use the
terminology of ‘absolute possibility’.
Absolute possibility is the appropriate modality for our study. Now our task is to
clarify this modality, to ensure that we have a clear enough grip on the notion in order to
investigate substantive issues about its extent. The best place to start with clarifying a
notion is to consider examples of its application. Let’s consider some standard examples.
I don’t claim they are uncontroversial, many philosophers would dispute them. Rather
I’m merely making a claim of intelligibility; it is intelligible to interpret the following
examples in terms of absolute modality:

(1) Necessarily, either the sky is blue or it is not the case that the sky is blue.
(2) Necessarily, bachelors are unmarried.
(3) Necessarily, for any set there is a power set of that set.
(4) Necessarily, murder is impermissible
(5) Necessarily, for any objects there is a mereological sum of those objects.
(6) Necessarily, there are abstract objects.
(7) Necessarily, water is H2O.

While none of these examples are uncontroversial, the fact that they are
intelligible does convey something important about absolute possibility. (1), (2), (3), and
(4) are based on the widely held thought that truths of logic, concepts, mathematics, and

4

morality are absolutely necessary (assuming, of course, that there are any truths of these
kinds). (5) and (6) characterize the thought that controversial metaphysical claims can be
absolutely necessary. Indeed a common, but not universal, thought is that all sufficiently
general metaphysical truths are absolutely necessary.4 Finally, (7) illustrates that it is
intelligible to suppose that some absolute necessities can only be known a posteriori.
The existence of a posteriori absolute necessities is widely accepted, even if there is
disagreement in particular cases. A relatively uncontroversial example from Williamson
(2016) illustrates this, and also helps further clarify the notion of absolute necessity.
Let’s introduce ‘n’ to name the number of inhabited planets. Suppose as a matter of fact
27 planets are inhabited. Assuming that names are rigid, the following is absolutely
necessary, but cannot be known a priori:

(8) n=27.

A further way of understanding the notion of absolute necessity is by considering
how it relates to other modalities. Earlier I characterized an absolutely necessary truth as
one where there is no genuine sense of possibility in which it could have failed to be true.
5

But this initial idea needs qualification. For the time being let’s take sentences to be the

primary bearers of modality (in a moment we’ll have reason to revise this). Given this
assumption, it is clear that some modalities are more expansive than absolute possibility.

4

This is probably the orthodox view among metaphysicians that countenance absolute possibility. But there are
many recent dissenters. See Bohn (2009), Cameron (2007), Miller (2009) and (2010), Parsons (2013), and Rosen
(2006).
5
Hale (2013: 103-110) and Williamson (2016) both understand absolute possibility in this way.

5

For example, consider narrow logical possibility, according to which a sentence is
possible just in case it is not logically inconsistent. Any a posteriori absolute necessity is
not narrowly logically necessary. Consider (8), our example of an a posteriori absolute
necessity.

If (8) is true, then it is absolutely necessary; if false, it is absolutely

impossible. But it is narrowly logically contingent. So absolute possibility is not more
expansive than narrowly logical possibility. The same goes for conceptual possibility,
according to which a sentence is conceptually possible just in case it’s negation cannot be
known a priori.
In order to avoid these counterexamples, we need to restrict the sorts of modalities
that we are considering. To narrow our scope let us invoke the notion of an objective
modality. It is difficult to define an objective modality, but we can get a grip on the
notion by considering examples and general features of objective modalities. Absolute
possibility is an objective modality, as is nomological possibility, technological
possibility, and temporal possibility.

Objective modalities are not epistemic,

psychological, intentional, nor do they concern how things ought to be. Doxastic and
deontic possibility are not objective modalities.
An important general feature of objective modalities is that they are not tied to
how a situation is represented; whether or not a situation is objectively possible is not
sensitive to the manner in which we represent that situation. However, narrow logical
possibility and conceptual possibility are sensitive to the manner in which we represent a

6

situation.6

This is made evident by considering a posteriori absolute necessities.

Consider (8) again:

(8) n=27

This is neither narrowly logically necessary nor conceptually necessary. Now,
suppose that (8) is true, and so ‘n’ and ‘27’ are co-referring expressions. By substituting
co-referring expressions, from (8) we get:

(9) 27=27.7

Unlike (8), (9) is narrowly logically necessary as well as conceptually necessary.
But since the only difference between (8) and (9) is a difference in co-referring
expressions, narrow logical possibility and conceptual possibility are sensitive to the
representational resources we are using. This contrasts with absolute possibility, which is
not sensitive to how we represent a situation.8
As Williamson (2016) points out, linguistics has revealed some clear distinctions
between different modal locutions. Linguists distinguish epistemic and non-epistemic

6

I borrow the following argument from Williamson (2016).
Fregeans will hold that ‘n’ and ‘27’ have different senses, and so (8) and (9) express different propositions. But the
expressions are still co-referring.
8
The counterpart theorist holds that de re possibilities, possibilities for a particular object, depend on the manner in
which we refer to the object. So on this analysis, no de re modality is an objective modality, though it allows that
some de dicto modalities are. I think this is the right result for counterpart theory. In this dissertation, my primary
interest is in de dicto possibilities rather than de re ones. For more on counterpart theory and its consequence that
the de re possibilities for an object depend on how we refer to that object, see Lewis (1986: 192-263).
7

7

modals, for example. There is also a category of expressions that express objective
modalities.9 Since it is well attested that natural language has a category for objective
modalities, we should conclude that we have some understanding of the distinction, and
that it is not a stipulated ad-hoc category of modalities simply designed to avoid
counterexamples. So by focusing on objective modalities, we can set aside narrow
logical possibility, conceptual possibility, and other modalities that are not objective.
Once we have fixed our attention on objective modalities, we can develop a
framework that allows us to study how modalities relate to one another with greater
precision. I propose we work with propositions. As we’ve seen, working with sentences
threatens to import features of our representations onto the modalities. Instead let’s
develop a theory of propositions, keeping things simple enough so that we can be neutral
between different ways of thinking about propositions. These propositions satisfy the
usual Boolean laws for negation, conjunction, and disjunction.10 The Boolean laws allow
us to have a notion of implication that holds between propositions. One proposition is
the tautology, which is implied by every proposition.

Another proposition is the

contradictory proposition which implies every proposition.11 I call the space of these
propositions logical space.
We can take an objective necessity operator on propositions to be a function from
a proposition to a proposition; intuitively, this function maps a proposition P to the
proposition that P is necessary. We can define an objective possibility operator from the

9

Kratzer (2012: 49-62) calls these ‘circumstantial’ or ‘root’ modals, and Portner (2009: 144-184) calls these
‘dynamic’ modals.
10
For more details, see Bricker (1983) and Williamson (2013: 102-106).
11
This is a fairly coarse-grained conception of propositions, since there is only one tautology and only one
contradiction. We could adopt a more fine-grained if we wished, but nothing here requires that.

8

necessity operator in the usual way. We can define an objective modality simpliciter in
terms of a given objective necessity operator; intuitively, a modality is the set of all of its
necessary truths.12

More formally, for any objective necessity operator O, the

corresponding modality is the set of all propositions that O maps to true propositions. A
modality m is more expansive than another n just in case m is a proper subset of n. In
other words, every proposition that is necessary according to m is necessary according to
n, but not vice versa. So m countenances more possibilities than n.
We’re now in a position to consider another important counterexample to the
claim that absolute possibility is the most expansive sense of possibility. Given this
framework, it is easy to define a modality; simply take a set S of propositions and define
S-possibility as being consistent with those propositions. For example, consider George
Washington-possibility, defined as consistency with the truth that George Washington
was the first President of the United States. It is arguable that absolute possibility fails to
be more expansive than this sense of possibility. For example, suppose it is absolutely
necessary that sets exist. The denial of this is consistent with the truth that George
Washington was the first President of the United States. Of course, there is a clear
intuitive difference between modalities like absolute possibility and nomological
possibility on the one hand, and George Washington-possibility on the other. Intuitively,
it isn’t a genuine notion of possibility.
However, our framework does not guarantee that there is such a modality as
George Washington-possibility. Objective modalities have been defined in terms of true
12

Note that which propositions are true will vary from world to world, including necessary propositions, so whether
a set of propositions are a modality will vary from world to world. For example, if the laws of nature are contingent,
then the nomologically necessary propositions will vary from world to world.
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propositions, but we haven’t said anything about which modal propositions are true. We
need to say something additional to cover that. I find it convenient to be extremely
generous in what modalities there are. Some might prefer to deny that there is any sense
in which there is a modality like George Washington-possibility. But I think of this as an
issue of terminology. Clearly we can carve up logical space in a certain way. The
question is: is this the right way to carve it up? So I prefer to allow that George
Washington-possibility is a modality, but a later question we’ll consider it whether it is
the right kind of modality for the purposes of investigating absolute modality.
With the preceding in mind, I adopt a plenitudinous principle that governs
objective modalities. Say that a class C of propositions is closed under implication iff for
any propositions in C, if those propositions imply proposition P, then P is in C. If a class
of propositions is closed under implication, then it is consistent iff it doesn’t contain the
contradictory proposition. We can then formulate our principle as:

Plenitudinous Modalities For any consistent class of propositions that is closed
under implication, there is a necessity operator that maps all and only those
propositions to true propositions.13

13

If we adopt a Fregean conception of propositions, this principle will need to be modified. The Fregean holds that
sentences that use different senses that refer to the same thing express different propositions, but for objective
modalities we don’t want two propositions to differ in modal status merely by referring to the same thing using
different senses. To handle this complexity, we will need to add a some sort of restriction to the principle. No doubt
different Fregeans will have different strategies, so I will not attempt to provide a conclusive answer on behalf of the
Fregean. But I take it that any adequate Fregean view of propositions will need a way of understanding objective
modalities.
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Given this principle, we are guaranteed a modality corresponding to George
Washington-possibility.

This is the modality that results from starting with the

proposition that George Washington was the first president of the United States and
taking the closure under implication. Nevertheless, there is a clear intuitive difference
between this modality and more robust ones like absolute modality. It doesn’t seem that
one is merely more interesting to us than the other. Rather some modalities like absolute
possibility are more robust, able to carry more metaphysical and explanatory work than
others. Logical space offers up these modalities, rather than being something we impose
on logical space. I propose we recognize a distinction between modalities that are
genuine and those that are not.14 Logical space offers up genuine modalities; they carve
out joints in logical space. Modalities that are not genuine, on the other hand, are
imposed by us on logical space by defining a notion of possibility in terms of a restriction
to certain kinds of truths. George Washington-possibility is not a genuine modality.
Below I’ll discuss David Lewis’s notion of natural properties and show how this
can be used to clarify the notion of genuine modalities, and later I devote chapter seven to
the question of how to distinguish genuine modalities from mere restrictions. But for
now all we need is to grasp the distinction. With the distinction in hand, we can precisely
state our principle:

Expansive Absolute modality is the most expansive objective, genuine modality.

14

Lange (2009: 62) marks this distinction.
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Expansive gives us insight into the extent of absolute possibility. If P is possible
according to some objective, genuine modality, then P is absolutely possible. Likewise,
if P is absolutely impossible, then there is no objective, genuine modality according to
which P is possible. Expansive captures the sense in which if a situation is absolutely
impossible, then there is no genuine and objective sense in which it could have obtained.
Though, Expansive does allow that there are non-genuine or non-objective senses in
which it could have obtained.15
Anyone who thinks that absolute modality is philosophically significant should
accept Expansive. Denying Expansive threatens to make most debates about the extent
of absolute modality merely verbal. These debates involve one party holding that some
proposition is absolutely possible, whereas the other denies this. However, if we deny
Expansive, then the dispute could be resolved merely by holding that they are talking
about distinct modalities, one more expansive than the other. If we want to avoid this
result, and hold that debates about the extent of absolute modality are substantive, then
we should accept Expansive.16
Some philosophers would object that it is unnecessary to make use of the notion
of genuineness in formulating Expansive. On this view, absolute modality is simply the
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There are a couple of tricky potential counterexamples worth considering. First, on some views absolute necessity
fails to be more expansive than the temporal operator it is always the case that. On these views, there are
propositions that are necessarily true, but not always true. Second, on some views absolute necessity fails to be
more expansive than the operator it is determinately case that. On these views, there are propositions that are not
determinately true, but are absolute necessary. For details, see Bacon (2017). By way of a brief response, I’m not
convinced of the views that allow for these cases. However, assuming those views, I recommend we revise our
normal understanding of absolute necessity so that Expansive comes out true. If always and determinately are
objective, genuine modalities, then we should hold that every absolutely necessary proposition is always true and
determinately true. Such a revision will not affect the issues through the rest of the dissertation.
16
Of course, for all I’ve said here one is free to hold that most disputes about absolute modality are non-substantive.
I’m simply assuming here, for the sake of investigation, that absolute modality is philosophically significant and
disputes about its extent can be substantive.

12

most expansive objective modality simpliciter.

This approach holds that the only

absolutely necessary proposition is the tautology. How would the view handle the
counterexample from George Washington-possibility? Recall that I made use of the
proposition that sets exist. The example requires two key claims. First, it requires the
claim that it is absolutely necessary that sets exist. Second, it requires the claim that it is
not George Washington-necessary that sets exist. But if we wish to hold that absolute
possibility is the most expansive objective modality we could resist this counterexample
by denying one of the two key claims. We could deny that it is absolutely necessary that
sets

exist,

and

likewise

for

any

other

proposition

that

is

not

George

Washington-necessary. Alternatively, we could deny the second claim and hold that it is
George Washington-necessary that there are sets. This could be upheld by adopting a
very coarse-grained view of propositions, where the proposition that sets exist is the same
as the tautology proposition.
An advantage of this view is that it does not require the notion of a genuine
modality. But I do not commit myself to this view because it requires controversial
commitments about the extent of absolute possibility and how coarse-grained
propositions are. Indeed those who accept more restrictive conceptions of absolute
possibility in opposition to the Humean tend to adopt more fine-grained views of
propositions.17 For the sake of neutrality, I won’t assume such a view. This does invite a
natural objection. Surely the set that only contains the tautology is a genuine modality.
But if it is genuine, then by Expansive, this set must be absolute modality. So it seems

17

Cf. Bird (2007: 169, note 115).
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that despite my desire for neutrality, my framework requires us to hold that absolute
modality is the most expansive objective modality anyways.
However, this result is not inevitable. A philosopher that is inclined deny that
absolute modality is the most expansive objective modality, can also deny that the set that
only contains the tautology is a genuine modality. I’ll develop the argument in more
detail in chapter seven, but it will be helpful to quickly sketch the idea here. When a
modality is genuine then the propositions that it contains form a natural unity; they
objectively go together. Indeed a modality m cannot be genuine if another modality
contains a greater degree of natural unity than m.

But unless one accepts a very

coarse-grained view of propositions, there are many sets of propositions that would seem
to have much more unity that the set that only contains the tautology. For example, on a
fine-grained view of propositions, the following express distinct propositions:

(10) Nothing is both red all over and green all over.

(11) Nothing is both red all over and not red all over.

But a set that only contains (11) will have much less unity than a set that contains
both, and so a set that contains only (11) will not be genuine. Or so I shall argue. So, on
my framework, there is a principled way of denying that the most expansive objective
modality is absolute modality.

14

Much of our investigation of absolute possibility centers around its extent. How
far does absolute possibility extend? Imagine two rival philosophers, one that holds that
absolute possibility extends much farther than the other. How should the philosopher that
holds the more restrictive view of possibility, call her Restrictor, think about the other
philosopher’s views? In light of Expansive, Restrictor cannot hold that the modality that
characterizes the other philosopher’s view is a more expansive, objective, genuine
modality for otherwise Expansive would imply that absolute modality contains the rival’s
possibilities. Rather, Restrictor must deny that the rival modality is more expansive,
objective and genuine. It is uncontroversial that this rival modality is broader, that’s how
I set up the case. So Restrictor must hold that either the modality is not objective or it is
not genuine.
Let’s apply this line of thought to Hume’s Dictum. Some philosophers are
Humeans, denying any absolutely necessary connections between distinct existences.
Opposed to Humeans are philosophers who reject this Humean conception of possibility.
They accept necessary connections; equivalently, they reject possibilities that the
Humean accepts. These anti-Humeans are in the same position as Restrictor. The
conception of modality that the Humean is working with is broader than the conception
that the anti-Humean is working with. So given Expansive, the anti-Humean must deny
that the Humean’s modality is objective and genuine. The anti-Humean could deny that
the Humean’s modality is objective by denying that there is a set of propositions that
corresponds to it. Alternatively, the Humean’s opponent might accept that there is a set
of propositions corresponding to the Humean’s modality, but deny that it is a genuine
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modality. From the anti-Humean’s point of view, this modality is simply the result of
deleting necessary truths involving necessary connections between distinct existences.
On their view, the Humean’s modality is not genuine, but merely a miscellaneous
collection of necessary truths that don’t involve necessary connections. So the key
question is whether the Humean’s modality is a genuine modality. In chapter seven, I’ll
consider in more detail how to distinguish the difference between genuine modalities and
mere restrictions. I’ll defend a general principle that characterizes genuine modalities,
and argue that the Humean’s modality satisfies this principle.

1.2 How to Talk About Modality

Now that we have a clearer idea of absolute modality, I’ll discuss some additional
resources that I’ll use to investigate this modality. The canonical language for expressing
modality is a language that employs the modal operators ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly,’ and
perhaps also ‘actually.’ However, it is also useful to employ the ‘possible worlds’
language. In this language we quantify over worlds and their occupants. The two
languages often closely parallel one another, as the following pair brings out:

(12) Possibly, there is a talking donkey.

(13) There’s a possible world w such that, in w, there’s a talking donkey.
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However, some claims made in the possible worlds language are difficult to
capture in a language of modal operators. Indeed, some claims are impossible to capture
without making use of additional linguistic resources.18 For these reasons, I’ll make use
of the possible worlds language. I will freely quantify over all possibilia and the worlds
the possibilia occupy. However, I remain neutral regarding the interpretation of this
language. So I am neutral over whether we should interpret this in a straightforward way
as quantifying over concrete worlds and their concrete inhabitants as the modal realist
does.19 Or if it should be interpreted as quantifying over substitutes that represent the
possible individuals as the ersatzist does.20 I am even neutral over whether this language
should be thought of as a less fundamental, less metaphysically perspicuous, way of
speaking about possibility. An example of such a view would hold that this language
should be analyzed away in terms of the language of modal operators.21
There is a natural way to link up talk of possible worlds with our earlier theory of
propositions. First let’s define an atomic proposition. P is an atomic proposition iff P is
not the contradiction, and for any Q that implies P, either Q is the contradiction or Q=P.
Intuitively, atomic propositions are maximally consistent propositions; they are not
implied by any distinct proposition, except the contradictory which implies every
proposition. We can now add to our simple theory of propositions that logical space is
atomic; in other words, every proposition that is not the contradictory is implied by at

18

For discussion, see Hazen (1976) and Hodes (1984).
See Lewis (1986b).
20
On ersatz views of possible worlds see Adams (1974), Kment (2014), Plantinga (1974), and Stalnaker (1976) and
(2011).
21
See Fine (2003).
19
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least one atomic proposition.22 For those inclined to take worlds to be abstract objects of
some kind, it is natural to identify atomic propositions with worlds. Modal realists that
hold that possible worlds are concrete objects will reject this identification but instead
hold that a world-propositions is true at a single world.23

1.3 Perfectly Natural Properties

There is a second key piece of metaphysical machinery that I need. As will
become clear in the following chapters when I formulate Hume’s Dictum, the Humean
requires a notion of the intrinsic nature of an object. Unfortunately, without a further
account of this notion it is not helpful for formulating HD, because it is often
controversial whether a property is intrinsic or extrinsic. The Humean rejects necessary
causal relations, but a philosopher that holds that causal relations are necessary may also
hold that an object’s causal powers are intrinsic to that object. Indeed, Ross Cameron
(2008c) has argued that this fact raises an insoluble problem for the Humean. According
to Cameron, we can only be warranted in accepting Hume’s Dictum, if we are warranted
in holding that there are no intrinsic properties that violate Hume’s Dictum. But,
Cameron argues, we can only be warranted in accepting this if we already accept Hume’s
Dictum. We are left with an irremediable epistemic circularity.

22

See Bricker (1983: 33-37) for discussion. Still there are detractors, According to Strohminger and Yli-Vakkur
(2018) it is not obvious that logical space is atomic.
23
The modal realist may take propositions to be sets of worlds, in which case a world-proposition is the singleton of
some world.
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However, we can avoid these worries by developing an independent notion of
intrinsic property. To get this independent notion of intrinsic property, I will make use of
David Lewis’s distinction between properties that are perfectly natural and those that are
not.24 I will also interchangeably use the terminology of ‘fundamental properties’ and
‘non-fundamental properties.’ As is standard, I treat this as a primitive distinction; so it
does not admit of further definition. Since I cannot define this distinction, I need to use
other means to clarify it. The best way to clarify the distinction is in terms of the
theoretical role that it is intended to play.
To better understand the theoretical role let’s first get a bit more precise on the
general theory of perfectly natural properties. Let’s start off with an abundant conception
of properties. On an abundant conception, almost any well-formed predicate expresses a
property (we need the caveat ‘almost’ in order to exclude paradox inducing predicates
such as ‘being a non-self-instantiator’). This contrasts with a sparse conception of
properties, according to which most predicates do not express a property. If we want a
systematic account of abundant properties, there are two prominent theories on offer.
First is Lewis’s theory of properties, where properties are understood as sets of their
instances, across all possible worlds.25

On this theory, property-theory is ultimately

regimented in the language of set theory. The second theory, by contrast, regiments
property theory in terms of higher-order languages that involve quantification into
predicate position. There are primarily two ways of interpreting this language. First, we
can interpret the higher-order quantification as quantification over a special type of
24

See Lewis (1983) and (1986b: 59-69). See also Sider (2012), which develops a generalization of Lewis’s theory
of natural properties that applies to any syntactic category.
25
Lewis (1986: 50-69).
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entity; namely, properties and relations.

Alternatively, we could understand the

higher-order quantification in such a way that there’s no sense in which higher-order
quantifiers quantify over any entities.26 In fact, on such a view, property talk is merely a
heuristic gloss on claims that can only be expressed in the language of higher-order logic.
The sentence ‘there is some property that Frege and Russell share’ is at best a merely
heuristic gloss for the sentence ‘∃F(F(Frege)∧F(Russell))’. A proponent of such a view
should understand my talk of properties throughout this dissertation as heuristic.
One way to get a theory of perfectly natural properties is by adding to our theory
of abundant properties a predicate is perfectly natural that applies to properties.
However, instead of only making sense of perfectly natural properties, we should also
make sense of the notion of one property being more natural than another. So we can
instead add the two-place predicate is more natural than; we could use this, for example,
to say that the property of having 2 kg mass is more natural than the property of being
grue. With this ideology we can define the notion of a perfectly natural property: P is
perfectly natural iff there is no property Q that is more natural than P.
Since the predicate is more natural than is taken to be primitive, our best grip on
the notion is in terms of the theoretical roles that it’s intended to play. I’ll run through
several prominent roles that the theory of natural properties is intended to play. Whether
natural properties are capable of playing any of these roles is a major topic in its own
right, with many detractors. Further, there are different ways of making these theoretical
roles precise. I’m only going to give very simple and straightforward accounts, but many
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For defense of this view, see Prior (1971: Ch. 3) and Williamson (2013: 254-261).
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philosophers prefer more sophisticated approaches. I don’t wish to enter into these
controversies here, but rather just discuss enough of the theoretical roles in order to give
us a grip on the predicate is more natural than.
The first theoretical role that the notion of naturalness is intended to play is in
capturing a notion of dependence. All qualitative facts depend on facts about the
instantiation of perfectly natural properties.27 Lewis (1986b: 60) puts it like this: “there
are only just enough of them to characterise things completely and without redundancy.”
We can understand dependence modally and link up the notion of naturalness with
absolute possibility. The intuitive idea is that once you have settled all the facts about the
instantiation of perfectly natural properties, it is absolutely necessary that all other
qualitative facts are settled. This sort of modal covariation is called supervenience, with
which we can formulate our first role for naturalness:

Supervenience All qualitative facts supervene on facts about the instantiation of
perfectly natural properties and relations.

There are many ways of making precise the notion of supervenience and the
notion of fact. Here’s a relatively simple way. Let an F-isomorphism be a one-to-one
mapping f from the individuals in world w1 to the individuals in world w2 such that, for all
x1, …, xn in w1, x1, …, xn instantiates F in w1 iff f(x1), …, f(xn) instantiates F in w2. We can

27

Qualitative facts contrast with non-qualitative facts. The former, intuitively, don’t involve any particular
individuals, they are purely general. These are facts like there are some electrons. Non-qualitative facts do involve
particular individuals.
These are facts like Sparky is one of the electrons.
For more on the
qualitative/non-qualitative distinction see Cowling (2015).
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generalize this notion to an isomorphism preserving several properties, rather than a
single one. Let an Δ-isomorphism be a one-to-one mapping f from the individuals in
world w1 to the individuals in world w2 such that for any F∈Δ, and for all x1, …, xn in w1,
x1, …, xn instantiates F in w1 iff f(x1), …, f(xn) instantiates F in w2. We can now define
supervenience: for all sets of properties Δ and Γ, the Δ facts supervene on the Γ facts iff
for any two absolutely possible worlds, every Γ-isomorphism between the occupants of
those worlds is also a Δ-isomorphism between the occupants of those worlds. So
Supervenience tells us that every isomorphism that preserves all perfectly natural
properties and relations between two worlds is an isomorphism that preserves all
qualitative properties and relations between those worlds.

Not only is naturalness

connected with a supervenience claim, but many hold that the combination of naturalness
and supervenience gives us an important notion of metaphysical dependence; a
metaphysical reading of the expression ‘P holds in virtue of Q.’28
Another theoretical role natural properties are intended to play is in connection
with the laws of nature. Consider the fundamental laws of nature, those laws that do not
depend on any others. The properties that figure in the fundamental laws of nature are
perfectly natural. This gives us an important epistemic connection to the perfectly natural
properties. By discovering the fundamental laws we also discover the perfectly natural
properties.29

28

Bricker (2004) makes use of this account of ‘in virtue of.’ For a similar account, see Skow (2007).
Lewis (1983: 365-368). Hicks and Schaffer (2017) have recently argued that non-fundamental properties can
figure into fundamental laws. However, they note there are weaker connections between natural properties and
fundamental laws that their view allows.
29
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Natural properties have also been appealed to in order to account for
representation.30 In virtue of what do our thoughts and language mean what they do?
Clearly usage plays a role, and perhaps causation does as well. But there is a worry that
these constraints will not be enough to get us the meanings that, intuitively, our thoughts
and language have. Proponents of naturalness have appealed to it as another constraint.
Among the candidate meanings that satisfy the other constraints, the most natural
candidate or candidates are the meanings of our expressions.
A further theoretical role that naturalness is put to is capturing a notion of
objective similarity. The sharing of perfectly natural properties makes for a respect of
perfect objective similarity. Sharing of fairly natural properties makes for a respect of
fairly objective similarity. The sharing of unnatural properties does not make for any
respect of similarity.
This idea of perfect objective similarity is the guiding idea behind the notion of
intrinsic nature needed for formulating Hume’s Dictum. This is the key theoretical role
that I’ll make use of in this dissertation. On this understanding, an object’s intrinsic
nature is entirely fixed by that object’s perfectly natural properties as well as the perfectly
natural properties and relations instantiated by that object’s parts. We can make this
precise by defining the notion of two object’s being perfect duplicates of one another:

Duplicate x and y are duplicates iff x and y have the same perfectly natural
properties, and their parts can be put into a one-to-one correspondence so that
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Lewis (1983: 370-377) and (1984).
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corresponding parts have the same perfectly natural properties, and corresponding
sequences of parts bear the same perfectly natural relations.

Duplicates share their intrinsic nature. So we can say that a property P is intrinsic
iff for any possible duplicates x and y, x has P iff y has P. This allows us to fix a
particular notion of intrinsic nature so that disputes about Hume’s Dictum will not
devolve into disagreements over whether a property is intrinsic or not. Instead we can
focus on duplicates, which are defined in terms of perfectly natural properties and
relations. The Humean claim can then be understood in terms of duplicates. At the cost
of a commitment to the notion of naturalness, we have an independent notion of
duplication with which we can formulate Hume’s Dictum.31
While there is debate regarding which properties and relations are perfectly
natural, that doesn’t imply a problem in having warrant to accept Hume’s Dictum. We
get our grip on the notion of perfectly natural properties and relations in terms of the
various theoretical roles that they play. This allows us to have independent means for
evaluating whether Hume’s Dictum is true.
I will conclude this chapter by considering one final application of natural
properties: they can be used to illuminate the notion of genuine modalities. I defined an
objective modality as a set of propositions. Each objective modality corresponds to a
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Since the notion of duplicate is key for my formulation of Hume’s Dictum, it’s worth wondering how things work
out in a world where there are no perfectly natural properties, but instead infinite chains of properties that are
increasingly natural. In such a world, since there are no perfectly natural properties, no object instantiates any
perfectly natural properties, and so Duplicate implies that everything is a duplicate of everything else. However,
Sider (1993: 67-71) provides an alternative definition that can non-trivially apply in such a world. So if we admit
the possibility of these worlds, we can still apply Hume’s Dictum to them.
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property of proposition: the property of being necessary according to that modality. We
can then apply the notion of naturalness to modalities in virtue of the naturalness of the
corresponding properties.32 If we can apply naturalness to modalities, then it’s tempting
to define a genuine modality as a modality that is perfectly natural. The trouble with this
approach is that it commits anyone that is a reductionist about absolute modality to the
claim that absolute modality is not a genuine modality. But this doesn’t seem right. One
could reduce absolute modality to other notions, but still hold that absolute modality
corresponds to an objective carving in logical space. For example, the modal realist
reduces absolute modality to quantification over concrete possible worlds and their
occupants. But the modal realist can still hold that absolute modality is a genuine
modality. After all, there’s nothing conventional or arbitrary about the limits of the
concrete possible worlds. Rather, the limits of the concrete worlds correspond to an
objective distinction in logical space.
Here’s a more ecumenical approach. Instead of requiring that a genuine modality
is perfectly natural, we could merely require that a genuine modality is not less natural
than any other modality. More precisely: Modality m is genuine iff there is no modality n
that is more natural than m. This allows us to deny that a genuine modality is perfectly
natural; though, it also allows that a genuine modality is perfectly natural. If we hold that
absolute modality is a genuine modality, then no other modality is more natural than
absolute modality.

We can deny that George Washington-Possibility is a genuine

modality by holding that it is less natural than absolute possibility. Expansive now comes
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If properties are sets, then a modality just is a property of propositions, in which case we can directly apply the
notion of naturalness to modalities.
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out as the claim that absolute modality is the most expansive objective modality that is
not less natural than any other modality.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTRAINTS ON FORMULATING HUME’S DICTUM

Our first job is to get clear on what exactly Hume’s Dictum (HD) says. We want
something more precise than ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences.’ While many philosophers have made use of some sort of Humean principle
and offered rough-and-ready formulations, properly evaluating the principle requires a
fully general and precise formulation. Developing such a formulation is the goal of this
chapter and the next.
Let’s start by going through the constraints that guide our search. First, I’m
looking for a principle that is faithful in the sense of being faithful to the Humean
tradition. This means that the principle can do much of the work that the Humean
tradition has wanted out of it. A principle of no use to Humeans wouldn’t be worthy of
the name. This is not to say that we need to do justice to every application. I allow
enough flexibility to allow that some alleged uses of HD don’t, in fact, follow from HD,
but require a different principle. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to discussing in
detail some key applications of the Humean tradition.
Second, we’re looking for a principle that is neutral, in the sense of being neutral
between different metaphysical frameworks. Some formulations of Humean principles
are wedded to a particular metaphysics. Often, for example, they are wedded to a
Lewisian or Armstrongian metaphysics. This is fine for the purposes of doing systematic
metaphysics. But if we want to properly evaluate HD, then it’s best to make the principle
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as neutral as possible. I intend for this to hold in the formulation of HD, but not in its
implications. We shouldn’t build in, say, Lewisian metaphysical assumptions into the
formulation of HD. But there’s no problem if HD vindicates some of those Lewisian
claims.
Third, I want our principle to be complete, in that it completely captures the idea
behind HD. Due to the difficulty with fully formulating HD, when philosophers want to
make use of it they often only formulate a version that is strong enough for the purpose at
hand. However, without a complete principle, we cannot properly evaluate HD. It is too
hard to see its commitments, especially its potentially problematic commitments. As a
result it’s too difficult to argue for or against the principle. As I’ll later argue, some
alleged problems for HD actually turn on failing to see what exactly the principle is
committed to.
Lastly, I want our principle to be adequate in the sense of being able to adequately
play the theoretical roles that HD is intended to play. The primary theoretical role that I
consider is that of being a principle of plenitude, that is, a principle that fills out
possibilities in a principled, non-arbitrary way.33 I focus on this role, for one of the major
reasons to accept HD is that it performs this role much better than any of its rivals, or so
I’ll argue. After discussing the Humean tradition, I will discuss principles of plenitude in
more detail.
One final introductory remark. HD can take two forms. In denying necessary
connections, we are affirming possibilities that violate the alleged necessary connections.
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28

In effect, if two objects are distinct, then we can recombine them in different ways
corresponding to further possibilities. But how do the possible worlds represent these
recombinations? On one approach, the worlds represent the recombined objects by
containing duplicates of those objects. On a second approach, the worlds represent the
recombined objects by containing the objects themselves. On the first approach, HD
allows us to reason from the fact that a dragon is possible and that a donkey is possible,
to the fact that a duplicate of the dragon and a duplicate of the donkey are compossible.
On the second, we can reason to a world where that particular dragon and that particular
donkey both exist. The principle that I’m defending is interpreted in terms of duplicates,
rather than the objects themselves. Interpreting the principle in the second fashion faces
many difficulties. First, there are widespread modal intuitions that particular objects
essentially coexist with other particular objects. For example, many philosophers hold
that the origins of a person is essential to them, so that every person is essentially born
from their actual parents.34 This implies that I cannot exist without my parents also
existing. Given these widespread modal intuitions, it would be much harder to defend a
Humean principle interpreted in terms of the objects themselves, rather than a principle
interpreted in terms of duplicates. Moreover, many philosophers reject understanding de
re modality in terms of transworld identity; rather, they accept a counterpart-theoretic
interpretation.35

On counterpart theory an object is possibly F just in case it has a

counterpart that is F. The trouble is that the counterpart relation is context sensitive. But
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See Kripke (1980) for defense and discussion of origins essentialism.
On counterpart theory, see Lewis (1968) and (1986a: 192-263).
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we don’t want our Humean principle to be dependent on context. For these reasons,
Hume’s Dictum is best interpreted in terms of duplicates.
So much for the background constraints. The next step is to discuss the Humean
tradition that our principle needs to be faithful to, and to further spell out the theoretical
role of a principle of plenitude. I take up each of these in turn.

2.1 The Humean Tradition

Let’s consider applications of HD made in the Humean tradition. The number of
applications is quite substantial, so we won’t survey every single one. Rather, I’ll discuss
some significant and representative ones.

2.1.1 Causal and Nomic Relations

Let’s first consider applying HD to causal and nomic relations. This application is
the most traditional, perhaps going back to Hume himself.36

In the contemporary

literature, HD has been used to argue that the laws of nature are not necessary, in that, it
is not necessary that a property plays the role in the laws that it actually plays.37 For
example, Lewis endorses a formulation of HD and notes that the principle gets this result.
Roughly put, his principle says that a duplicate of anything can coexist with a duplicate

36

There is, of course, debate on how to interpret Hume. But on the traditional interpretation, Hume appeals to a
denial of necessary connections to argue that we cannot know a priori when one object causes another object, see
Hume (1979: Book I, Part III, Section VI).
37
For some influential defenses of the claim that the laws of nature are necessary, see Shoemaker (1980), Swoyer
(1982), Ellis (2001), and Bird (2007).
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of anything else, in any spatiotemporal arrangement.

Lewis uses this principle to derive

the following case:

Start with a world where the quark colours and flavours do figure in the laws that
are supposed to be essential to them. By patching together duplicates of things from that
world, we can presumably describe a world where those laws are broken; yet perfectly
natural properties are intrinsic ex officio, and so they never can differ between
39

duplicates.

So the result of rearranging duplicates of the actual world corresponds to a
possible world where the actual laws of nature are broken.40

Duplicates preserve

fundamental properties, so this new world shares fundamental properties with the actual
world. Actual fundamental properties can be instantiated in ways that break the actual
laws of nature. So there are worlds where the actual laws of nature are broken and actual
fundamental properties do not play the role in the laws that they actually play. HD rules
out the view that the actual laws of nature are necessary.

2.1.2 Spatiotemporal Relations

38

See Lewis (1986: 86-92).
Ibid, 163. See also the case in ibid, 91.
40
Think of ‘generate’ in metaphorical terms. We aren’t literally generating the worlds. Rather HD allows us derive
that they exist. This is analogous to the axioms of set theory. They don’t literally generate sets. Rather the axioms
characterize the set-theoretic universe, and allow us to derive that those sets exist.
39
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Let’s now consider applying HD to spatiotemporal relations. I will focus on an
argument for the possibility of extended simples, though several other issues arise along
the way. While a number of authors have argued for the possibility of extended simples
from recombination, I take inspiration from them, but do not exactly reproduce their
arguments.

41

The metaphysical backdrop of this argument requires taking the located-at
42

relation to be a fundamental relation.

This relation holds between a material object and

a spacetime region; a material object is located at a spacetime region. An extended
simple is a mereological simple that bears the located-at relation to an extended
spacetime region.
Suppose that extended simples are impossible. So it is necessary that whenever a
material simple bears the located-at relation to a region, that region is also a simple; that
is, it consists of a single spacetime point. But this kind of modal constraint seems
unacceptable for the Humean. The mereological structure of the material object (having
no parts) and a fundamental relation that object bears to a region of spacetime modally
constrains the mereological structure of that region of spacetime (having no parts). This
modal constraint is a necessary connection. If the located-at relation is fundamental, then
we should be able to rearrange how objects bear that relation, and so we should have a
world where a mereological simple is located at an extended region.

41

See McDaniel (2007), Sider (2007), and Saucedo (2011).
In order for the located-at relation to be fundamental we must be substantivalists, that is, realists about spacetime
who do not identity material objects with the regions that they occupy. This is opposed to relationalists, who reduce
spacetime to the spatiotemporal relations between objects, as well as to supersubstantivalists, those who are realists
about spacetime, but identity material objects with the regions they are located at.
42
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In the applications related to laws of nature, we derived our conclusion by
spatiotemporally rearranging particles in ways that broke the laws. In this application,
we are rearranging objects, but in a more extended fashion. We are rearranging how a
material object fits into an overall pattern of instantiation of the located at relation. This
gives us further insight into the formulation of HD. We need to be able to apply HD to
any fundamental relation that there might be, not just a special class of them. Once we
have posited a fundamental located at relation, the Humean requires that we can
rearrange objects within the pattern of instantiation of that fundamental relation.43
It might be argued that the reasoning that goes into arguing that extended simples
44

are possible generates bad results.

For example, suppose we rearranged a simple so that

it is located at the spatiotemporal region that the Eiffel Tower is actually located at. This
seems to generate a world where an extended simple has the same size and shape as the
45

Eiffel Tower, which is a surprising result.

Or even worse, suppose we rearranged how

things bear the located-at relation to one another, so that material objects are located at
other material objects.
It is worth considering how we might block these unintuitive results. A natural
thought is to deny that being located at is a fundamental relation. We might identify
material objects with regions of spacetime, as the supersubstantivalist does. On this

43

While this general moral is right and, I think, straightforward, the Humean application to extended simples raises
some delicate issues. The Humean requires that we can freely rearrange distinct existences within a structure, be it a
spatiotemporal structure or occupation structure. But this is not to say anything about what structures are possible.
When I turn to formulate HD, I will keep separate issues of recombination from issues of what structures are
possible. But it will turn out that this seemingly simple argument extended simples depends on claims about what
structures are possible. However, it is easiest to see this once we have a formulation of HD on the table, so I will
delay this point until the next chapter.
44
Though, some philosophers may hold that the possibility of extended simples is bad enough.
45
For similar cases, see Hudson (2005: 113-116).
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picture there is no necessary connection between distinct existences, for a material object
and the region it occupies are not distinct.46
A different strategy for avoiding these results proceeds by restricting how we can
rearrange objects within the pattern of instantiation of fundamental relations. We can
block the result that a duplicate of me could be a region that other objects occupy by
requiring that our rearrangements preserve the kind of ‘category’ a thing is. We could
hold that material objects are one category, and regions are another category, and that
material objects cannot have other things located at them, whereas regions cannot be
located at other things.
In this vein, we could also add further categories. For example, we might suppose
that the size and shape properties are also categories that an object has.47 We would then
treat them like we treat the category of being a material object. This would allow the
Humean to avoid bizarre results involving mismatches between the size and shape
properties of a material object and the size and shape properties of the region the object is
located at.

If we restrict the allowable recombinations so that they preserve these

categories then we block our ability to generate a world where a simple has the same size
and shape of the Eiffel Tower. Given the restriction, the only way we could generate a
world where a simple had the size and shape of the Eiffel Tower is if we already had a
simple that was the same size and shape.

46

If we reject substantivalism in favor of relationalism, denying that spacetime is a fundamental substance and
instead reducing spacetime to spatiotemporal relations between material objects, we will avoid the worry about
material objects occupying other material objects. However, we still have an argument for extended simples. If
extended simples are impossible, then a material object’s mereological structure modally constraints how it bears
spatiotemporal relations to other objects.
47
Bricker (Forthcoming A: 23-24) makes use of this restriction.
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The size and shape restriction even blocks the original argument for extended
simples. In that argument, we began with a simple located at a single spacetime point.
The size and shape properties of an object located at a single point are different from the
size and shape properties of an object located at an extended region. Given that we can
only rearrange the simple in ways that preserve its size and shape we will only be able to
rearrange the simple so that it is located at a single spacetime point (unless we already
had an extended simple to rearrange). So we will not be able to get a world where a
simple is located at an extended region.
These category restrictions on our Humean principle may strike some
philosophers as giving up on the Humean spirit. For example, McDaniel (2007) and
Skow (2007) have argued that, rather than restricting the Humean principle, we should
deny that size and shape properties are intrinsic. Rather, these properties are extrinsic; a
material object has the size and shape properties it has in virtue of the region that it
occupies. These are delicate issues that I do not attempt to resolve. My goal is simply to
get clearer on how the Humean arguments are supposed to work, and what considerations
bear on them. When we turn to formulating a general version of HD, we’ll put these
issues into sharper focus, but I’ll leave open whether we should add category restrictions.
We will see how to add them or how to do without them.

2.1.3 Universals and Possible Worlds
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I turn to the third category of applications of HD, those involving universals and
the magical ersatzer’s possible worlds, which can be usefully grouped together. I’ll
consider universals first.
Structural universals are a special kind of universal. What is characteristic of
them is that when a structural universal is instantiated by an object that necessitates the
instantiation of another universal by a part of that object.48 As an example, we can
understand the property of being methane as a structural universal. Necessarily, if an
object instantiates the universal methane-hood, then that object has a part that instantiates
the universal hydrogen-hood. These universals engender necessary connections on the
grounds that necessarily whenever an object instantiates methane-hood, then that object
has a part that instantiates hydrogen-hood.
This necessary connection raises some complications. I mentioned that I interpret
HD in terms of duplicates rather than the objects themselves. But this application doesn’t
seem to involve duplicates, but rather the particular universals themselves. However,
when it comes to universals, I think the Humean can interpret HD in terms of the
universals themselves rather than their duplicates. The problems with not interpreting the
principle in terms of duplicates when applied to particulars don’t arise for universals.
Those who reject the transworld identity of particulars typically allow the transworld
identity of properties; in the sense that it can be true that something is F in distinct worlds
without recourse to counterparts.49
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The most prominent defender of structural universals is D. M. Armstrong. See his (1978b: 69-71) and (1997:
32-38).
49
Lewis (1986: 204-205) allows for transworld identity of universals. Some philosophers do reject the transworld
identity of universals, such as Heller (1998) and Hawthorne (2001: 373-375), instead opting to apply counterpart
theory to universals. However, on such a view, one should not apply the HD to necessary connections engendered
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Moreover, there are widespread modal intuitions that particulars involve
necessary connections with distinct objects, but not so for universals on a sparse
conception of universals. On a sparse conception, very few predicates correspond to a
universal, only the fundamental or at least reasonably natural properties do.50 While we
have strong modal intuitions that there are necessary connections between properties,
such as that it is necessary that anything that is scarlet is red, which properties correspond
to a universal is very much a theoretical question. So holding that there are no necessary
connections between universals doesn’t obviously run afoul of our modal intuitions in the
way that the claim that there are no necessary connections between distinct particulars
does (when we don’t interpret that claim in terms of duplicates). Given the differing
issues facing particulars and universals, the Humean has a principled position that rejects
applying HD to particulars themselves rather than their duplicates, but does apply the
principle to universals.
Given this understanding of HD, we can now understand the necessary connection
that structural universals involve.

It is necessary that anything that instantiates

methane-hood has a part that instantiates hydrogen-hood. But HD should allow us to
recombine how universals fit into the instantiation structure, ruling out such a necessary
connection.
However, there is a very natural way to respond to this necessary connection. The
Humean ban on necessary connections only applies to distinct existences, but the believer
in structural universals may hold that the necessarily connected universals are
by universals anyways, just as we should not apply HD to de re necessary connections between particulars, such as
the necessary connection between myself and my parents.
50
On the sparse conception of universals, see Armstrong (1978b) and (1997), Lewis (1983), and Schaffer (2004).
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constituents of one another, where the constituency relation is a kind of composition.51
The universal hydrogen-hood is a constituent of the universal methane-hood. Of course,
this mode of composition is a non-mereological form of composition, failing to obey the
axioms of classical extensional composition. For example, distinct universals can be
composed of the same constituents, and a universal can have another universal as a
constituent many times over; e.g. the universal methane-hood contains the universal
hydrogen-hood as a constituent four times over. This sort of composition is certainly
controversial.52 But given this mode of composition, we don’t have an objection from
HD.
Let’s consider a different application to universals.

Universals have been

appealed to in one of the more prominent accounts of laws of nature: the
Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley view of laws.53 On this view, a regularity is lawful in virtue
of a higher-order lawlike relation that holds between universals. In the simplest case, the
regularity that all Fs are Gs is lawful in virtue of the lawlike relation holding between F
and G. In order for the lawlike relation to account for laws of nature it must be
absolutely necessary that if F bears the lawlike relation to G, and a is F, then a is G.
This lawlike relation seems to involve a necessary connection, but is it the sort of
necessary connection that violates Hume’s Dictum? Lewis says ‘no:’

I am tempted to complain in Humean fashion of alleged necessary connections
between distinct existences … That complaint is not clearly right: the sharing of universals
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This is defended by Armstrong (1986) and Forrest (1986).
According to Lewis (1992: 213), it is a contradiction in terms.
53
See Armstrong (1983), Dretske (1977), and Tooley (1977).
52
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detracts from the distinctness of the necessitating and the necessitated universals. But I am
not pleased. I conclude that necessary connections can be unintelligible even when they are
supposed to obtain between existences that are not clearly and wholly distinct.54

According to Lewis, it’s not clear that we can charge this view of laws with
involving an un-Humean necessary connection, because the necessary connection isn’t
clearly between distinct existences. The necessary connection is between facts involving
F and G and another fact involving G.55 Since G is involved with facts on both sides of
the necessary connection it’s not clear that we have distinct existences.
How we think about this necessary connection turns on how we apply Hume’s
Dictum to universals. I think, contra Lewis, that we should think of the facts involved
here as distinct existences. There’s an intuitive sense in which this view of laws involves
a necessity that a Humean will object to; Lewis illustrates this when he complains that the
necessary connection is still unintelligible.
To motivate my way of understanding distinct existences, let’s consider some
other cases. Let F be a fundamental property. Now consider a purported absolute
necessity that if something is F, then there are countably infinite distinct Fs. Or that it is
absolutely necessary that if something is F, then nothing else is F. These seem be
instances of un-Humean necessary connections. Indeed, any Humean should reject them.
But if two facts fail to be distinct in virtue of both involving F, then there will not be a
necessary connection between distinct existences.

54

Lewis (1983: 40).
I don’t mean anything metaphysically heavy-weight by the term ‘facts.’ This is just a convenient way to talk
about instances of properties.
55
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As a further consideration, consider a different pair of cases, but where we change
our metaphysics of properties. Instead of working with universals, let’s now work with
tropes. Unlike universals, tropes are not repeatable entities.56 If two things are both F,
then they instantiate numerically distinct tropes. When we consider my two cases in
terms of tropes, then they clearly involve necessary connections between distinct
existences, for the tropes are distinct from one another. But it doesn’t seem like whether
we are working with universals or tropes should change whether the necessary
connections are between distinct existences in the cases above.
So the Humean should regard two facts containing the same universal as ‘distinct
existences’ for the purposes of HD. In other words, HD should permit recombination of
instances of universals. Now the cases I’ve appealed to in order to illustrate my approach
only involve instantiations of universals; they don’t involve universals instantiating other
universals such as a lawlike relation. So there is a dissimilarity. But my purpose in
considering these cases is to show that if two facts involve the same universal, they can
still be distinct existences, and we’ll want to formulate HD in such a way to reflect that.
In the next chapter, when I formulate HD, we’ll see how to treat instances of universals
as distinct existences, and we’ll find that HD will rule out the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley
view of laws.
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How should we understand duplication for tropes? Tropes fall into equivalence classes according to their type; for
example, there is a class of all the 2 kg mass tropes. It’s natural to hold that a trope T is a duplicate of something
just in case it is a trope of the same type as T. This falls out of the definition of duplication, if we take the types of
tropes to be fundamental properties, and assume that this is the only fundamental property that a trope has.
Alternatively, we could revise the definition of duplication making use of the ideology of two tropes being of the
same type. Finally, we could take duplication between tropes to be primitive, and define a more general notion of
duplication in terms of the primitive notion.
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Let’s turn to a final application of HD in this section. Lewis appeals to HD to rule
out a view about possible worlds he calls ‘magical ersatzism.’57 The idea behind this
view is that possible worlds are abstract objects that represent possibilities, but not in
virtue of their structure; the worlds are compositionally simple on this approach. Rather
the worlds represent by way of a brute modal connection. For example, consider a
possible world according to which there is something with 2 kg mass. This world doesn’t
represent there being something with 2 kg mass in virtue of the internal structure of the
world. Rather the world represents in virtue of the necessary truth that if the world is
actual, then there is something with 2 kg mass. Lewis calls this modal connection the
selection relation, where the concrete world selects one of these abstract worlds; when an
abstract world is selected, then we say that it is actual.
There are different way of fleshing out this abstract theory.

The primary

distinction that Lewis makes is whether the selection relation is internal, supervening on
the intrinsic natures of the relata, or whether it is external, failing to be internal but
supervening on the intrinsic nature of the fusion of the relata. If the selection relation is
external then that would seem to require that it is a fundamental relation, since it can’t be
grounded in the intrinsic natures of the relata.58 But if so, then we have an un-Humean
necessary connection, for if the concrete universe has a particular intrinsic nature, then
that will necessitate how it bears the selection relation.
We get the same complication that we had with universals. The necessary
connection doesn’t seem to involve duplicates on both sides. One side of the necessary
57

Lewis (1986b: 174-191).
If there were other relations between the concrete universe and the abstract world, then the selection relation could
be grounded in these other relations, but there don’t seem to be any plausible relations to appeal to.
58
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connection involves the concrete world having a particular intrinsic nature, so we could
understand this in terms of duplication. However, on the other side of the necessary
connection it seems to concern the particular abstract object, rather than a duplicate of
that abstract object. But I think we can treat the magical ersatzer’s worlds in the same
way as we treated structural universals. After all, it is easy to think of the magical
ersatzer’s worlds as a kind of universal.59 We can let the distinction between transworld
identity and duplication collapse for these entities, allowing HD to rule out this view.
Now let’s suppose that the selection relation is an internal relation.

So it

supervenes on the intrinsic nature of its relata. On this approach, we no longer have a
Humean objection, for we can now analyze the selection relation in terms of the intrinsic
nature of the abstract worlds and the concrete universe. On analysis, the selection
relation has the form ‘the concrete universe selects an abstract world if the concrete
universe has intrinsic property I and the world has intrinsic property J, or if the concrete
universe has intrinsic property I* and the world has intrinsic property J*, …’ But the
Humean won’t object to necessary connections involved with this relation, because it
isn’t a fundamental relation. Lewis does object to magical ersatzism on other grounds if
the selection relation internal; in particular, he objects that we cannot grasp the selection
relation, since it is analyzed in terms of the intrinsic properties of the abstract worlds and
we cannot grasp these properties. But this objection lies outside of our interest here.
Let’s sum up the results of this section. We’ve seen that in order to make good on
the application to universals, HD must allow the recombination of universals themselves
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Forrest (1986b) develops a view where they are universals. Though, they are kind of structural universals. Since
Forrest’s worlds have internal structure, they are not the magical ersatzer’s worlds which lack internal structure.
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rather than merely duplicates of universals, the same goes for other kinds of entities like
the magical ersatzer’s abstract worlds. Further, it’s not enough for HD to recombine
universals, HD must also be able to recombine instances of the universals as well.

2.1.4 States of Affairs

Lewis famously wielded a Humean argument against states of affairs. However,
as others have pointed out, there are serious problems with Lewis’s argument, so my
discussion will be longer on this topic.60 We’ll see that Lewis’s argument fails from the
Humean’s point of view.
The best way to understand states of affairs is by way of truthmaker theory.
According to truthmaker theory, for every truth, there is something that entails that truth.
61

More precisely:

Truthmaker Theory For every truth T, there is an x such that necessarily, if x
exists, then T is true.

This principle is easily satisfied for some truths, such as the truth that I exist. I
am the truthmaker for it.

But finding truthmakers can be harder for other truths.

Consider the truth that a particular has some property, where the particular does not
essentially have the property. For Armstrong, a particular having a property must be
60

On problems with Lewis’s argument, see Bricker (2015: 171) and Cameron (2008).
Some truthmaker theorists require not just necessitation, but a stronger in virtue of relation. But all I need here is
the necessitation claim.
61
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accounted for in terms of a particular instantiating a universal.62 But even universals
won’t satisfy truthmaker theory. For example, take a red ball and suppose that redness is
a universal. We have the truth that the ball instantiates redness, and this truth needs a
truthmaker. Neither the particular nor the universal will do. The ball could exist without
instantiating redness, so the ball cannot be the truthmaker. The universal could be had by
a different particular when the ball does not instantiate the universal, so the universal
won’t do. The fusion of the ball and redness will exist whenever both of them exist, but
the two could co-exist even though the ball does not instantiate redness, so the fusion
won’t work either. In order for the truth to have a truthmaker we need to have an entity
that only exists when the particular instantiates the universal. States of affairs are posited
for the job, in particular, the state of affairs of the ball’s being red. This state of affairs
contains the ball and redness as constituents and only exists when the ball instantiates
redness.63
Lewis objected to states of affairs on the grounds that they violate HD.64 States of
affairs involve two sorts of necessary connections: necessary inclusions and necessary
exclusions. Let’s first consider the necessary inclusions. These obtain when a state of
affairs requires the existence of another object. For example, consider a red ball, b, and
suppose that being red is a universal. Then we will have the state of affairs of b’s being
red. This state of affairs is necessarily connected to b. It cannot possibly exist without b.
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See Armstrong (1978a), (1978b), and (1997) for a sustained argument this claim.
More complex states of affairs are required as truthmakers for other kinds of truths. We’ll introduce these as
needed.
64
In Lewis (1992), (1998), and (2001).
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Now turn to necessary exclusions. Some states of affairs require that another
object fails to exist. Consider the truthmaker for negative truths, such as that there are no
unicorns. Armstrong puts forward higher-order states of affairs, states of affairs that
contain first-order states of affairs as constituents, as truthmaker for negative truths. The
truthmaker for the truth that there are no unicorns is a state of affairs that involves the
sum of all first-order state of affairs bearing the totaling relation to the property of being
a first-order state of affairs. The existence of this higher-order totality state of affairs tells
us that this sum of state of affairs are all of the first-order state of affairs. The sum of
first-order states of affairs totals the property of being a first-order state of affairs, in the
sense that the sum contains everything that has the property of being a first-order state of
affairs.

Given that none of the first-order states of affairs involve a unicorn, the

higher-order state of affairs cannot coexist with a unicorn. For if there were a unicorn,
then that particular sum of states of affairs would no longer total the property of being a
first-order state of affairs. This allows it to do the truthmaking work. But it also
engenders a necessary exclusion; the state of affairs necessarily excludes unicorns.
As Bricker (2015: 171) points out, the trouble with these Humean arguments is
that they don’t involve duplicates. We haven’t consider duplicates of the states of affairs,
but only the states of affairs themselves. The Humean might hold out that we can rework
the argument so that it involves duplicates. However, I’ll argue that this approach doesn’t
work.
First, consider the necessary includers. We need to find a necessary connection
between a duplicate of a and a duplicate of the state of affairs of a’s being F. How should
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we understood duplicates of states of affairs?

Given that constitution is a kind of

composition, it is natural to hold that a state of affairs inherits its intrinsic nature from the
intrinsic natures of its constituents and their relations to one another in the same way that
a mereological sum inherits its intrinsic nature from the intrinsic natures of its parts and
their relations to one another.65 Consider the simplest case involving a states of affairs
that contains a single particular and a single universal. The natural thing to say is that
two such states of affairs are duplicates just in case their constituent particulars are
duplicates and their constituent universals are duplicates. This will give us the required
necessary connection: necessarily, a duplicate of the state of affairs of a’s being F
coexists with a duplicate of a.
However, this argument faces a serious problem for a is a constituent of the state
of affairs. If the constituency relation is a kind of composition then the duplicates are not
distinct existences. There should be no objection to necessary connections between
entities that are not distinct. After all, Socrates is not distinct from his hand and yet
clearly it is impossible for a duplicate of Socrates to exist without a duplicate of his hand.
The Humean should have no quarrel with these kinds of necessary connections.
Suppose we denied that constitution is a kind of composition. In that case, this
way of applying duplication to states of affairs is misguided. If the constituents of a state
of affairs don’t compose that state of affairs, then a state of affairs cannot inherit its
intrinsic nature from the constituents. In general, an object doesn’t inherit its intrinsic
nature from objects that it bears a relation to, this only happens when the relation is a
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Sider (2007: 70, 74-75) discusses the idea that an object inherits intrinsic properties from its parts.
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kind of composition. For example, I don’t inherit any intrinsic properties from my
computer just because I bear a particular distance relation to my computer. So there is no
reason to hold that duplicate states of affairs must contain duplicate constituents. This
version of the Humean argument faces a damning dilemma: either constitution is a kind
of composition or it isn’t, but in either case the argument doesn’t work.
Things don’t fare any better for necessary excluders. It is less obvious how to
understand duplication for the higher-order totality state of affairs. But however we
understand it, we have a problem. For the excluding power of the totality state of affairs
doesn’t seem to be a matter of its intrinsic nature, but rather its extrinsic nature. Think
about when the totality state of affairs exists, it exists when a particular sum of first-order
states of affairs bears the totaling relation to the property of being a first-order state of
affairs. And they only bear this relation when that sum of states of affairs are all of the
first-order states of affairs, that is, when there are no first-order states that are not among
the sum, which is clearly an extrinsic fact. The totality state’s excluding power is an
extrinsic matter, and so it isn’t preserved under duplication. Hence, we cannot apply the
Humean argument here.
Ross Cameron (2008: 41-42) has argued that we can run the Humean argument if
we understand duplication of states of affairs in a particular way.66 He holds that it is an
intrinsic matter what particular constituent a state of affairs contains. According to
Cameron “it appears to be intrinsic to a state of affairs of a thing being a certain way that
it is a state of affairs of that very thing, and not some other thing, being that very way,
66

Though, Cameron has doubts about the Humean principle undergirding the argument. Further, he objects to
appealing the totality states of affairs as truthmakers for negative truths, instead he takes the entire world as their
truthmaker.
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and not some other way.”67 So if a state of affairs S contains a, then every duplicate of S
contains a; it’s not enough for a state of affairs to contain a duplicate of a, it must contain
a itself. Now, if it is intrinsic to a state of affairs that it contain the particular constituents
that it does, then any duplicate of the state of affairs must contain those very constituents.
In that case, it will be intrinsic to the totality state of affairs that it excludes duplicates of
unicorns. For consider our actual totality state of affairs that involves the sum of all
first-order state of affairs totaling the property of being a first-order state of affairs. Since
there are no actual unicorns, there are no actual first-order states of affairs that involve a
unicorn. So no totality state of affairs that contains this same sum of first-order state of
affairs will include a first-order state of affairs that involves a unicorn. Since on this view
duplicate states of affairs contain the same constituents, it follows that no duplicate of our
totality state of affairs contains a first-order state of affairs that involves a unicorn.
Finally, a totality state of affairs that involves a sum totaling the property of being a
first-order state of affairs cannot coexist with any first-order state of affairs that is not a
part of the sum that is a constituent of the totality of state of affairs; in particular, it
cannot coexist with a first-order state of affairs involving a unicorn that isn’t a part of the
sum that is a constituent. From all of this it follows that no duplicate of our totality state
of affairs can coexist with a first-order state of affairs involving a unicorn, and so no
duplicate of the state of affairs can coexist with a unicorn. Assuming that the property of
being a unicorn is preserved under duplication, it follows that no duplicate of the totality
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state of affairs can coexist with a duplicate of the unicorn, giving us our un-Humean
necessary connection.
However, I think it’s a mistake to hold that every duplicate of a state of affairs S
contains the same constituents as S. It is important for the notion of duplication to
distinguish qualitative properties from non-qualitative properties.68
properties characteristically depend on particular objects.

Non-qualitative

When we refer to these

properties we generally do so by way of reference to particular objects. Non-qualitative
properties are properties like being identical with Socrates, being Alexander the Great’s
teacher, etc. When considering the notion of duplication and the corresponding notion of
intrinsicness, it is important to make this distinction and set aside non-qualitative
properties. After all, it seems like being identical with Socrates is intrinsic to Socrates, it
doesn’t depend on anything outside of Socrates, but we wouldn’t want to hold that every
duplicate of Socrates is identical with Socrates, clearly Socrates could have a duplicate
that was not identical with him. So for the sense of intrinsic that matters for duplication,
and in terms of which we are understanding Hume’s Dictum, we must set aside
non-qualitative properties.
This carries over to states of affairs. The property of containing a particular a as a
constituent is a non-qualitative property and so should not be preserved under
duplication. After all, assuming that constitution is a kind of composition, intuitively it
seems like if a is a duplicate of b, then the state of affairs of a’s being F is a duplicate of
the state of affairs of b’s being F.69
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For discussion on the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties see Cowling (2015).
Earlier in Cameron (2008) he argues against holding that it is intrinsic to a set that it contains the particular
members that it does. He gives a diagnosis for why we might mistakenly think that this is intrinsic to the set.
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At any rate, we should deny that it is intrinsic to a state of affairs that it contain
the particular constituents that it does.

And so Cameron’s formulation of Lewis’s

Humean argument against necessarily excluding states of affairs doesn’t go through.
So we haven’t found a way to get the Humean argument to work. As far as I can
see the argument from HD against states of affairs is unsuccessful. However, there is a
successful Humean argument against the totaling relation that totality states of affairs
contain as a constituent. The details will need to wait until we have the full version of
HD on the table to work with. But the basic idea is that whenever a sum bears the
totaling relation to a property F, that necessarily excludes any instance of F that isn’t a
part of the sum. However, we’ll see that HD rules out necessary exclusions like this.

2.1.5 Moral Properties

For good measure, let’s consider one final application of HD to show that its
applications are not limited only to issues of interest to analytic metaphysicians. It also
has applications in meta-ethics. A prominent view in the metaphysics of moral properties
holds that moral properties are entirely distinct from non-moral properties.70 On this
view, there is no sense in which moral properties reduce to, are analyzed in terms of, or

Ironically, two points of the diagnosis are applicable to holding that it is intrinsic to a states of affairs that it has the
particular constituents that it has. First, it may trade on confusing the distinction between intrinsic and essence. It is
essential to a state of affairs that it contain the particulars that it does, even though it is not intrinsic to it. Second,
there may be a de re/de dicto confusion here. It is not intrinsic to a state of affairs that it contains the constituents it
does, but it is intrinsic that it contains constituents that are a certain way; the way that its actual constituents are.
The former claim is de re, whereas the latter is de dicto.
70
This view is famously associated with Moore (1903). For a contemporary defense of this view, see Shafer-Landau
(2003).
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are constituted by non-moral properties. Further, most of us hold that moral properties
supervene on non-moral properties. Take a paradigmatically morally bad situation, and
describe that situation in purely descriptive terms. Most of us accept that any world
containing that purely descriptive situation instantiates the same moral properties.71 But
here we have a violation of HD. If the moral properties are entirely distinct from the
non-moral properties, then HD should allow us to rearrange how the properties are
instantiated so that the moral properties fail to supervene on the non-moral properties.
HD advises us to reject the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, or reject the
distinctness of the moral and the non-moral.72
This lengthy survey of applications will serve us with enough fodder for
understanding HD. We can now turn to consider HD’s theoretical role as a principle of
plenitude.

2.2 Principles of Plenitude

The constraint of being adequate requires that our formulation of HD is adequate
for playing the theoretical role of being a principle of plenitude. A principle of plenitude
tells us about the extent of possibility. Think of a principle of plenitude as a kind of
axiom of modality that tells you that some propositions are possible. Often these
principles are conditional in form, telling you that if some propositions are possible, then
a further proposition is possible.

71
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Perhaps we need to add some information about the rest of the world in which the situation obtains.
See Dreier (1992) discussion of supervenience of the moral on the natural.
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There are many reasons to consider principles of plenitude. Armstrong (1989)
and more recently Turner (2016) have considered whether recombination principles of
plenitude much like HD permit a reduction of modality. Several philosophers have put
forward principles of plenitude in the hopes of undergirding our modal epistemology73 or
for ruling out unattractive ‘brute’ necessities.74
Principles of plenitude are a fruitful place for inquiry into modality.

Any

plausible principle of plenitude must be strong, precise, and non-ad-hoc. These are just
the sorts of claims that admit of fruitful investigation. For we can nicely investigate the
consequences they have for the extent of possibility. The key consequence we are
concerned with is that of guaranteeing that logical space is sufficiently plenitudinous
without being too plenitudinous; that is, guaranteeing that logical space isn’t missing any
possibilities, without implying that it contains any impossibilities.
A conception of logical space can be missing possibilities in two ways. The first
way is by failing to include a specific possibility that we independently accept. For
example, if we independently accept that it is possible for the world to be governed by
Newton’s laws of mechanics, then we have grounds to reject a conception of logical
space that doesn’t include that possibility.
But a conception of logical space can also fail to include a possibility, not because
we independently accept that possibility, but because we hold that if logical space
includes some other possibilities it should include the former possibility as well.
Generally cases like this get their force because there is something arbitrary about
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See Lewis (1986: 90), Bricker (1991), Chalmers (1996), and Levine (2001).
See Chalmers (1996), Dorr (2004), and Levine (2001).
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including some possibilities, while failing to include others. Arbitrariness of this kind
typically has the form of an arbitrary gap or an arbitrary cut-off.75 As an example of an
arbitrary gap, suppose it was possible for space to have any number of dimensions except
for 6. There’s a striking gap here. If logical space includes possibilities where space has
4 dimensions, 5 dimensions, 7 dimensions, and so on; then it seems arbitrary for logical
space to not also include possibilities where space has 6 dimensions. As an example of a
cut-off, suppose space could have any number of dimensions up to 6 dimensions, but it is
not possible for it to have a greater number of dimensions. If logical space contains
possibilities where space has any number of dimensions up to 6, it is arbitrary for it to
lack possibilities where space has a greater number of dimensions. The purpose of
accepting a principle of plenitude is to rule out cases like this. The goal is to accept a
several principles of plenitude that rule out arbitrariness in logical space.
We want to formulate HD so that it can function as a principle of plenitude. By
guaranteeing that any recombination of distinct existences is possible, this principle has
great promise for functioning as a powerful principle of plenitude. In order to better
understand how HD can play this role, it’s helpful to consider how HD contributes to a
plenitudinous conception of logical space alongside other principles of plenitude. Let’s
consider Bricker’s (1991) conception of plenitude where HD plays a key role. He divides
up principles of plenitude into three varieties. First are principles that tell us what
properties and individuals are possible. For example, alien properties may be possible;
that is, properties that are not instantiated in the actual world and cannot be constructed
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Lewis (1986: 86) discusses gaps and Bricker (1991: 610-611) discusses both gaps and cut-offs.
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from actually instantiated properties. If these sorts of properties are possible, then a
principle of plenitude will guarantee that.
Second are principles of recombination. Our concern is with these sorts of
principles. They tell you that if several things are possible, then those things are modally
recombinable. There are worlds that correspond to every way that those objects can be
recombined. A strong principle of recombination should tell you that if a donkey is
possible and a dragon is possible, then there is a world where a duplicate of the donkey
and a duplicate of the dragon coexist, a world where just a duplicate of the dragon exists,
a world where just a duplicate of the donkey exists, and a world where there is no
duplicate of either.
Lastly are principles of plenitude for structures. These principles characterize the
sort of structures that the patterns of recombination can exhibit. For example, these
principles tell us whether it is possible for there to be a spacetime larger than our own
spacetime; for example, one where the cardinality of the spacetime points is greater than
the continuum.

76

As I mentioned, my concern is with the second sort of principle. But it is
important to keep the other principles in mind, so we can better determine if something is
best handled by a principle of recombination or by a different principle. For example, the
issue of the possible size of spacetime could be translated into an issue regarding
recombination: can we recombine objects so many times that they generate a spacetime
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As an example of a principle of possible structures, Bricker (1991: 617) puts forward the following: where S is a
class of possible structures, any structure belonging to any natural generalization of S is possible. A natural
generalization is a relation that holds between a class C and a subclass of C, where this relation is natural in Lewis’s
sense of natural properties and relations.
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larger than the continuum? However, while the question can be posed in this manner, I
think it is clear that this issue is best left to be characterized by a principle of possible
77

structures, rather than recombination.

A strong principle of recombination tells us that recombinations of possible
objects corresponds to possibilities. But this is just another way of articulating HD. For
if the objects can be freely recombined then they are not necessarily connected to one
another. Before, our slogan for HD was: there are no necessary connections between
distinct existences.

We can rephrase this as: distinct existences are modally

recombinable. This allows us to think of HD as offering a strong principle of plenitude
for recombination. Anti-Humeans, opponents of HD, will reject these strong principles,
objecting that they incorrectly classify impossibilities as possible. Instead, anti-Humeans
may offer weaker principles as replacements.
In order for HD to function as a principle of plenitude, we get a grip on the form
that HD must take. First, HD should not only apply to only two objects as it is often
78

formulated, rather it should apply to any number of objects.

Otherwise, HD’s ability to

generate possibilities would be too limited. Further, in order to fully recombine objects,
HD must both prohibit necessary inclusions as well as necessary exclusions, as both are
necessary connections.

As Lewis puts it: “anything can coexist with anything
79

else...anything can fail to coexist with anything else.”

Lastly, it is not enough that

objects can coexist or fail to coexist, we must also be able to rearrange them. If we take
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Cf. Lewis’s (1986b: 89) proviso on his principle of recombination: “size and shape of spacetime permitting.”
For example, the formulation of HD in Wilson (2010) is limited to two objects.
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Lewis (1986: 88).
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dragons and donkeys to be possible, we don’t merely want a world where a dragon and a
donkey coexist, but a world where a dragon is adjacent to a donkey.
Now that we have a sense of the Humean tradition and the theoretical role of
being a principle of plenitude, we can go about formulating a principle that satisfies the
four constraints that I began the chapter with. That is the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
FORMULATING HUME’S DICTUM

3.1 Formulation

In the last chapter I distinguished four constraints that an adequate formulation of
HD must satisfy. We can now use those constraints as a guide to formulating HD. A
natural starting point is to look to Lewis for a formulation of HD, as he made use of HD
as a principle of plenitude.80 Lewis used a rough-and-ready formulation of the principle
that says that any number of duplicates of any number of things can coexist or fail to
coexist with any number of duplicates of anything else, in any spatiotemporal
arrangement. This rough-and-ready statement of the principle has been more rigorously
formulated by David Efird and Tom Stoneham (with refinements from George Darby and
Duncan Watson) as:

(1) For any sequence of objects x1, x2, ..., xα and any appropriate α-place spatiotemporal
relation there is a world which contains numerically distinct objects y1, y2, ..., yα such that
yi duplicates xi and the y’s stand in that spatiotemporal relation and there’s nothing else
81

that isn’t a part of the sum of the duplicates.
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Lewis (1986b: 86-92).
See Efird and Stoneham (2008) for the original proposal. See Darby and Watson (2010) for refinement of that
proposal. Here I give the refined version. The Darby-Watson refinement clarifies some ambiguities in the original
proposal. It’s also intended to handle a problem with gunk, but see Bricker (Forthcoming B) for criticism.
81
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Think of (1) as a principle that allows us to ‘plug in’ a sequence of objects and an
accompanying spatiotemporal relation, and thereby guarantee a world with duplicates of
the objects in the sequence that instantiate that spatiotemporal relation. The sequence of
objects that we plug in can be of any length, including an infinite length or even proper
82

class length.

The sequence can include multiple instances of numerically identical

objects. This allows us to get multiple duplicates of the same object. For each member
of the sequence, the principle gives us a duplicate of that member, so we can get n
duplicates of a single object by admitting n instances of that object in the sequence. The
final ‘and there’s nothing else...’ clause rules out necessary connections. If x does not
show up in the sequence used to generate a world, then unless a duplicate of x is a part of
the mereological sum of the duplicates, no duplicate of x will be in that world. Of course,
if a duplicate of an object is a part of the sum of the duplicates, then it will be a part of
that world. But this is no problem for the Humean, for the duplicate of x is not distinct
from the sum of the rest of the duplicates. For example, if Socrates is plugged into the
sequence, then a duplicate of Socrates will exist at the generated world. A duplicate of
Socrates’ arm will also exist at this world, since this duplicate is a part of the sum of the
duplicates. This implies that there is a necessary connection between Socrates and his
arm, which is a welcome result since they are not distinct, and should be necessarily
connected. This amounts to understanding distinct existences in mereological terms;
objects are distinct just in case they are mereologically distinct from one another.
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Of course, a principle of plenitude for possible structures could restrict our principle of recombination so that
sequences of some lengths will never generate a world. For example, if our principle of structures does not permit
worlds with proper class many objects, then there will not be any spatiotemporal relation with proper class many
places. We might have sequences that are proper class long, but without any proper class place spatiotemporal
relation, no worlds will be generated with these sequences.
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This principle is a good starting point for us. However, there are two reasons to
be dissatisfied with the principle. First, Darby and Watson do not tell us precisely what
they mean by an ‘appropriate α-place spatiotemporal relation.’ Perhaps they intend to
rule out cases like the following: consider four square objects of the same size, arranged
in a two-by-two grid. There is a spatiotemporal relation that these four objects bear to
one another. But four objects that have different shapes or sizes from one another cannot
bear this spatiotemporal relation, since if the object had different shapes or sizes from one
another, then they cannot form a two-by-two grid. Darby and Watson might hold that this
spatiotemporal relation is not appropriate to four objects with different shapes and sizes.
But surely a full account of HD should explain this notion. This is especially pressing
because it leaves room for the Humean’s opponent to explain how non-Humean
necessary connections are consistent with (1).

Whenever (1) is used to produce a

recombination that violates an apparent necessary connection, one could always complain
that the recombination involves a spatiotemporal relation that is not appropriate to the
relata. A further explanation is necessary.
A second concern with (1) is that it sacrifices neutrality in two ways. First, the
only fundamental relations that it countenances are spatiotemporal, as seen by the
spatiotemporal relation in which we are placing the duplicates. But there might be
fundamental relations that are not spatiotemporal.83

For example, suppose there are

fundamental causal and nomic relations, or fundamental relations characteristic of
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Indeed, according to some speculative physical theories, spatiotemporal relations are not even fundamental in the
actual world.
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abstract entities like the set membership relation or the instantiation relation. The
Humean will still want to recombine objects with respect to these relations.
Secondly, gives us a world where nothing else exists that is not a part of the
mereological sum of the duplicates. This amounts to understanding distinct existences in
purely mereological terms.84

But suppose there were a non-mereological form of

composition. Humeans would not want to freely recombine objects that overlap one
another with respect to this non-merological form of composition, for they are not distinct
existences.
So we want a way of making sense of the notion of an ‘appropriate spatiotemporal
relation’. We also want a principle that applies to all fundamental relations. Finally, we
want to have a more neutral way of spelling out distinctness between objects.
It’s fairly straightforward to broaden the notion of distinctness, so let’s start there.
We should broaden the notion of distinctness to include any of kind of composition. If
the only kind of composition is mereological, then we get the Lewisian view of
distinctness above. However, if other forms of composition are accepted, then we will
get a different notion of distinctness. But this raises the following question: why stop
there? Why not broaden the notion of distinctness to other kinds of relations? The
answer is that, for the Humean, there is an intimate connection between compositional
relations and intrinsic properties that other relations don’t have. If P is an intrinsic
property, then the property of having a part that is a P is also an intrinsic property.85 But
this isn’t true of non-compositional relations. This connection nicely explains why the
84

By a mereological form of composition, I mean one that obeys the axioms of classical extensional mereology. See
for example, Lewis (1991: 72-75).
85
For more discussion see Sider (2007: 70-79).
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Humean would want to count objects as not distinct if one composes the other, for this
allows the Humean to avoid a commitment to possibilities where a whole’s intrinsic
properties do not match its parts’ intrinsic properties.

Further, it explains why

non-compositional relations do not make for a lack of distinctness, for non-compositional
relations don’t involve this connection to intrinsic properties. So in order ensure a more
neutral way of understanding distinctness, I will understand it in terms of composition.
We will want our principle to encode a notion of distinctness according to which two
objects are distinct just in case neither composes the other. The most natural way to do
that is in how we interpret the definition of duplicates. In the first chapter, I defined
duplicates in the standard way in terms of a mereological notion of parthood. We should
generalize this so that the notion of parthood in the definition of duplicates can be any
form of composition. So the term ‘part’ in the definition of duplication should be
interpreted so as to apply to any notion of composition.
Let’s now extend the notion of a spatiotemporal arrangement to accommodate
other fundamental relations; along the way we’ll see that we can explain the notion of an
‘appropriate’ spatiotemporal relation.

Here I draw on the approach in Bricker’s

“Principles of Plenitude.” On his approach, we can characterize a possible world in terms
86

of two features; the structure and the contents.

If we give a structure, and then assign

contents to places in that structure, then we have settled all the facts about that world.
Different philosophers will draw the line between structure and contents in different
ways.

For example, on Lewis’s view the structure is purely spatiotemporal, and
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Bricker (Forthcoming A: 22-26). The definitions and framework below have been inspired by this approach, but I
deploy them differently.
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everything else comprises the contents.87

This fits well with Efird and Stoneham’s

principle, where their notion of an ‘α-place spatiotemporal relation’ corresponds to a
purely spatiotemporal structure. Our strategy will be to accommodate all fundamental
relations, even those that are not spatiotemporal, into the structure of the world.
Start by considering the pattern of instantiation of all spatiotemporal relations in
our world. This pattern corresponds to a spatiotemporal structure containing places that
objects can occupy. We can generalize this to relations that are not spatiotemporal.
Think of the pattern of instantiation of all of the fundamental relations in our world. This
pattern also corresponds to a structure with places that objects can occupy. We can treat
this structure in the same way that we treat the spatiotemporal structure.
On a view where the only fundamental relations are spatiotemporal ones, the
structures are purely spatiotemporal.

This fits nicely with either a relationalist or

supersubstantivalist view of spacetime.

On a dualistic substantivalist view, where

spacetime and material objects are distinct from one another, the structure of the world
will be more complex. On this view, the structure will code in facts about spatiotemporal
relations between regions and objects, as well as facts about what objects are located at
what regions. First, there are places in the structure that regions and points occupy, and
these places characterize the spatiotemporal relations that the regions and points bear to
one another. Second, there are places in the structure that material objects occupy, and
these characterize how the located at relation holds between material objects and regions.
We can think of the spatiotemporal relations that material objects bear to one another as
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This is his view in his (1986b: 86-92). Later, Lewis (2009) generalizes his approach to allow for the
recombination of ‘abstract parts’ of worlds such as properties and relations.
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being derivative on the located at relation and the spatiotemporal relations between
regions and points. Naturally, adding more fundamental relations will produce a more
complex structure.88 It is important to keep in mind the distinction between occupying a
place in the structure, and being located at a region of spacetime. These are different
relations. The relation of occupying a place is a relation that an object bears to an
abstract structure of fundamental relations. The relation of being located at a region of
spacetime is a relation that holds between a material object and a region of spacetime.
This informal discussion gives an idea of what I have in mind by a structure, but
it’s worth making this more precise. A standard way to study structures is by making use
of the tools from model theory.89 The usual way of defining a structure in model theory
proceeds by taking a domain of elements, a set of predicates, and an assignment function
that maps each n-ary predicate to a set of n-tuples from the domain; the assignment maps
each predicate to its extension in the model.90 When we define models this way, they are
best thought of as modelling linguistic structures. However, in formulating HD, our
interest is not in language, but rather worldly features that language represents. So
instead of using predicates, I’ll use the relations that the predicates express.
A further issue that needs to be addressed is what objects inhabit the domains in
our structure. We’ll want our structures to be capable of being instantiated in different
worlds and by different objects, so it is best to have the domain inhabited by objects that
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In the appendix to this chapter, I explore an alternative version of dualistic substantivalism approach that does
away with the located at relation by allowing spacetime regions and material objects to occupy the same place in the
structure.
89
I have drawn inspiration from Hawthorne and Russell (Forthcoming) who also make use of tools from model
theory in characterizing the structure of a world.
90
Model-theoretic structures can also have functions and distinguished elements, but we won’t need to make use of
these in formulating HD.
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are guaranteed to exist in every world. To keep things simple, I’ll only allow pure sets in
the domain. We can now formulate the following official definition of a structure:

Structure A structure is any ordered triple <D, R, f>, where D is a domain of pure
sets, R is a set of fundamental relations, and f is an assignment function that maps
every n-ary relation in R to a set of n-tuples from the domain.91

It will be useful to make use of some terminology. Call a member of D in a
structure a place in the structure. If the assignment function maps R to a set of n-tuples
then we say that those n-tuples are in the extension of R in that structure. Intuitively, the
structure represents the members of the n-tuple instantiating R. If an n-tuple is in the
extension of R in a structure, it is often convenient to speak informally and say that the
n-tuple instantiates R in the structure. Two structures S and S* are isomorphic just in case
there is a one-to-one correspondence f between the domains of the structures such that,
for all x1, …, xn in S, x1, …, xn are in the extension of R in S iff f(x1), …, f(xn) are in the
extension of R in S*.
Let’s focus on the components of structures. Notice that we get a different
structures simply by swapping which members are in the domain. But these differences
do not matter when it comes to the pattern of instantiation of the fundamental relations.
Fortunately this won’t raise a problem for my framework for formulating HD. When I
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It is standard to define structures set-theoretically. However, this won’t be adequate if we wish to consider
structures that have as many elements as there are sets, for then the domain will have too many elements to form a
set. In that case, we will instead need to define structures using different tools. We could instead use the resources
of plural logic, class theory, or higher-order logic to define structures.
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later define what it is for a world to instantiate a structure, it will be a consequence of that
definition that whenever a world instantantiates a structure, it also instantiates every other
isomorphic structure.
Let’s now consider the relations in R. I’m thinking of the relations that go in R as
having quiddities; the relations have a primitive thisness.

So there is a primitive

difference between relations. This also implies that we get a different structure simply by
swapping relations, either by swapping which relations are in R, or by swapping the
extension of relations.
Some might deny this quiddistic conception of relations. Instead of taking the
relations to be fundamental and defining structures in terms of them, we could instead
take structures to be fundamental and define relations in terms of the structures. On such
a view, one could deny that merely swapping relations will give rise to a different
structure. Call this the structure-first view and my view the relations-first view. The
dispute between these two approaches is a deep one that I cannot enter into here.
Fortunately, this dispute is mostly orthogonal to the issues that I focus on in this
dissertation.

From the perspective of the structure-first theorist, I draw distinctions

between structures and between worlds that aren’t there to make; from my perspective
the structure-first theorist identifies structures and worlds that are distinct. But this is a
matter of how fine-grained logical space is, whereas in this dissertation I’m primarily
interested in the extent of logical space.
Let’s now consider some structures. Let’s first consider the simpler case of a pure
spatiotemporal structure, which would be most appropriate for supersubstantivalism and
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relationalism.

For the supersubstantivalist, if the spacetime we are modeling has

continuum many points, then the domain will contain continuum many elements. For the
relationalist, there will be as many elements as there are material objects. Now what
about the relations? There are a range of options that we could use for the fundamental
spatiotemporal relations. For a simple case, we could use the relations of the form x is
between y and z and the distance between x and y is congruent with the distance between
z and w; in other words the betweenness relation and the congruence relation.92 So on
this approach we only have two relations. We now have an array of different structures,
based on different ways of assigning extensions to these relations.
Let’s now consider the more complex case of dualistic supersubstantivalism.
Here we have continuum many elements for points, and some further elements for the
material objects. We still have our relations of betweenness and congruence, but now we
add the located at relation that holds between material objects and spacetime regions. We
now have a variety of different structures given by different ways of assigning extensions
to these relations.
We can also accommodate universals or tropes in structures.
different approaches depending on one’s favored ontology.

We can take

One might adopt an

instantiation approach to properties. Our structures can accommodate this approach by
including enough structure to characterize which individuals instantiate which properties.
Our structures will have an instantiation relation and places for individuals and properties
to occupy. Alternatively, one might eschew individuals and adopt the bundle theory. On
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Tarski (1959) uses these two relations to provide an axiomatization of Euclidean geometry.
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this view, the world fundamentally consists of properties that are bundled together. So
our domain will only include places for properties to occupy, and the structure includes
the bundling relation these properties bear to one another.93 Finally, one might adopt a
states of affairs approach. On this approach, there are places for properties, places for
individuals, and places for states of affairs. Properties and individuals relate to states of
affairs by being constituents of the states of affairs. So the key relation that combines
these three types of entities is a constituency relation.
In the previous chapter, I argued that we should think of each instance of a
universal as a distinct existence so that HD will rule out necessary connections between
distinct instances of a universal. In order to treat each instance of a universal as a distinct
existence in our structures, we should allow universals to occupy multiple places in the
structure. Here’s an example of how this would work. Suppose we have two particulars
that instantiate the same universal. The structure that corresponds to this world will
include a place for each of the particulars, and it will include two places for the universal,
one for each instance of the universal. On this approach, HD will imply that if a
universal occupies a place in the structure, then it isn’t necessary that it occupy a distinct
place in the structure.
We now need to make precise how a world instantiates a structure. Intuitively, a
world instantiates a structure just in case the objects in the world bear the fundamental
relations in the way that the structure says they do.
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More precisely: a world w

Bricker (2017) proposes a conception of structure where more than one entity can occupy the same place. He
makes use of a trope ontology, where multiple tropes can be assigned the same place in the structure. The
definitions that I make use of here will need to be modified in order allow for the approach. However, I relegate the
details to the appendix.
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instantiates a structure S iff there is a function f that maps the elements in the domain of
S to objects in w such that, for all places x1, …, xα in S, x1, …, xα are in the extension of R
in S iff f(x1), …, f(xα) instantiate R in w. Every place in S must be mapped to some object,
and every object in w must have some place mapped to it. The function can be many-one
in order to accommodate universals, for universals will generally have more than one
place mapped to them. Note that the definition requires that every object in w must have
a place mapped to it, so the definition requires that the entire world instantiates the
structure, rather than merely a part of the world.
If a world instantiates a structure, and the function maps an object to a place in the
structure, then say that the object occupies that place relative to that function. If a
structure has symmetries in it, then there will be more than one function from the places
to the objects in the world. For example, consider a world containing only two simples
bearing a symmetrical relation to one another. The structure that corresponds to this
world contains only two places with a symmetrical relation between them, so the world
instantiates this structure by way of two functions, since either place can be mapped to
either object. The two objects occupy both places in the structure, though relative to
different functions.
It is clear from the definition of a world instantiating a structure that the elements
in the domain of the structure are irrelevant to whether a world instantiates a structure.
So whenever a world instantiates a structure S, it also instantiates every other structure
that is isomorphic to S.
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To say that a structure is possible is to say that some possible world instantiates
that structure, rather than merely a part of some world. I am not committed to the claim
that every structure is possible.

Given plausible assumptions about fundamental

relations, the claim that every structure is possible will lead to quite bizarre possibilities.
For example, given a parthood relation, there will be structures that violate every
interesting axiom of parthood. There are structures where parthood fails to be transitive,
or where it is symmetrical. Given very plausible views about how fundamental relations
can be instantiated, not every structure is possible.94
Having generalized Efird and Stoneham’s spatiotemporal relations to structures,
we now need a way of arranging objects in the structures. What we need is a mapping
from the places in a possible structure to a set of objects. Now, places are just pure sets,
so this is just a mapping from pure sets to objects. We also need to include which
structure the mapping involves. With this in mind we can define an assignment as an
ordered pair <S, f>, where S is any possible structure, and f is a function mapping the
95

places in S to a set of entities.

Assignments allow us to recombine entities in structures,

which will be a convenient way of characterizing a Humean principle of recombination.
The assignment can map multiple places to the same entity. This allows us to have
assignments that correspond to worlds with multiple duplicates of the same entity. For
example, if a material object is assigned to two places, then the corresponding world will
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See Bricker (1991) for discussion of what structures are possible. Dorr (2004) holds that any logically consistent
sentence containing only logical expressions and predicates for fundamental properties and relations is possibly true,
which seems to imply that any structure is possible. See Russell and Hawthorne (Forthcoming) for an interesting
discussion of the consistency of holding that every structure is possible and that everything can be recombined into a
single world.
95
As before, if we are assigning as many objects as there are sets, then we will need to use resources other than set
theory in order to define the notion of an assignment.
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have two duplicates of that object, one in each place. It is also desirable for universals,
since universals can occupy more than one place in a structure.
The restriction to possible structures is important here. This will ensure that our
formulation of HD is consistent with whatever principle of possible structure we accept.
For example, if we hold that it is impossible for there to be more than continuum many
objects, then there will be no possible structure that contains more than continuum many
places. Since assignments are defined in terms of possible structures, if there are no
possible structures containing more than continuum many places, then there will be no
assignments that involve such structures. I will formulate HD in terms of assignments,
guaranteeing that HD is consistent with whatever principles of possible structures we
accept.
We’ve generalized spatiotemporal relations to structures, and we’ve generalized
the idea of assigning objects to places in a spatiotemporal system to assignments. We
now need to make sense of the notion of an ‘appropriate’ assignment.

If any

compositional relations are fundamental, then structures include compositional relations.
For example, a typical spatiotemporal structure will have a parthood relation that holds
between places that structures those places into points and regions of spacetime.
Assuming that at least some compositional relations are fundamental, we cannot allow
assignments to be just any mapping of places in a structure to objects, since the structures
include the compositional relations. Suppose we assigned a mereologically complex
object to a place that does not have any places assigned to be its parts; so according to the
structure, the place has no parts. This gives us a mismatch; any duplicate of the object
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must be mereologically complex, but anything that occupies that place in the structure
must be mereologically simple. We must require that assignments avoid this mismatch.
Whenever an assignment assigns a place P in a structure S to an object x, x must match P
in that the relations between the parts of x must be the same as the relations the structure
assigns to the places that are assigned to be the parts of P. Put more precisely: there must
be a one-to-one function f from the parts of x and the places that the assignment assigns
to be the parts of P such that, for all x1, …, xα that are parts of x, x1, …, xα bear
fundamental relation R iff f(x1), …, f(xα) are in the extension of R in S. Call this the
matching constraint.

This ensures that there is no mismatch between the relations

instantiated by the parts of an object and the relations instantiated by the parts of the
place that the object occupies. Return to my example above of four square objects of the
same size arranged in a grid. If the size and shape of these objects is purely a matter of
the relations between the parts of the objects, then assignments that satisfy the matching
constraint can only assign objects with the same size and shape to those places in the
structure. Of course, on some views, the size and shape of an object is not purely a
matter of the relations between the object’s parts, but also depends on the relations the
object bears to distinct objects.96 This view allows that an object can have a different size
and shape from one of our squares, but have the same relations between its parts. The
matching constraint allows that this object can be assigned to one of the square places in
the structure, but in a world where the object occupies the place it will be the same size
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For discussion, see McDaniel (2007) and Skow (2007).
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and shape as our squares. On such a view, the size and shape of an object is not intrinsic
to that object.
We want to ensure that every place in a structure is assigned an object, however, it
isn’t necessary that the assignment explicitly map an object to every place. For example,
suppose we accept universal composition; the principle that for any plurality, there is a
fusion of that plurality. Suppose further that we adopt the plausible principle that a whole
‘inherits’ the location of its parts; that is, if a is the fusion of some xxs, then a is located at
the fusion of where the xxs are located. If these principles are necessary, then an
assignment need only map the xxs to places, and we are guaranteed that their fusion will
be ‘assigned’ a place as well. Though, this is not explicitly part of the assignment, it is
implicitly guaranteed by universal composition and the inheritance principle, and these
principles are coded into the structures. The necessity of these principles implies that
they are preserved in every possible structure.
Not only do we not need to explicitly assign objects to every place, but in many
cases we will not want to. We want to rule out cases where we assign a to place P, but
assign objects that are not duplicates of a’s parts to places that are parts of P in the
structure.

In order to avoid these incongruities we will want to restrict how the

assignment maps objects to places. In order to lay down a further constraint, recall that
when an object matches a place in a structure there is a correspondence between the parts
of the object and the parts of the place. Say that an assignment is consistent iff whenever
the assignment maps two objects to overlapping places, the parts that correspond to the
place of overlap duplicate one another. We require that all assignments are consistent in
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order to guarantee that we will not have incongruities between objects that bear
compositional relations to one another.
We also want to guarantee that every place in the structure will be occupied, even
if the assignment does not explicitly map an object to every place. We can obtain this by
requiring that all assignments are complete; an assignment A is complete iff every place
in the structure overlaps some place that A assigns an object to.

We only want

assignments that satisfy all of these constraints that we’ve laid down, so define an
arrangement to be a consistent, complete assignment that satisfies the matching
constraint.
To get a sense of how arrangements work, let us consider how to construct an
arrangement that corresponds to the actual world. First we have the actual world’s
structure that captures the pattern of instantiation of the actual fundamental relations. We
now want a mapping of the actual objects to their places in this structure. We could
simply let every object into the arrangement, mapping each object to the place that object
occupies; even though this arrangement maps objects to overlapping places, this still
satisfies the consistency requirement. But thanks to how the compositional relations
work, we can capture all of the facts about the world, without admitting every object into
the arrangements. There is the simple arrangement where the only object that goes into
the arrangement is the fusion of everything.

Alternatively, if the world can be

exhaustively divided into simples, then we could allow only simples into the
arrangement. Naturally, there are many middle-ground approaches. These are all ways
of providing an arrangement that characterizes the actual world.
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We need one more piece of machinery to go from the arrangements to worlds.
Intuitively, a world corresponds to an arrangement if that world contains duplicates of the
objects in the arrangement instantiating the structure the way that the arrangement says
that do.

However, recall that if our ontology includes universals, then rather than

recombining duplicates of universals the Humean should recombine the universals
themselves. With this in mind, we can now be more precise. A world w corresponds to
an arrangement A iff for all x, if A assigns x to place P, then, if x is a particular then a
duplicate of x occupies P in w, and if x is a universal then x itself occupies P in w. Note
that an object can only occupy a place in a structure if the world which contains that
object instantiates that structure, so the definition of a world corresponding to an
arrangement guarantees that the world instantiates the structure contained in the
assignment.
We can now formulate our Humean principle of plenitude:

Hume’s Dictum (HD) For any arrangement there’s a world that corresponds to that
arrangement.

This principle is sufficiently general and powerful that it can serve as a principle
of plenitude. Given fairly weak claims about what objects and structures are possible,
HD guarantees a vast array of worlds in a principled manner that should be appealing to
the Humean. But it’s important to see that HD is only capable of generating worlds given
that we have possible structures and possible entities to assign to those structures. As a
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consequence, there are cases of necessities that cannot be ruled out on the basis of HD,
but instead require substantial claims about what structures or entities are possible. For
example, is it possible for non-overlapping duplicates of every possible entity to exist in a
single word? If it isn’t possible, is that not a necessary connection? But HD doesn’t
imply this possibility on its own, it only implies this given a possible structure big
enough to contain them all. Here’s a second case. Suppose that, at bottom, the world
consists of mereologically simple particles. Is it possible for there to be only one of these
particles?

If not, is that not a necessary connection? But, HD doesn’t imply this

possibility on its own either. We can’t simply remove an object and not replace it with
another without entirely replacing the structure. So in order to guarantee the possibility
of a world containing only one of the particles, we must accept the possibility of a
structure with only a single place.
What these cases demonstrate is that some necessities may superficially appear to
be a violation of free recombination, but on analysis they are really a matter of what
structure or entities are possible. I take the core Humean claim to be a claim about free
recombination, and this is adequately captured by HD. This is the principle that I will
defend in this dissertation.
HD satisfies all of the constraints laid out in the previous chapter. It is faithful, in
that it is capable of providing the needed modal principle in the Humean arguments that I
surveyed in the previous chapter - with the important exception of the extended simples
argument, which we’ll see turns out to be entirely a matter of what structures are
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possible. In the next section, we’ll consider how HD can do the required work in these
arguments.
HD is also neutral, in that it doesn’t require that the only form of composition is
mereology, nor does it require that the only fundamental relations are spatiotemporal.
HD is complete in completely capturing the idea that any recombination of distinct
existences is a possibility. Finally, it is adequate in that it is capable of playing the
theoretical roles that Hume’s Dictum is intended to play. In particular, it can serve as a
principle of plenitude, as it is capable of delivering a vast array of possibilities in a
principled, non-arbitrary manner. I will have more so say about this in chapter six where
the idea that HD serves as a better principle of plenitude than its rivals gives us reason to
accept it. This makes it worthy of the name ‘Hume’s Dictum.’
Some philosophers would object to HD, holding that an important restriction
needs to be placed on it. Suppose you accept a two-category ontology; that is, you accept
that there is an important metaphysical divide between two kinds of objects. To fix ideas,
let’s say you believe in concrete particulars and sets, and hold that there is a
metaphysically significant distinction between the two, so that they comprise two
ontological categories.97 Notice that HD does not respect the different categories objects
may belong to. For example, a duplicate of a concrete particular could be mapped to
place that a set occupies. So it appears that a duplicate of a concrete particular could be a
set, which is an unattractive result to anyone that thinks that concrete particulars and sets
form two different categories.
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See van Inwagen (2014: 183-201) for a discussion of ontological categories.

76

A natural solution is to weaken HD by imposing a restriction on it. We can
98

require that arrangements are category preserving.

The two-category metaphysician

will hold that for every place, objects from only one kind of category can occupy that
place.

We can formalize this by adding category properties to the structure, and

extending the assignment function so that it assigns each category an extension. If a
place is in the extension of category C, then the place is a C-Place. An arrangement A is
category preserving iff for all categories C, A only maps objects of category C to
C-places. However, the Humean needs to tread carefully here. In this framework,
categories are basically properties, and coding in some properties into the structure and
requiring that all recombinations respect these categories amounts to placing a restriction
on the allowable recombinations. This naturally invites the question of what justifies
treating category properties in this way.

Why are some properties coded into the

structure, but others are not? I’m not saying there aren’t good answers here, but the
Humean needs to be prepared to have an answer for the particular categories that are
used, otherwise HD threatens to be unprincipled.
This concludes my formulation of HD. In the next section, I turn to the Humean
arguments that we discussed in the previous chapter. I argue that HD can do the required
work in each of the Humean arguments, with the exception of the argument for extended
simples.

3.2 Applying HD

98

Bricker (Forthcoming A: 23-24) opts for this strategy.
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3.2.1 Laws of Nature

Let’s first consider HD’s consequences for the laws of nature. The most striking
consequence is that HD implies that the fundamental laws of nature are contingent. We
can assign objects to places in a spatiotemporal structure in such a way that there will be
a world where duplicates of the objects don’t follow trajectories that conform to the
actual laws of nature. Moreover, fundamental properties are preserved under duplication.
For example, we can assign duplicates of massive objects in a spatiotemporal structure in
such a way that those massive objects fail to attract one another. This gives us the result
that the fundamental laws are contingent.
As for the higher-level laws, whether or not they are contingent turns on how the
properties that figure in the higher-level laws are grounded in the fundamental properties.
They might be analyzed in such a way that builds in their causal and nomic relations, in
which case the laws will be necessary. For example, Alexander Bird (2001) argues that
salt is grounded in the fundamental properties in such a way that salt can only exist if
certain lower-level laws hold, but those same lower-level laws guarantee that salt will
dissolve in water. So in any world where salt exists, salt will also dissolve in water. But
we won’t have a violation of HD because those properties are not preserved under
duplication, for if we recombine duplicates so that the causal and nomic relations
between fundamental properties are radically different from those in the actual world,
then the duplicates won’t instantiate the same higher-level properties. If Bird is right, a
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duplicate of a pinch of salt in a world where the fundamental laws are radically different
won’t be salt. From the Humean point of view, being salt is an extrinsic property rather
than an intrinsic property, so there’s no need for the Humean to reject this necessity.
A further, striking consequence of HD is that a property floats free from its role in
the laws of nature, that is, it’s nomic role. Not only can a property fail to play its nomic
role, but that property could play a wide array of different nomic roles. Many object to
HD because of this implication. In chapter eight, I’ll make this implication more precise,
and argue that these objections do not give us good reason to reject HD, but for now it’s
worth simply nothing that HD has this consequence.

3.2.2 Extended Simples

The extended simples argument ends up being quite different from the Humean
arguments involving the laws of nature we just considered. As we’ll see, it depends on
claims about what structures are possible. As before, we’ll need to be mindful of the
distinction between the occupation relation that an entity bears to a place in a structure
and the located-at relation that a material objects bear to a region of space.
Now, in order for HD to imply the possibility of an extended simple, we need an
arrangement that maps a mereologically simply object to a place in a structure that
corresponds to being located at an extended region. This requires a place in a structure
that corresponds to being mereologically simple, but located at an extended region. But
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that is a matter of what structures are possible, rather than a matter of recombination in
those structures.
It’s worth thinking about what sort of principles that govern the possibility of
structures get us the desired result. This will help us to better see how the possibility of
extended simples is not a matter of recombination. It is also intrinsically interesting to
consider how to derive the possibility of extended simples in this framework. Obviously
it wouldn’t be illuminating to start with the claim that there is a possible structure that
involves a simple object located at an extended region. It would be more illuminating to
find a general conditional principle that tells us that if some structures are possible, then
so are others. We can then use this conditional principle, together with uncontroversial
claims about what structures are possible, to derive the possibility of extended simples.
Here’s a simple principle that does the trick. The intuitive idea is that if a
structure is possible, then the result of removing some elements from the structure results
in a possible structure. To make this precise, we must define the notion of a substructure.
Let S be a structure with domain D. S* is a substructure of S iff the domain D* of S* is a
subset of D and the assignment functions of the two structures agree with respect to the
objects in D*. A simple principle is:

Substructure Any substructure of a possible structure is a possible structure.

This principle does the required work. We can start with a substructure involving
a mereologically complex object located at an extended region.
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Now take the

substructure that is exactly the same except we remove all the parts of the mereological
complex object, so that it is now simple. This gives us a structure where a simple object
is located at an extended region. Since this is a possible structure, there is a possible
world that instantiates this structure. Hence, there is a world containing an extended
simple.
However, Substructure has strange consequences that many would find
implausible. With no constraints on the substructures we take, we can derive structures
that violate principles that many philosophers accept.99 If our substructure includes parts,
but not the wholes, then we will have a possible structure in which universal composition
isn’t true.

So those who accept the necessity of universal composition must reject

Substructure. Substructure also implies the possibility of a gunky object. Start with an
object with infinitely many parts, such as an extended region of space. Take the
substructure that excludes the points of space. We now have a structure with a gunky
object, but this is a controversial possibility. Perhaps most controversial of all, start with
a structure involving a composite object that decomposes into two non-overlapping parts.
By Substructure, we can remove one of those parts leaving the other part and the whole
remaining. The result will give us a structure that involves a composite object that
decomposes into a single object. In other words, we have a case where a single object
composes a further object, violating standard supplementation principles.
If we don’t add any restriction, Substructure gives us a number of controversial
possibilities that many would reject.

99

Further, these possibilities are not ones the

As noted in Bricker’s postscript to “Plenitude of Possible Structures.”
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Humeans needs to be committed to. It would be better to accept a weaker principle that
does the required work.

Bricker’s postscript to “Plenitude of Possible Structures”

suggests a weaker principle that avoids these problems. Bricker makes use of the notion
of a substructure that preserves mereological structure.

Structure S’s mereological

structure is preserved by substructure S* iff for any xxs in the domain of S*, if x is the
fusion of the xxs in S, then x is in the domain of S*, and if x is part of one of the xxs in S,
then x is in the domain of S*. We can now formulate a weaker principle governing what
structures are possible:

Substructure* Any substructure that preserves the mereological structure of a
possible structure is a possible structure.100

This principle avoids all of the controversial results that Substructure had, but it
also does not allow us to derive an extended simple. Substructure allowed us to derive
the possibility of an extended simple by deleting parts from a possible structure. But
Substructure* explicitly bans us from doing that. There is, however, a middle-ground
principle that is stronger than Substructure*, but weaker than Substructure.

This

principle that avoids the problematic consequences, but still implies the possibility of
extended simples.
This new principle differs from Substructure* in that instead of preserving the
mereological structure in the original structure, this new principle only requires that we
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Note that Bricker does not formulate this principle in the same way, but rather builds into the notion of a
substructure that every substructure preserves mereological structure.
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preserve the laws of mereology. Whatever laws of mereology there are, the principle
requires that every substructure preserves those laws. Think of the laws of mereology as
the simplest and tidiest way of formulating the truths of mereology using only logical and
mereological expressions. So, importantly, they do not include principles that connect
mereology to other notions, such as spatial notions. We can formulate this principle as:

Substructure** Any substructure of a possible structure that preserves the laws of
mereology is a possible structure.

This principle avoids the problematic cases. If universal composition and the
axiom of atomicity are both laws of mereology, then Substructure** will not allow us to
to take any substructures that violates those laws. However, our method for deriving an
extended simple remains intact, since it does not violate any laws of mereology.
Since Substructure allows for both the problematic cases and extended simples,
Substructure** allows for extended simples but not the problematic cases, and
Substructure* doesn’t allow for any of the cases, we can see the relative strength of these
principles.

Substructure is the strongest, Substructure** the second strongest, and

Substructure*

the weakest. We can accept the possibility of extended simples by

accepting Substructure** without facing the problematic results that we saw above.
Similar reasoning can allow one to derive some other interesting possibilities as
well. By removing the parts of an extended region of space, we get a substructure with a
simple extended region of space. Presumably, a mereologically complex object could
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also occupy this simple region. If we deny that the axiom of atomicity is a law of
mereology, and so we accept the possibility of gunk, then we can derive the possibility of
a non-gunky object occupying a gunky region, and a gunky object occupying a
non-gunky region.

Start with a non-gunky material object occupying a non-gunky

region, and suppose that both have continuum-many parts. If we remove the atomic parts
of the material object, we will have a substructure with a gunky material object
occupying a non-gunky region. If instead we remove the atomic parts of the region, we
will have a non-gunky object occupying a gunky region.
However, Substructure** does not allow us to get the much more bizarre
possibilities that Saucedo discusses in his “Parthood and Location.” The previous
possibilities involve a kind of ‘internal mismatch’, in that the mereological structure of a
material object doesn’t match the mereological structure of the region it occupies. There
are also ‘external mismatches’ where the locations of the parts of a whole fails to match
up with the location of that whole. Here’s an example of this sort of mismatch: some
objects compose a further object, but that object is not located at the fusion of the regions
that those objects occupy. This possibility is even more bizarre than the previous ones
because they involve a failure of the intuitive idea that a whole inherits its location from
its parts.
Assuming that unrestricted composition holds for regions, Substructure** will not
imply this possibility, for there’s no way of deriving a structure for this possibility simply
by taking substructures of possible structures.101 What kind of principle would allow us
101

The assumption of unrestricted composition for regions is required to ensure that we cannot obtain a structure
where a whole is not located at the fusion of the regions occupied by its parts simply because there is no fusion of
the regions occupied by the parts.
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to derive these possibilities? We need an even stronger principle that governs possible
structures. We can construct such a principle by greatly generalizing Substructure**.
The idea behind Substructure** is that any way of taking away members of the domain
of a possible structure that respects the laws of mereology is a possible structure. We can
generalize this by accepting a principle that says that we can freely construct possible
structures so long as they respect the individual laws that govern each fundamental
relation. The idea is that there are laws that govern the fundamental relations, but
nothing constrains how those relations interact with one another. With this guiding idea,
let’s define the notion of two structures that share a pattern of instantiation for a relation.
Structures S and S* share a pattern of instantiation for relation R iff there is a one-to-one
function f from the members of S that bear R to the members of S* that bear R such that,
for all x1, …, xn that are members of S, x1, …, xn bear R iff f(x1), …, f(xn) bear R. If a
structure S shares a pattern of instantiation for relation R with a possible structure, then
say that R’s pattern of instantiation in S is possible. We can now formulate:

Patterns If every relation in a structure S has a possible pattern of instantiation in
S, then S is a possible structure.102

Patterns allows us to derive the cases of external mismatches, for in each case the
individual patterns of instantiation of the mereological, spatial, and occupation relations
all obey the laws that govern those relations. There’s nothing bizarre about the patterns
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Saucedo (2011) defends a similar principle.
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on their own; What’s bizarre is how they interact with one another. I leave it open
whether the Humean should be committed to Patterns. One might make the case that
rejecting Patterns involves a commitment to a necessary connection, in that the denial of
Patterns implies that the fundamental relations an object bears modally constrains how it
bears other fundamental relations.

But other Humeans might reject the external

mismatches, holding that Patterns is not a matter of necessary connections, but rather a
matter of what structures are possible.
We can see from this discussion that all of the work in the argument for extended
simples is done by the principle governing what structures are possible, rather than HD.
These principles tell us that certain sorts of structures are possible; that is, that they are
instantiated by a possible world. If there’s a possible structure involving an extended
simple, then it immediately follows that an extended simple is possible, there’s no need to
rearrange anything in a structure. The upshot is that HD is not capable of doing the work
needed in this particular application. However, I don’t think that shows a failure of HD
to capture the Humean’s conception of modality. The framework I’m using allows us to
see that the extended simples argument is a matter of what structures are possible, rather
than what recombinations are possible. The possibility of extended simples doesn’t
involve a necessary connection between distinct existences, so much as it involves a
necessary connection between the pattern of instantiation of two relations: parthood and
occupation. I think the sort of necessary connections that the Humean qua Humean
resists are the former sort. In either case, it is clear that we have two very different sorts
of necessary connections, and we are better off distinguishing them. In this dissertation,
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my core interest is in defending HD. I will be officially neutral regarding which
principles of possible structures we should accept.

3.2.3 Universals, Possible Worlds, and States of Affairs

Let’s now turn to consider the applications to universals, magical ersatzist
possible worlds, and states of affairs. First, let’s consider the application to structural
universals. This application is straightforward. Suppose that the relationship between a
structural universal and its constituents is not a form of composition. In that case, HD
lets us rearrange how universals are instantiated so that a structural universal can be
instantiated by an object without its constituent universals being instantiated by any of
the object’s parts.

Of course, this application can be blocked if one accepts a

non-mereological form of composition that applies to structural universals. In that case,
even if we assign a structural universal to a place in a structure without assigning its
constituents, the corresponding world will still contain the constituent universals.
Likewise, HD can do the work in the argument against Armstrong’s conception of
laws of nature. On Armstrong’s view there is a fundamental nomic relation that holds
between universals; this relation will have its own accompanying structure, with places
that universals occupy. Recall that each instance of a universal corresponds to its own
place in a structure, so while particulars occupy only a single place in a structure,
universals occupy many places in the structure.

It is natural to accommodate a

higher-order universal like the nomic relation by adding further places to the structure for
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the first-order universals to occupy. For example, suppose we work with a structure
containing an instantiation relation. Take a structure containing two places a and b for
concrete individuals to occupy, and suppose this is a simple structure where there are
only two places for universals to occupy for each of the individuals to instantiate. We’ll
have two places, P1 and P2, for universals that a instantiates. Likewise, there is P3 and P4
for b. If we want to generate a world where both a and b instantiate universal F, then we
can assign F to P1 and P3. Importantly, in the generated world, F will occupy two
different places in the structure.
We can extend this structure so that it can accommodate Armstrong’s theory of
laws by including a nomic relation alongside the instantiation relation. This will include
further places for universals to occupy. Suppose universals F and G are assigned to
places in the structure in such a way that guarantees that it is a law that everything that is
F is G. This corresponds to there being some places P5 and P6 that F and G occupy. But
HD will allow us to assign F and G to structures in such a way that F and G occupy P5
and P6, F is assigned to P1 so that a instantiates F, but where G is not assigned to P2, so
that a is not G. This gives us a world where F is nomically related to G, but where not
every F is a G, in contradiction to Armstrong’s conception of laws of nature. So HD
rules out Armstrong’s theory of laws.
Let’s now consider the magical ersatzer’s worlds. Recall that the version of the
theory that faces an objection from HD takes the selection relation that holds between the
concrete universe and the abstract worlds to be an external relation.103 The simplest way
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Recall that an external relation is one that does not supervene on the intrinsic nature of the relata taken separately,
but does supervene on the intrinsic nature of the fusion of the relata.
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to incorporate the magical ersatzer’s world in our structures is by treating the selection
relation as a fundamental relation. Notice that the magical ersatzer’s worlds are much
like universals; perhaps they just are universals. So I propose that, with respect to HD,
we treat them in the same manner as universals. This allows us to bypass questions about
how duplication applies to the magical ersatzer’s worlds. When we assign an abstract
world to a place in a structure, the corresponding world contains that very abstract world
in that place in the structure. We can now see how HD raises a problem for the magical
ersatzer’s theory of possible worlds. According to the magical ersatzer’s theory the
worlds represent by way of their modal profile. So a world represents there being a
donkey in virtue of it being the case that necessarily if that world is selected, then there is
a donkey. But HD doesn’t allow any world to have this modal profile. For any world,
HD allows us to rearrange things so that the concrete universe doesn’t contain a donkey,
but selects that world. So HD implies that no world represents there being a donkey. HD
is inconsistent with the magical ersazter’s theory of possible worlds.104
Finally, let’s consider states of affairs. Recall that in the last chapter I concluded
that there was no way to get a Humean argument against states of affairs to work.
However, I also suggested that there is a way to run a Humean argument against the
totaling relation that is a constituent of totality states of affairs. As a reminder, the
totality relation holds between a sum of entities and a property when the sum contains
every instance of the property. We’re now in a position to see how the argument can go.
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What if the selection is external without being fundamental? In that case, the selection relation can be analyzed
in terms of some further fundamental relation R and some intrinsic properties had by either the abstract worlds or the
concrete universe. HD will allow us to recombine the worlds and the concrete universe so that they have all their
actual intrinsic properties, but where the concrete universe fails to bear R to any of the worlds that represent the
concrete universe having its actual intrinsic nature, in contradiction with the magical ersatzer’s theory.
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Let F be a fundamental property, and suppose a sum of Fs totals the property of being F.
HD allows us to recombine the property F so that a duplicate of the sum of Fs totals the
property of being F while coexisting with a distinct F that isn’t a part of the sum of Fs.
But the theory of the totaling relation rules this possibility out. If a sum of Fs totals the
property of being F, then there cannot be any Fs that aren’t a part of the sum. Hence, the
totaling relation is inconsistent with HD.
Perhaps we could avoid the inconsistency by holding that the totaling relation is
only contingently the totaling relation. To make things clearer, let’s name the totaling
relation ‘T’. So the proposal is that there are worlds where a sum of Fs bears T to the
property of being F while there is a distinct instance of F that’s not a part of the sum, but
in this world T doesn’t count as the totaling relation. This restores consistency with HD.
But it comes at the cost of giving up the point of positing the totaling relation in the first
place. The purpose of the totaling relation is to be a constituent of totality states of affairs
that are truthmakers for negative and general truths. A state of affairs can only be a
truthmaker for a truth if the existence of that state of affairs entails the truth. But if the
totaling relation could fail to be a totaling relation, then totality states of affairs can’t do
the work of truthmaking. For example, suppose we have the truth that all Fs are Gs.
Truthmaker theorists need a truthmaker for this truth. Suppose there is a state of affairs
involving a sum of the Fs bearing the relation T to the property of being F, and it turns
out that all of the Fs are Gs. But if it is possible for the same sum of Fs to bear the
relation T to the property of being F, while there exists an instance of F that isn’t a part of
the sum of Fs, then surely it’s also possible for that further instance of F to fail to be a G.
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In that case we will have the same state of affairs existing, even though not all Fs are Gs.
The existence of the state of affairs doesn’t entail that all Fs are Gs, so it can’t be a
truthmaker for that truth.

3.2.4 Moral Properties

Finally, let’s consider moral properties. This objection is wielded against a
non-naturalist moral realist. The realist component tells us that moral properties are mind
independent, and the non-naturalist component tells us that moral properties are not
reducible to non-moral properties.

Putting this together implies that some moral

properties are fundamental. Since they are fundamental, HD allows us to rearrange them
independently of the non-moral properties. For example, HD allows us to generate a
world that is indiscernible from the actual world with respect to non-moral properties, but
with the moral properties instantiated differently from how they actually are. It follows
that moral properties do not supervene on the non-moral properties.

3.2.5 Novel Applications to Composition

One advantage of formulating a fully general and precise version of HD is to
better see its consequences. My formulation of HD has some novel consequences for the
metaphysics of composition.
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The first has to do with the conditions under which a material object is a simple.
Ned Markosian (1998) has posed the question like this:

The Simple Question What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
material object’s being a simple?

Now, it is easy to define the notion of being a simple; to be simple is just to have
no parts. The Simple Question is not asking about the definition of being simple. Rather,
we’re interested in whether there are conditions under which a material object is simple
that can be stated without using any mereological terminology like ‘having no parts.’
Interestingly, HD is inconsistent with Markosian’s answer to the Simple Question.
In order to understand Markosian’s answer, we need the following definition: x is a
maximally continuous object iff x is a spatially continuous object and there is no
continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x is a proper subset of
R, and (ii) every point in R is occupied by some object or other. We can formulate
Markosian’s answer to The Simple Question:

The Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon) Necessarily, x is a simple
iff x is a maximally continuous object.105

105

Markosian (1998).
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So to be simple is to occupy a maximal, matter-filled, continuous region.
However, given some modest assumptions, HD rules out MaxCon. Consider a world w
containing two extended, maximally continuous objects o and o*, and suppose that o is
adjacent to an empty region that is the same size and shape as o*. According to Maxon o
and o* are both simples. Now take an assignment where o is assigned to the same place,
but o* is assigned to the place that corresponds to occupying the region that is adjacent to
o.

HD guarantees a world where a duplicate of o is adjacent to a duplicate of o*.

Duplicates shares their mereological structure, so the duplicates are also simples. But
since they are adjacent, the fusion of the regions they occupy is a continuous region of
space such that every point in that region is occupied by some object. So the two simples
are not maximally continuous objects in this world. Hence, HD implies that being a
maximally continuous objects is not necessary for being simple. If it is possible for these
two objects to compose a further object while remaining adjacent, then it will follow that
being a maximally continuous object is not sufficient for being simple either, since the
fusion of these two simples is a maximally continuous object. Intuitively, HD implies
that whether or not an object is a simple does not depend on what’s going on in the
environment around that object; one can freely rearrange the environment of an object
and still have a possibility. MaxCon, on the other hand, implies that whether or not an
object is a simple depends on the object’s environment; it depends on whether the object
is surrounded by a continuous patch of matter.
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It is interesting to compare my Humean argument against MaxCon, to a similar
argument in the literature. McDaniel (2003) objects to MaxCon by appealing to the
following principle:

Supervenience of Constitution (SoC) Necessarily, for any portion of matter that
constitutes some object x, any duplicate of that portion of matter constitutes a
duplicate of x.

SoC is inconsistent with MaxCon, as the following example from Markosian
(2004) shows. Consider a statue that is maximally spatially continuous. MaxCon implies
that the statue is a simple. Since the statue has no parts, there is no object corresponding
to what we would call the left arm of the statue. Now suppose that there is also a statue
of only a left arm, and that the matter that constitutes this statue is a duplicate of the
portion of matter that constitutes what we call the left arm of the statue. So according to
MaxCon, there is no left arm of the first statue, but there is the second statue. But since
there are two duplicate portions of matter, we have a violation of SoC.
Note that HD and SoC, do not imply one another. That SoC doesn’t imply HD
should be clear. To see that HD doesn’t imply SoC, first note that HD doesn’t require an
ontology of both stuff (portions of matter) and things (objects constituted by the matter).
But even if we adopted that ontology, HD doesn’t imply SoC. The structures will include
the constitution relation, and will have places for matter as well as the objects constituted
by the matter. HD is consistent with it not being necessary that every portion of matter
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constitutes some object.106 In that case, there will be structures with a place for a portion
of matter, but where there is no accompanying place for an object constituted by that
portion of matter. Consider a portion of matter that does constitute a further object and
suppose that the relations the parts of that portion bear to one another are the same as
those that hold between the parts, the pps, of a portion of matter that doesn’t constitute a
further object. We can assign the pps to the places in the structure that correspond to a
portion of matter that does constitute an object. HD guarantees a world where there is a
portion of matter that constitutes an object, but where that matter is a duplicate of the pps,
which do not constitute an object. HD is consistent with a counterexample to SoC, so
HD does not imply SoC, giving us a distinct objection to MaxCon. I also find this
objection more illuminating, because it doesn’t depend on considering how a stuff
ontology relates to a thing ontology. The objection from HD more directly applies to
MaxCon, rather than bringing in other metaphysical machinery.
Let’s consider a second important issue in the metaphysics of composition. This
is the widely discussed question of the conditions under which composition occurs. van
Inwagen (1990) has put the question like this:

The Special Composition Question What necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions must the xxs satisfy in order for it to be the case that there is an object
that the xxs compose?
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If it is necessary that any portion of matter constitutes an object, then SoC trivially holds.
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Given a plausible assumption, HD is inconsistent with van Inwagen’s answer to
this question. His proposal is that composition occurs just when some objects constitute
a life. More precisely:

van Inwagen’s Answer Necessarily, for any xxs, there is an object composed of the
xxs iff either (i) the activity of the xxs constitutes a life or (ii) there is only one of
the xxs.

So the only objects with proper parts are living beings.
However, given a key assumption, HD rules out this proposal. Start with a world
where there is a living thing, and consider the structure of this world. The structure
involves several simples composing a further thing, and in the world this structure is
instantiated by the living thing and its parts. HD allows us to freely assign simples to
those places in the structure and this guarantees that the simples bear the same relations
to one another, and that they compose a further object. The key assumption is that it is
not the case that no matter what objects we assign to the structure, duplicates of those
objects will constitute a life. Whether or not some simples constitute a life is not simply
a matter of the relations they bear to one another, but also the intrinsic properties
instantiated by those simples. Since we can assign simples to a structure that guarantees
that they compose a further object, but yet they fail to form a life, we have a
counterexample to van Inwagen’s proposal.
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More generally, HD implies that whether or not some simples compose a further
object does not depend on the intrinsic properties instantiated by those simples. This
rules out any answer to the Special Composition Question that requires that some simples
have a specific intrinsic nature in order for those simples to compose an object.
Interestingly, just as HD does not imply (SoC), it does not imply the similar claim
that composition supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the parts. If we want to make
sense of the intrinsic nature of a plurality of parts, then we need to be able to apply the
notion of duplication to pluralities. It is straightforward to extend our definition of
duplication to pluralities. Two pluralities are duplicates iff they instantiate the same
perfectly natural properties, and their subpluralities can be put into a one-to-one
correspondence so that corresponding subpluralities have the same perfectly natural
properties, and corresponding sequences of subpluralities bear the same perfectly natural
relations. Note that I allow that a plurality can collectively instantiate a perfectly natural
property. However, I do not intend to include the compositional relations. If a plurality
composes something, that involves a relation between the plurality and the further object,
which is not a part of the plurality.107
The claim that composition supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the parts then
becomes:
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This will be rejected by those who accept some form of Composition as Identity, according to which the parts are
in some sense the same as the whole. However, philosophers that are committed to Composition as Identity
typically hold that every plurality composes something, and so it is trivial that duplicate pluralities compose
something.
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Supervenience of Composition Necessarily, for any plurality that composes an
object, any duplicate of that plurality composes an object.

To see that HD does not imply this, first note that HD does not imply unrestricted
composition. On my framework, this is a matter of what structures are possible. So HD
is consistent with some plurality of places in a structure not composing a further place.
Let’s consider a case involving simples. Start with a plurality of simples the xxs that
compose a further object. Consider a structure with a plurality of places the pps that
don’t compose a further object, and where the relations between the pps are the same as
the relations between the xxs. We can assign the xxs to the places, giving us a world
where a plurality that does not compose anything is a duplicate of the xxs, which do
compose something.

So HD is consistent with the falsity of Supervenience of

Composition.

3.3 Summary

HD is a good candidate for satisfying the four constraints from chapter two.
However, there is an important issue remaining. Many of the applications that we
surveyed deal with the recombination of properties. But recombining properties raises a
special

difficulty.

Properties,

including

fundamental

properties,

have

a

determinate-determinable structure that involves necessary connections. Necessarily, two
determinates of the same determinable cannot be co-instantiated. In the next chapter, I
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consider various attempts at handling the recombination of properties in the Humean
framework.
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3.4 Appendix: Multiple Entities in a Place

In this appendix, I formulate a framework that allows that more than one entity
can occupy the same place in a structure. It will be useful to begin by illustrating this
approach with some examples. First, as mentioned in the chapter, Bricker (2017) applies
this approach to a trope ontology. On this approach, we allow that multiple tropes can
occupy the same place in the structure. For example, our structure might be purely
spatiotemporal, and multiple tropes can occupy the same place in spacetime. As a second
example, consider dualistic substantivalism. On this approach, we can have a structure
that involves only spatiotemporal relations and both spacetime regions and material
objects can occupy the same places in the structure.
In order to accommodate such an approach, some of my definitions need to be
modified. The first definition we need to modify is the notion of a world instantiating a
structure. Intuitively, when a world instantiates a structure, according to the definition in
the text above, that requires that if x occupies a place P1 and y occupies a place P2 then x
must bear to y every fundamental relation that P1 bears to P2, including compositional
relations. So, if P1 is a part of P2, then anything that occupies P1 is a part of everything
that occupies P2. But once we allow that more than one entity can occupy a structure,
then we should allow that entities that do not overlap one another can occupy the same
place. This makes sense on both the trope ontology and dualistic substantivalism that we
considered above. It isn’t plausible that all the tropes occupying the same place in the
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structure overlap one another; it also isn’t plausible that when a material object and
region of spacetime occupy the same place in the structure they overlap one another.
In order to revise the definition of a world instantiating a structure, we need to
distinguish between the compositional relations and the rest of the relations. The
standard definition works fine for non-compositional relations; it only needs to be
changed for the compositional relations. With that in mind, here is the revised definition:
a world w instantiates a structure S iff there is a function f that maps the objects in w to
places in S iff (i) for all non-compositional relations R, and for all x1, …, xα in w, x1, …, xα
instantiate R in w iff f(x1), …, f(xα) are in the extension of R in S, (ii) for all compositional
relations R*, if x1, …, xα instantiate R* in w, then f(x1), …, f(xα) are in the extension of R*
in S, and (iii) for all compositional relations R**, if P1, …, Pα are in the extension of R**
in S, then there’s an x1, …, xα in w, such that f maps x1, …, xα to P1, …, Pα, and x1, …, xα
bear R** in w.108 Note that while the first clause is a biconditional, the second and third
clauses are merely material conditionals. By weakening the definition to a material
conditional when it applies to compositional relations, this allows us to accommodate
multiple non-overlapping entities occupying the same place. Clause (ii) requires that
whenever some objects bear a composition relation to one another, there is a composition
relation between the places the function maps those object to. But it doesn’t require that
there is a composition relation between any objects that are mapped to those places. The
definition allows that a pair of objects that don’t bear a composition relation to one
another can be mapped to a pair of places that do bear a composition relation to one
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This needs to be adjusted to accommodate universals that occupy more than one place. Instead universals should
be mapped to a plurality of places in the structure, and the rest of the definition should be changed accordingly.
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another. Clause (iii) requires that when there is a compositional relation between some
places in the structure, at least some of occupants of those places bear that relation.
We can now turn to arrangements. One constraint on an arrangement that I
required was that an object must match the place it is assigned, in the following sense:
whenever an arrangement assigns an object x to a place P in a structure S it must match
that place in that there must be a one-to-one function f from the parts of x and the places
that are parts of P such that, for all x1, …, xα that are parts of x, and all fundamental
relations R, x1, …, xα bear R iff f(x1), …, f(xα) in in the extension of R in S. If we keep
this requirement, then that requires that the mereological structure of an object always
matches the mereological structure of the place it occupies. But once we allow more than
one object can occupy a place, we might choose to no longer require that. However, we
still want to guarantee that the non-compositional relations between an object’s parts
match the place the object occupies. We can guarantee that with a weaker constraint: an
object x weakly matches a place P in structure S iff there is a one-to-one function f from
the parts of x to a subset of the places that are parts of P such that, for all x1, …, xα that
are parts of x, and for all fundamental relations R, x1, …, xα bear fundamental relation R
iff f(x1), …, f(xα) are in the extension of R in S. The key difference is that the range of the
function no longer contains all of the places that are parts of the place P, but only a subset
of those places. So an object can weakly match a place P even though it might not have a
part corresponding to a place that is a part of P. If an object matches a place according to
the stronger, standard definition, then say that the object strongly matches the place. We
can now revise our matching constraint on arrangements as follows: all arrangements
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must be such that whenever the arrangement maps an object to a place, that object weakly
matches the place.
Since we now allow that multiple non-overlapping objects can occupy the same
place, we drop the requirement that arrangements are consistent. Objects that are not
duplicates of one another can now occupy the same place. However, we must revise our
definition of an arrangement being a complete. Not only do we want to ensure that an
arrangement, implicitly or explicitly, maps an object to each place in the structure, but we
also want to ensure at least one object in every place strongly matches that place. To do
that, we strengthen the requirement that every arrangement must be complete, to the
requirement that every arrangement is strongly complete. An arrangement is strongly
complete iff for every place P in the structure, there’s a place P* that overlaps P such that
the arrangement maps an object to P* that strongly matches P*. We can leave the
definition of the notion of a world recombining an arrangement unchanged.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINATES

If we countenance properties in our ontology, then HD allows us to freely
recombine them.

This is a welcome result for many reasons. First, many of the

applications of HD in the Humean tradition required it, such as the application to
structural universals, Armstrong’s conception of the laws of nature, and moral properties.
In order for my formulation to be adequate, in the sense of being able to do the required
work in HD’s applications, then it must apply to properties. Second, it would be arbitrary
to not apply HD to these entities. If we accept a free recombination principle for
particulars, and we include properties as a part of our ontology, then it would be
unprincipled to not apply recombination to properties. Finally, HD needs some way of
recombining properties in order to do its work as a principle of plenitude. If HD does not
recombine properties, then it will be too weak in its ability to generate possibilities.109
Consider the possibility of a plaid kangaroo. How can HD generate this possibility?
Simply taking duplicates of kangaroos will not work, since no duplicate of an actual
kangaroo is plaid. A natural strategy would be to take duplicates of fundamental particles
and rearrange them in such a way that their fusion is a plaid kangaroo. The problem with
this strategy is that it presupposes a strong form of reductionism that allows us to build
up a plaid kangaroo from fundamental particles. But this is a controversial claim;
kangaroos are conscious and some might doubt that consciousness can be reduced to an
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This issue is raised by Divers and Melia (2002) and Wilson (2015: 150-153).
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arrangement of fundamental particles. If so, we cannot guarantee that we’ll have a plaid
kangaroo simply by recombining fundamental particles. It would be better if we could be
neutral with respect to this controversial claim about consciousness. Further, there’s an
epistemic problem. Plausibly, we know that plaid kangaroos are possible, but we do not
know whether they can be built up from actual fundamental particles. So our knowledge
of this possibility does not depend on our knowing that plaid kangaroos can be built up
from actual fundamental particles. Finally, even if all actual properties can be reduced to
the properties of fundamental particles, surely it is possible for there to be emergent
properties that are not so reducible.
For these reasons, the Humean must move beyond merely recombining duplicates
of individuals, and must also apply recombination to fundamental properties. But
applying recombination to fundamental properties raises a serious problem.

For

properties stand in the determinable-determinate relation which seems to require
necessary connections. Consider the property of having 4 kg mass and the property of 5
kg mass. It seems impossible that anything could have both of these properties. Yet they
appear to be distinct from one another; a necessary exclusion between distinct existences.
In general, two determinates of the same determinable seem to exclude one another. Call
this the problem of determinates. In this chapter, I survey several Humean-friendly
attempts at addressing this problem. While many strategies face serious problems, I
develop two promising strategies for solving the problem of determinates; though, in both
cases they require a re-thinking of the metaphysics of properties and individuals.
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4.1 A Radical Approach

Before considering views that attempt to accommodate the necessary connections
between determinates and determinables, it’s worth considering a view that simply rejects
these necessities. To fix ideas, let’s take determinates to be the fundamental properties.
On this view the fundamental determinates are completely recombinable. It is possible
that an object be both 5 kgs mass and 6 kg mass at the same time. This is a radical view
that is at odds with our ordinary modal intuitions, and I don’t think that the Humean
ought to simply discount our modal intuitions here, for a major reason to accept HD is on
the basis of our modal intuitions, as I argue in the next chapter. But it’s still worth
considering this approach. This gives us a starting point for thinking about how to fit
properties into the framework from which we can go on to develop more sophisticated
approaches.
On this view, it is easy to accommodate properties in my Humean framework.
We can simply add the fundamental determinate properties to be available to be
rearranged in the structure. For example, let’s adopt an instantiation approach in our
structures.

So on this approach, we have a two-category ontology, there are bare

particulars and properties, and there are corresponding places in the structure for the bare
particulars and for properties. HD will allow us to freely recombine properties, giving us
worlds where there are objects that instantiate two (or more) determinates of the same
determinable.
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This is a very simple and straightforward way of applying HD to properties.
Unfortunately, it fits very poorly with our modal intuitions. It guarantees the possibility
of an object that instantiates any number of fundamental determinates of the same
determinable.
Interestingly, there is a strategy that may allow this view to satisfy our modal
intuitions. We could hold that it is a conceptual matter that no object can instantiate two
determinates of the same determinable. It is part of our concept of, say, mass that nothing
could have two determinate mass properties. But if this is a conceptual matter, then it
leaves open the ontological questions. A principled view could hold that the properties
we call ‘mass’ are completely recombinable, but that in these strange worlds where an
object has two distinct mass determinates, the properties fail to count as ‘mass.’ Perhaps
part of our concept of mass is that a family of properties only count as ‘mass’ in a world
when they satisfy the structure of the determinate-determinable relation.
Despite the elegance of the view, it faces a problem. As Bricker (2017: 32) points
out, the view has trouble handling the fact that properties can be referred to in different
ways. For example, suppose my favorite property is 2kg mass and yours is 7 kg mass.
Then the following is true:

(1) Necessarily, nothing could instantiate my favorite property and your favorite property
at the same time.
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But it is hard to see how there could be anything about the concept of being my
favorite property or being your favorite property that guarantee this necessity;
particularly since we could easily have different favorite properties that were not
determinates of the same determinable.
Even if we set aside this problem, I do not think most philosophers would be
sympathetic to the approach I’ve outlined in this section. Most would simply insist that it
is impossible for an object to have two determinates of the same determinable regardless
of our concept of these properties. In other words, the necessary exclusion between
determinates is not simply a matter of the words or concepts we use to refer to properties,
but also a matter of the properties themselves.
So for the rest of this chapter, I’ll take the necessary exclusion between
determinates as a datum. In order to handle this necessity, the Humean needs a more
complex approach to properties.

Let’s now consider some attempts at solving the

problem of determinates.

4.2 Armstrong’s Combinatorialism

One of the most prominent attempts at solving this problem comes from D. M.
Armstrong.110 Armstrong understands properties in terms of universals, and his solution
to the problem of determinates is to posit that universals have compositional structure.
On his view, universals that are determinates of the same determinable overlap one
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See Armstrong (1989: 77-86).
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another by being structural universals. For example, 2 kg mass is a structural universal
that contains 1 kg mass as a constituent. For something to instantiate 2 kg mass, it must
have two overlapping parts that each instantiate 1 kg mass. So two universals of the
same determinable overlap one another. Armstrong proposes we solve the problem of
determinates by adopting a principle of recombination that says that we can freely
recombine universals so long as they do not overlap one another. Since determinates of
the same determinable overlap one another, this principle will never allow us to
recombine two determinates of the same determinable.
Unfortunately, Armstrong’s approach faces several serious problems. First, the
proposal only works for determinates that have the same structure as the mass properties.
As Eddon (2007) argues, the proposal won’t work for determinates with a different
structure, such as the charge properties which have a negative value. It’s not clear how
positive and negative charge universals relate to one another on Armstrong’s theory; it
doesn’t seem like a negative charge universal and a positive charge universal overlap one
another.
Further, the account cannot allow that a mereological simple instantiates a mass
universal. Since each mass universal is a structural universal containing other mass
universals as constituents, whenever an object instantiates a mass universal it must also
have parts that instantiate the constituent mass universals. But every mass universal has a
constituent, since there is no smallest quantity of mass. So whenever an individual
instantiates a mass universal, it must have proper parts that instantiate the constituents of
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that universal. Yet this seems wrong, for it seems that a mereological simple could have
some degree of mass.
A further problem from Sider (2005) is that Armstrong’s account of
recombination is severely limited in its ability to generate possibilities. Since we cannot
recombine overlapping universals, we are stuck only able to recombine one mass
universal at a time. It’s hard to see how we could generate the possibility of a 1 kg mass
object and a π kg mass object bearing some relation to one another.
Finally, Bricker (2017) argues that this proposal doesn’t solve the problem even
for the case of mass. Armstrong restricts the principle of recombination in such a way
that avoids a commitment to possibilities where an object instantiates two determinates of
the same determinable. But there’s no explanation for this failure of recombination.
Appealing to a lack of distinctness between two entities doesn’t explain why they
necessarily exclude one another.

It’s perfectly obvious why a lack of distinctness

explains a necessary inclusion; if one thing is a part of another, then it’s clear why one
cannot have a duplicate of the latter without a duplicate of the former. But a lack of
distinctness, doesn’t explain a necessary exclusion. If two things aren’t distinct, then
why can’t they be co-instantiated at the same place? So Armstrong’s solution faces
several serious problems; the Humean had better look elsewhere for a solution.

4.3 Moss’s Approach
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Sarah Moss (2012) has proposed a novel solution to this problem. On her
approach, the fundamental properties have the appearance of being gerry-mandered,
disjunctive properties. Moss illustrates the view using a simple case involving color.
Suppose there are only four colors: red, yellow, green, and blue. On Moss’s approach, we
can ground these color properties in the following properties: being red or yellow and
being red or green. It’s important to not be misled by how we’re referring to these
properties; these properties aren’t grounded in the normal color properties, rather the
color properties are grounded in these more exotic properties. These two properties are
freely recombinable; they can be co-instantiated, and either can be instantiated without
the other.

Further, if they ground the normal color properties, we have a clear

explanation for why the normal color properties are incompatible with one another. It
reduces to a matter of logic and analysis. For something to be red is for it to instantiate
both red or yellow and red or green. For something to be yellow is for it to instantiate
red or yellow and for it to not instantiate red or green, and so on. This case with only
four colors is just a simple example, but Moss shows how to extend it to cases where
there are infinitely many determinates.

So if we treat fundamental properties in

accordance with Moss’s strategy, they will be freely recombinable.
Unfortunately, there something very artificial about this proposal, at least for the
Humean’s purposes. One way to bring this out is to notice that the properties this
proposal takes to be fundamental fit very poorly with the theoretical roles associated with
fundamental properties. These properties don’t make for significant similarity between
the individuals that bear them. They wouldn’t allow us to formulate very simple or
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elegant laws in terms of them; imagine attempting to formulate simple Newtonian laws in
terms of disjunctions of the mass properties. They generally seem harder to refer to than
the properties that they ground. The only theoretical role these properties seem to play is
in being freely recombinable, but if the properties that the Humean takes to be
fundamental don’t link up in any meaningful way with other theoretical roles, then there’s
a worry that the Humean conception ceases to be a substantial principle. It just becomes
the claim that there is some base of freely recombinable properties on which all other
properties supervene.

But this is too weak of a claim to play a central role in

metaphysics.

4.4 Comparativism

Let’s consider a different strategy.

For any given quantity, one can dispute

whether to take an Absolutist or a Comparativist approach to that quantity. In the case of
mass, Absolutists hold that the fundamental quantities are monadic properties; e.g. being
5 kgs mass.

In contrast, Comparativists hold that the fundamental quantities are

comparative relations; i.e. having twice as much mass as.111 According to Absolutism,
the comparative relations are grounded in the monadic properties. In contrast, the
Comparativist holds that the monadic properties are grounded in the comparative
relations. So far I have been assuming an Absolutist conception of quantities, but it is
worth considering how things work out for the Comparativist.
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For more on the dispute, and an argument in favor of Comparativism see Dasgupta (2013).
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To start, let’s consider a thoroughgoing Comparativism according to which there
are not any fundamental monadic properties at all, only fundamental relations.112 On this
approach, we don’t need to worry about recombining any properties at all, for there aren’t
any fundamental properties. We’ll get all the recombinations we need by recombining
bare particulars with no interesting intrinsic natures in the various possible structures that
characterize the possible patterns of instantiation of the fundamental relations. Since
every fundamental quantity is being treated as a relation, our structures will include a
large number of relations. HD says that any way of recombining particulars in these
structures corresponds to a possibility.
Unfortunately, there’s trouble with this approach. Since the only intrinsic nature
that an object has is a matter of the relations between its parts, rearranging duplicates in a
structure is trivial. While adopting this view avoids the problem of determinates, a
consequence of this view is that HD loses much of its interest.
Things are different if we suppose that there are also fundamental monadic
properties, but that they don’t fall in the determinate-determinable relation, in the sense
that if P is a fundamental property, then there is no fundamental property Q such that P
and Q are determinates of the same determinable. Since these properties don’t stand in
the determinate-determinable relation to one another, they won’t exhibit necessary
exclusions, so we can simply accept a principle of free recombination for these
properties. In this case, HD is a substantive principle, since it allows for the non-trivial
recombination of these fundamental monadic properties in the structure, and the view
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Esfeld (2004) defends this view.
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will solve the problem of determinates, since on this view the fundamental properties
don’t exhibit the determinate-determinable structure. Of course, it’s not clear that there
are any fundamental properties that don’t exhibit the determinate-determinable structure.
Let’s consider other strategies for solving the problem of determinates. It would
be better if the Humean did not need to commit to a Comparativist approach to all
quantities, since it is a controversial view. Further, if there are no fundamental monadic
properties at all, HD loses much of its interest.

4.5 Properties as Places

A prominent interpretation of modern physical theories conceives of properties as
forming a space, analogous to physical space, that objects occupy.113 Call this view
locationism. Spatiotemporal relations involve various sorts of necessities, but these don’t
raise a problem for HD because HD only allows us to recombine objects within the
spatiotemporal structure; it doesn’t allow us to apply recombination to the structure itself.
This suggests that we may be able to solve the problem of determinates by treating
properties in an analogous way by adopting locationism. If the necessary exclusion
between determinables of the same determinate can be accounted for in the same manner
that the Humean accounts for spatiotemporal necessities, then we could solve our
problem. Let’s consider various ways of developing locationism with an eye to solving
the problem of determinates.
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Important contributions are Maudlin (2007), Cowling (2011), Arntzenius (2012), and Bricker (2017). Less
recently, Stalnaker (1979) and van Fraassen (1967) develop semantic theories that model properties by treating them
as forming a space, but they don’t intend this to be a substantial metaphysical claim about properties.
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Bricker (2017) develops the view specifically in order to handle the problem of
determinates, so let’s begin there. Bricker calls the familiar spatiotemporal structure that
we have been working with horizontal structure. The key feature underlying Bricker’s
proposal is to posit vertical structure alongside the horizontal structure. For each place in
the horizontal structure, there is vertical structure that characterizes the structure of the
properties that are instantiated at that place. Bricker then posits that the fundamental
properties are determinables rather than determinates. So the property of having mass is
fundamental rather than the property of having 2 kg mass. The determinable properties
ground the determinate properties in virtue of occupying a place in the vertical structure.
For example, consider a 2 kg mass object. This object instantiates the fundamental
property of having mass. The structure of the mass properties is the same as the structure
of the positive real numbers, so we can posit that the vertical structure at least contains
the structure of the positive real numbers. We can then hold that the fundamental
properties of having mass occupies a place in the vertical structure that corresponds to 2
kg. Together, this grounds the object having 2 kg mass. This view goes a long way
towards satisfying the Humean ban on necessary connections, for the fundamental
determinable properties can be freely recombined.
Unfortunately, as Bricker points out, the problem of determinates re-arises. HD
allows us to assign more than one instance of a determinable to a location and we can
assign the different instances of the determinable to different places in the property
structure. This will give us distinct determinates of the same determinable instantiated in
the same place. Bricker (2017: 46-47) does suggest a potential solution to this problem.
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He recommends extending our notion of logic, so that it is a logical matter that a

determinable only takes a single value at a given location. Of course, this requires a
non-standard account of logic. Further, the account needs to be further developed. In the
next section, I consider an approach that accepts this consequence, but let’s first consider
other ways of formulating the properties as places approach.
Cowling (2011) develops an alternative way of understanding locationism that
does not involve determinables occupying the property space, but rather individuals
themselves occupying the property space.

Keeping with Bricker’s framework of

horizontal and vertical structure, this amounts to positing that individuals can be freely
recombined in the vertical structure. However, we must consider how this framework
handles the case of assigning more than one individual to a place in the horizontal
structure. When we assign more than one individual to a place in the horizontal structure,
we can assign those individuals to different places in the vertical structure. The resulting
possibility will depend on our background metaphysics. Suppose the individuals we are
recombining are points and regions of physical space in both the horizontal structure and
the vertical structure, as would be amenable to the supersubstantivalist. On such a
metaphysics, there is no sense to be made of distinct co-located individuals at the same
place in physical space. On this view, multiple individuals can only be assigned to the
same place in the horizontal structure if they are duplicates of one another, as the
consistency requirement from the last chapter requires.

Since the individuals are

duplicates of one another, the world corresponding to an arrangement that assigns
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Bricker (2017: 45) also considers a conventionalist solution that rules out the unwanted possibilities by a mere
convention of what we mean by ‘possible.’ As this solution does not depend on thinking of properties as forming a
space, I set it aside.
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multiple individuals to the same place in the horizontal structure will contain a single
duplicate of all of those individuals at those worlds. Now we need to be careful with the
notion of duplicate here. According to locationism, an object has its intrinsic nature in
virtue of occupying a particular place in the vertical structure. So it would seem natural
to say that two objects are only duplicates if they occupy the same place in the vertical
structure. The consistency requirement would then say that we can only assign multiple
individuals to the same place in the horizontal structure if they are all assigned to the
same place in the vertical structure. But this seems to be a clear cheat. On this approach,
the consistency requirement is just an inexplicable constraint that solves the problem of
determinates all on its own. Rather, we need a notion of duplicate that is independent of
occupying a particular place in the vertical structure.

In effect, the fundamental

properties and relations that are appealed to in defining duplication must be restricted to
those that are not a result of occupying a particular place in the vertical structure. On this
way of thinking, we can then assign multiple individuals to the same place in the
horizontal structure that occupy different places in the vertical structure.

In the

supersubstantivalist metaphysics we are working with, this will give us a world where a
single spacetime point occupies a place in the horizontal structure, and is located at more
than one place in the vertical structure. So the problem of determinates re-arises.
However, things are different if we take the individuals being recombined to be
material objects and allow the possibility of co-located material objects.

On this

approach, when multiple individuals are assigned to the same place in the horizontal
structure, but different places in the vertical structure, then the corresponding possibility
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will contain multiple co-located objects that are located at different places in the vertical
structure. Since the objects are located at different places in the vertical structure, they
will instantiate different properties, and so will instantiate different determinates of the
same determinable. While this approach allows that different determinates of the same
determinable can be instantiated in the same place, it does not allow that the same
individual can instantiate different determinates of the same determinate. At long last,
we have found a viable strategy for solving the problem of determinates.

4.6 Humean Bundle Theory

Let’s consider a further potential solution to the problem of determinates.
According to the bundle theory, individuals are simply bundles of properties.115 I will
develop a novel approach to the bundle theory, arguing that it provides a solution to the
problem of determinates.

Let the determinates be fundamental, and allow that the

determinates can be freely recombined in a spatiotemporal structure. At first glance this
clearly fails to solve our problem, for HD will allow us to recombine the properties so
that two determinates of the same determinable are instantiated in the same region of
spacetime. But we need to draw a subtle distinction here. Two determinates of the same
determinable being instantiated in the same region is not quite the same as a single object
instantiating two determinates of the same determinable. Two determinates may be
instantiated in the same region, but if co-location is permitted, then that region may be
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There is a large literature on the bundle theory. For some useful introductions to the various issues, see Van
Cleve (1985) and O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (1998).

118

occupied by two different objects. But is there a way to formulate the bundle theory in a
way that allows for this?116
The standard way of accommodating this is in terms of a primitive notion of
compresence. A plurality of properties bear the compresence relation to one another, and
individuals are identified with maximal fusion of compresent properties. Two distinct
bundles of properties might be compresent at the same location, and these bundles could
include different determinates of the same determinable. The trouble here is that HD will
allow us to freely recombine how properties are compresent with one another, so that two
determinates of the same determinable can be compresent with one another. This would
give us an individual that instantiates both determinates.
However, there’s a way of rethinking how properties bundle together into
individuals that avoids this problem.

Rather than adopting a primitive notion of

compresence, let’s consider an approach that analyzes the compresence relation. Begin
by simply imagining properties distributed across space and time. On this version of the
bundle theory, individuals are fusions of properties. But not every fusion counts as an
individual; only the fusions of properties the satisfy the right constraints are individuals.
For example, one constraint is that the properties must all be instantiated in the same
region together. A sum of properties drawn from different regions is not eligible to be an
individual. Another constraint is that a sum that includes determinates of the same
determinable is not eligible to be an individual. It’s important to see that these constraints
are not a matter of what reality is like at a fundamental level. Rather they are constraints
116

One version of the bundle theory that cannot accommodate this is Schaffer’s (2001) version according to which
an object is the sum of properties instantiated at the same location. Of course, it is clear in that paper, as well as in
Schaffer (2009a: 140), that Schaffer rejects the possibility of co-located objects.
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on how a non-fundamental element of reality is grounded in the fundamental.
Fundamentally the world only consists of properties, relations, and spacetime.
Individuals are defined in terms of this fundamental reality of properties and relations.117
However, this version of the bundle theory is neutral over whether we should think of it
as a mere convention that individuals do not have more than one determinate of the same
determinable.

If would be a mere convention if we could just as easily have used

‘individual’ in such a way that individuals could have more than one determinate of the
same determinable.

But this is not required.

I’ve already accepted an objective

distinction between more or less natural properties. It could be that our notion of
individual corresponds to a much more natural property than any other nearby notion, and
its naturalness makes it the correct one to play its role in our conceptual scheme. We
would be doing something incorrect by using a different, less natural notion instead.118
However, there remains a puzzle for this view. The constraints that I’ve laid
down underdetermine what individuals there are. Imagine that the following properties
are instantiated in a region: P1, P2, Q1, and Q2; P1 and P2 are determinates of the same
determinable, and Q1 and Q2 are determinates of a different determinable.

What

individuals exist in this region? We don’t have an answer yet, for many answers are
consistent with the constraints we’ve seen so far. For example, there could be two
individuals, one composed of P1 and Q1, the other composed of P2 and Q2. But there
could instead be an individual composed of P1 and Q2 and the other composed of P2 and
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Paul (2006) develops a mereological bundle theory, but appeals to restricted composition in order to avoid the
result that every sum of properties is an object. But this is no help for me here, for even if composition is restricted,
HD will still allow that we can recombine properties so that two determinate of the same determinable compose an
object.
118
Cf. Sider (2011: 52-78).
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Q1.

Both answers are consistent with the theory so far; we haven’t yet said how

fundamental reality determinately grounds non-fundamental reality.
I think the bundle theorist can provide an answer here.119 A Humean bundle
theorist can give an account in terms of the laws of nature. Among the many different
ways of classifying fusions of properties as individuals, the right one is the one that
permits the best formulation of the laws of nature. On the standard Humean best systems
account of the laws of nature, the laws of nature are the theorems of the system that best
balances strength and simplicity. Now, the laws of nature are formulated in terms of
individuals, since the laws don’t merely talk about the instances of properties, but also
which instances of properties go together; that is, which instances of properties are
bundled together as an individual.

The Humean bundle theorist can hold that a

classification of sums of properties as individuals is the right one when it permits a better
system of laws than any other classification of sums of properties as individuals.120
Here’s an example of how this would work. Recall our example above where P1,
P2, Q1, and Q2 are instantiated in a region together. Suppose we’re in a world where
whenever P1 is instantiated in a region so is Q1, and whenever P2 is instantiated in a
region so is Q2. Further, suppose it is not the case that whenever P1 is instantiated in a
region so is Q2, and it is not the case that whenever P2 is instantiated in a region so is Q1.
Given these regularities, by holding that the sum of P1 and Q1 is an individual, and the
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My answer draws inspiration from Theodore Sider’s (2001: 224-236) response to the problem of the homogenous
spinning sphere for the four dimensionalist.
120
There might be cases where a system would fare better in terms of strength and simplicity by allowing that
individuals can bear more than one determinate of the same determinable. Nevertheless, on this view, this system
would still not be the laws of nature because the laws are inter-defined with individuals, and individuals are defined
in such a way that guarantees that they never bear more than one determinate of the same determinable.
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sum of P2 and Q2 is an individual, we will allow for a system of laws in which it is a law
that every P1 is a Q1 and a law that every P2 is a Q2. If we don’t have this particular way
of classifying sums as individuals, then we’ll have a much weaker system of laws. For
example, if in the region where P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 are all instantiated we have an
individual composed of P1 and Q2 and an individual composed of P2 and Q1, then the
laws will be much worse since the laws won’t be able to include the regularity that every
P1 is a Q1 and that every P2 is a Q2. Further, the laws won’t be able to include any extra
regularities that they couldn’t include on the other classification.
I admit this is a radical approach. Whether or not a fusion of properties is an
individual is an extremely extrinsic fact, depending on the pattern of instantiation of
properties across the entire world. Further, whether or not a fusion is an individual
depends on the laws of nature, and this has significant consequences for worlds that are
bizarre with respect to their laws. For example, in worlds without laws, there will not be
any individuals. Further, worlds where it is indeterminate what the laws are will allow
that it is indeterminate what individuals there are.121

Moreover, Humeans allow both of

these sorts of worlds, allowing that there are worlds without enough regularities to permit
any system of laws, as well as worlds where there are ties regarding the best system of
the laws.
As radical as these results are, it is worth seeing how these results can be thought
of as a generalization of commitments that many Humeans already take on. Many
philosophers, including Humeans, take persistence over time to hold partly in virtue of
121

Though it is indeterminate what individuals there are, on all the permissible ways of classifying sums of
properties as individuals, no individual instantiates two determinates from the same determinable. So if we
supervaluate, it will come out supertrue that no individual instantiates two determinates from the same determinable.
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causal relations. So whether or not an object at one time is identical with an object at
another time will depend, in part, on the causal relations between the objects. Of course,
for the Humean, causal relations also depend on regularities across the entire world.
Further, we will have strange consequences for persistence in worlds where causation is
especially bizarre. In worlds without any causation, which the Humean should allow,
there is no persistence.

Worlds where causation is indeterminate will allow that

persistence is indeterminate. These are strange results regarding identity over time that
stem from a combination of holding that persistence depends on causation and a Humean
view of causation. Likewise, the strange results regarding identity at a time are due to a
combination of the Humean bundle theory and a Humean view of the laws.
I can understand philosophers that reject the strange results for both identity over
time and identity at a time, but if one already accepts the strange results for identity over
time, as many Humeans do, then it is not obvious why one should reject the strange
results for identity at a time. So I think Humeans should take this view seriously as a
way to solve the problem of determinates.
To briefly conclude, we’ve seen two promising strategies for solving the problem
of determinates. While both strategies require taking on substantial commitments, it is no
small feat to avoid the problem. This completes the first part of the dissertation, where I
develop Hume’s Dictum. But we have yet to see any reason to accept the principle. That
is the goal of the next part of the dissertation. In the next three chapters, I develop three
independent arguments in favor of the principle.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT

In the preceding chapters we’ve considered how to formulate Hume’s Dictum.
But is there any reason to accept this principle? Over the course of the next three
chapters, I develop three arguments in favor of HD, beginning with the most traditional.
Going all the way back to Hume, the traditional way of supporting HD is by appealing to
considerations of what we can conceive of.122 As this is the traditional argument for HD,
it is unsurprising that there are many objections to it. Further, despite being a traditional
way of supporting HD, the argument has yet to be fully developed. In this chapter, I
develop and defend the line of reasoning that underlies this argument, and consider the
objections to it.

First, I attempt to get clear on how exactly considerations of

conceivability provide evidence for a general metaphysical principle like HD. I argue
that we can conceive of a core base of Humean situations, thereby supporting their
possibility. This in turn supports HD on the grounds that HD is the most natural and
elegant extension of those possibilities. Second, I clear up the dialectic surrounding the
objections to the conceivability argument. I ultimately defend a modest take on this
argument. While the argument can be avoided, doing so requires an independent reason
to accept an un-Humean necessary connection. While Humeans might desire a more
ambitious conclusion, it still has some teeth. With this argument in hand, the Humean
need only rebut arguments in favor of necessary connections, and they thereby have a
122

As Hume put it: “Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the
idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible,” Hume
(1739-40/2000: 26).
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positive reason to be a Humean. Further, the argument gives HD a kind of default status;
by default it is the most plausible view and the burden is on detractors to argue otherwise.
Here’s the plan for this chapter. In the first section, I formulate the conceivability
argument. In the remaining three sections, I consider objections to the argument.

1.1 The Conceivability Argument

The conceivability argument begins with the following key premise:

(1) Conceiving of a situation provides evidence that the situation is absolutely possible.

We first need to get clear on the intended sense of ‘conceiving’ in (1). There are
different ways to interpret this notion. I have in mind positive conceivability, where a
positive conception of the situation is formed. This is opposed to negative conceivability,
where a situation is negatively conceivable if it cannot be ruled out a priori.123 The
relevant notion of conceiving is much like imagining, and so I will use those terms
interchangeably.124 It is also important to see that (1) is not the claim that considerations
of what we can conceive is the ultimate arbiter in disputes about what is possible. Rather,
it is the more modest claim that this constitutes evidence.
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For more on the distinction, see Chalmers (2002).
Chalmers (2002) characterizes positive conceivability in terms of imaginability. Some philosophers distinguish
between imagining and conceiving. Some also deny that these mental acts are the source of our basic modal beliefs,
but rather hold that they are based on an act of rational insight that occurs when we consider the imagined or
conceived situation. The cases I appeal to below don’t depend on precisely how we draw these distinctions, and so
for simplicity I suppress these details in the text.
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I assume that we have some kind of epistemic access to absolute modality; in
other words, I assume that modal skepticism is false. So my argument is not for the
modal skeptic. Given that we have epistemic access to absolute modality, does the nature
of that access made (1) plausible? There are many rival theories of the epistemology of
modality, but there is a remarkable convergence among many prominent theories that
supports (1). First there are accounts of the epistemology of modality that are primarily
based on what is conceivable.

Chalmers (2002) and Yablo (1993) defend a

conceivability-based account of our modal knowledge, while Gregory (2004) and
Williamson (2007) appeal to the imagination.125 Biggs and Wilson (2019) defend an
abductive account of the epistemology, where the pieces of evidence that abduction is
applied to include facts about what we can conceive.
There are also accounts that tie the epistemology more directly in terms of the a
priori, like Bealer’s (2002) account that appeals to rational insight, and Peacocke’s
(1999) account that appeals to the conceptual mastery of modal concepts. But it is very
plausible that if a situation can be conceived of without contradiction or incoherence then
it does not violate our rational insight or militate against our conceptual mastery of modal
concepts. So again, (1) is supported by these accounts.
There are modal epistemologies that seem less friendly to (1). A recent view that
initially appears at odds with (1) is a modal epistemology based on our knowledge of
essences, as developed in Lowe (2012) and Hale (2013). This approach builds off of
Fine’s (1994) view that essences are more fundamental than modality. On this approach,
125

Hill (2006) and Kroedel (2012) account for modal epistemology in terms of counterfactuals, but they don’t offer
an epistemology of counterfactuals. However, Williamson (2007: 141-155) makes a persuasive case that the
epistemology of counterfactuals is often based on the imagination.
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modal epistemology is understood in terms of essence epistemology. But typically our
knowledge of essence is thought to have an a priori component.126 If so, then if we can
coherently conceive or imagine a situation involving some object, then that is evidence
(though defeasible) that the object’s essence doesn’t rule out that situation. So on these
views, considerations of conceivability still constitutes evidence.127
Conceivability may not be the whole story of modal epistemology; other features
may play a role. It’s not the end of the story either. I don’t take the fact that we can
conceive or imagine a situation to conclusively prove that it is possible. Rather, it is a
defeasible starting point for our theorizing. We may come to reject these possibilities, but
good methodology tells us that we need to have some reason to do so.
Despite the support these modal epistemologies give to (1), appealing to
conceivability arguments in metaphysics are often viewed with suspicion, and often for
good reason. Many take the considerations raised in Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity
to undercut the force of these arguments. Further, many philosophers have developed
modal epistemologies on which the ability to conceive of a situation provides no
evidence of its possibility. Later I will consider these challenges to my argument, where I
argue that these challenges only pose a threat to the conceivability argument if there is
independent reason to reject the Humean possibilities. But for now, let’s develop the rest
of the argument.
We can now consider the next premise of the argument:
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This even holds for Kripke’s (1980) a posteriori essences. In general, they can be factorized in terms of two
components, one of which is knowable a priori. In the canonical case, the first component is a conditional of the
form if a is F, then a is essentially F, which is knowable a priori. The second component has the form a is F, which
is only knowable a posteriori.
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For discussion on the epistemology of essence, including a priori knowledge, see Tahko (Forthcoming).
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(2) We can conceive of a wide array of Humean situations.

To start, consider Hume’s (1748/1999: 110-113) classic case involving billiard
balls. I can imagine a billiard ball being hit in such a way that the actual laws of nature
dictate that it move in one direction, yet it moves in a different direction, without being
interfered with in any way. My ability to conceive and reason about this situation is as
detailed and coherent as any situation, and I can fill in as much detail as I want.
It is easy to multiply examples like this one. When testing a scientific theory,
scientists contrast how the world would be if a theory were true with how the world
would be if it were false, so they can easily conceive of a world where the laws are
different. Again, as we reason through these cases we never run into anything that is
incoherent, contradictory, or militates against our rational insight. Even defenders of
necessary causal and lawful relations admit that it is conceivable that the laws of nature
are false (see Shoemaker, 1998: 61-62 and Bird, 2007: 169-172). That is why they think
it is important to undercut the significance of our ability to conceive of these scenarios.
If these situations are possible, then causal and nomic relations are not necessary,
contrary to the Humean’s opponent.
This further generalizes. It seems that for any two distinct objects that we can
conceive of, either from the same world or from different worlds, we can conceive of
freely arranging duplicates of those objects. Whichever objects I consider, I never find
myself unable to conceive of the scenario. I don’t run into any contradiction or absurdity;
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nothing that militates against my rational insight or conceptual mastery of modal
concepts. This gives us a core base of Humean possibilities.
Having supported premises (1) and (2), we now turn to consider how these
premises support HD. Together, (1) and (2) give us evidence that a wide base of Humean
situations are possible.

The most straightforward way this supports HD is by

disconfirming necessary connections that HD rules out. Now, we haven’t disconfirmed
necessary connections in cases that considerations of conceivability do not weigh in on.
But the cases do disconfirm necessary connections that apply to ordinary objects; they
disconfirm necessary causal and nomic relations, and other necessary connections
between duplicates of ordinary objects.
HD also receives more direct support from (1) and (2). The basic idea is that (1)
and (2) give us evidence of a basic stock of possibilities, and HD is the most natural and
elegant extension of that stock of possibilities. There are different ways of spelling out
that basic idea. One way to spell this out is in inductive terms. HD receives inductive
support by making predictions that consistently accord with what we can conceive of.
We can also spell out the basic idea that HD is the most natural extension of the
possibilities supported by (1) and (2) in explanatory terms.128 HD receives support by
explaining the possibilities our conceivings confirm. For any objects that I can conceive
of, I can conceive of various ways of rearranging duplicates of those objects.
Considerations of conceivability support holding that these situations are possible. This
gives us a striking pattern of possibilities that HD explains, and so rejecting HD incurs an
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On some views, inductive reasoning and explanatory reasoning are closely related to one another. I’m not
committed to the claim that these are independent ways of supporting HD.
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explanatory burden. If HD doesn’t govern modality, then why is there a wide pattern of
possibilities that seem to conform to it? Why does modality seem, at first glance, so
Humean when it isn’t? This is a substantial explanatory burden that one takes on.
Accepting HD allows us to answer this explanatory burden.
Of course, we’ve only considered cases that confirm HD, we must also consider
whether there are cases that disconfirm HD. One way of showing that there are cases that
disconfirm HD is by arguing for a philosophical theory that contradicts HD; for example,
by arguing that causal relations are necessary or that there are abstract objects that violate
HD. But defending such a theory would amount to giving an argument against HD. This
is our first example of the theme of this chapter; while the Humean’s opponent can avoid
the conceivability argument, doing so requires an independent reason to reject HD.
Setting aside theoretical arguments, HD might instead be disconfirmed by cases
that we accept simply on the basis of some sort of modal intuition. But I don’t think
there is much threat of disconfirming modal intuitions undermining the conceivability
argument.

Most philosophers that reject HD do not do so on the basis of a

counterexample from our modal intuitions, but rather on the basis of a theoretical
argument or because it contradicts one’s favored theory.129 Moreover, the cases that I
have surveyed are central Humean cases, and if I’m right, considerations of
conceivability give us reason to accept the possibility of these cases. This indicates that a
central core of HD is confirmed by our conceivings. In light of this, the Humean could
have two reactions to a given counterexample. The first reaction is that if a particular
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formulation of HD is disconfirmed by our modal intuitions, then the proper response is a
matter of correcting that particular formulation, rather than rejecting the general Humean
conception of modality. A second reaction is that the modal intuitions that support an
apparent counterexample are defeasible, and are overridden by the support that HD
otherwise enjoys.
Of course, these reactions are not plausible if HD faces widespread and
systematic counterexamples from our modal intuitions.

But are there systematic

counterexamples? It’s not possible to go through every potential counterexample here,
but I can address the most pressing ones that I’m aware of. We’ll see that they do not
raise a problem for the conceivability argument.
First, there’s a threat of counterexample from entities that are characterized in
such a way that guarantees necessary connections. To fix ideas, let’s use Armstrong’s
(1997: 196-201) totality state of affairs as an example. Totality states of affairs, as we
saw in previous chapters, are entities that contain as constituents a sum of objects, a
property F, and the totaling relation. The state of affairs exists just in case the sum of
objects totals F; in the sense that the sum includes every instance of F. So a totality state
of affairs that involves a sum of objects totaling F cannot coexist with an instance of F
that is not a part of that sum; the totality state of affairs necessarily excludes instances of
F that are not a constituent of it. Since these entities are characterized in a way that
guarantees they are involved in a necessary connection that violates HD, if these entities
are possible then we have a case that disconfirms HD.
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However, the possibility of these entities is controversial. Indeed, since these
entities are modally characterized, it is plausible that we cannot conceive of them by
conceiving of a single world containing the entity. For in order to conceive of a totality
state of affairs, we must ensure that it satisfies the modal condition that characterizes it.
Plausibly, one must conceive of every possible world in order to ensure that there is no
world where the totality state of affairs violates its modal condition. But that’s beyond
our ability.130 Of course, one might insist that they can conceive of these entities without
conceiving of every possible world. If someone thinks that they can conceive of them,
then there is little that I can say to convince them otherwise. However, I do think it is
reasonable to say that whether or not these entities are possible or conceivable is
controversial. We can’t simply take for granted the possibility of these entities; an
argument is needed if these entities are to disconfirm of HD.
Let’s consider a second kind of problem case. As we saw in the previous chapter,
one of the more significant problem cases for HD involve determinates and
determinables. They clearly involve necessary connections. The property of being
scarlet is a determinate of the property of being red, so it is necessary that if something is
scarlet then it is red. The property of being crimson is also a determinate of the property
of being red, so it is necessary that if something is scarlet, then it is not crimson. But we
might worry that HD implies that redness, scarlethood, and crimsonhood are not
necessarily connected in this way.

If HD has that implication then it would be

disconfirmed by our modal intuitions. However, Humeans accept our modal intuitions on
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this front. Instead, Humeans take on the burden of formulating HD in such a way that it
avoids this consequence. In the previous chapter, I developed two strategies the Humean
can use to accommodate the necessities that come with the determinate-determinable
relation.
These are the main potential systematic counterexamples to HD. The first sort
involve controversial possibilities that require an independent argument in order to
disconfirm HD.

The second sort fails to disconfirm HD, because HD should be

formulated so that it is not committed to the problematic possibilities. While this is
certainly no proof that there are no such systematic counterexamples, these two types of
counterexamples are the most pressing for the Humean. Further, my responses to these
counterexamples can be generalized to other cases.

In many cases, either the

counterexample rests on controversial possibilities, or HD does not have the problematic
possibility as a consequence.

So I think there is little threat of the conceivability

argument being undermined by counterexamples to HD.
It’s important to note that the inductive and explanatory support that HD receives
extends to cases where considerations of conceivability do not weigh in.

If a

generalization receives inductive or explanatory support, then that also supports the
instances of that generalization that go beyond our current evidence. In this case, HD is
supported by the possibilities that our conceivings confirm, and this in turn supports
instances of HD that considerations of conceivability do not weigh in on. Of course, it is
no simple matter to say precisely when a generalization receives inductive or explanatory
support. But HD has the right character. It is a simple, general, and elegant principle.
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Defending HD by appealing to considerations of conceivability is not new. So it
is no surprise that there are many objections to this line of thought. In the next three
sections, I consider the major objections that have appeared in the literature. In each
case, I argue that either the objection fails, or that its success depends on a successful
independent argument for an un-Humean necessary connection. One objection that I will
not address is the simple denial that one can genuinely conceive of the situations that I
claim we can conceive of. There’s not much I can say to address this point. All I can say
is that I can conceive of these situations and try to get you to do the same. But even if
you don’t share my judgments about what’s conceivable, I can at least hope to get you to
agree with me about the philosophical significance of those judgments about what’s
conceivable.

1.2 Are We Accurately Describing These Situations?

According to the first objection, we are often unreliable at determining what is
true in the situations we are conceiving. Consider the canonical example of Hesperus and
Phosphorus. Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus, and so necessarily identical, but
since this is an a posteriori necessity it seems that we can conceive of a world where they
are distinct. We can conceive of a world with two heavenly bodies. One appears in the
morning, and the other in the evening, and we eventually discover that the two are not
identical. However, according to Kripke (1980), I am mis-describing the worlds that I am
conceiving of. I can conceive of a world where there are two planets that are much like
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our planet Hesperus, where one planet is called ‘Hesperus’ and the other is called
‘Phosphorus,’ but these planets are distinct from Hesperus/Phosphorus. I am mistaken in
thinking that one of them is Hesperus and the other is Phosphorus. So the conceived of
world is consistent with the a posteriori necessity that Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus.
Sydney Shoemaker (1998) and Alexander Bird (2007: 179-186) apply this line of
reasoning to our alleged ability to conceive of worlds where the actual laws of nature are
violated. When I seem to conceive of massive objects violating the laws, I am actually
conceiving of objects without mass, but that have a property similar to mass. In the case
involving the billiard ball moving in a way that violates the actual laws of nature, this ball
doesn’t have any of the actual properties that are involved in the violated laws. Rather it
has alien properties that obey different laws. So I don’t conceive of a situation where the
actual laws of nature are false.
However, this objection only works given that we already accept that the laws are
necessary. As Schaffer (2005: 11) points out, in Kripke’s original cases there is a
compulsion to employ this mis-description strategy because we already have strong
reason to reject the possibilities that violate the a posteriori necessities. The reasons that
Kripke appeals to are modal intuitions and the necessity of identity. But in the case
involving the necessity of causal and nomic relations, and other un-Humean necessary
connections, we don’t have strong modal intuitions that these are necessary, and there is
no analogue of the necessity of identity that applies here. Further, if we don’t need
independent reason to apply the Kripkean strategy, then modal skepticism will ensue.
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For any attempt to justify a possibility by conceiving of it can be undercut using the
strategy. Surely it’s possible that I fail to drink coffee today, but we can undercut this
belief by holding that we have mis-described the conceived of situation as one where
someone similar to me fails to drink coffee. This is a bad road to go down, leading to
modal skepticism, and it isn’t one that the Humean’s opponent should want, since they
also want to trust some of our modal beliefs. Since nearly any such belief can be
undercut using the Kripkean strategy, the only way we can have justified modal beliefs
based on our conceivings is if there is an initial presumption against our mis-describing
the situations we conceive. In the absence of outweighing considerations, I am justified
in taking myself to correctly describe the situation. So the Kripkean strategy can only be
deployed by the non-Humean if there is already independent reason to reject HD, and that
these reasons outweigh the initial presumption that we are not mis-describing the
situation.
In order to buttress the Kripkean strategy, Bird (2007: 176-179) has presented a
case that purports to show that our ability to verify that a situation involves a violation of
the laws is unreliable. It appears conceivable that salt could fail to dissolve in water. But
in order to really conceive this, we need to conceive of the chemical makeup of salt and
water in such a way that we can see that it is consistent with salt’s failing to dissolve in
water. However, Bird argues that the physical laws required for there to be salt and water
at all also guarantee that salt dissolves in water. So even if the fundamental laws are
contingent, it still isn’t possible for salt to fail to dissolve in water, because of how the
existence of salt depends on the laws. The moral that Bird draws from this case is that
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our ability to correctly describe conceived of situations that violate the actual laws of
nature is unreliable (Bird 2007, 179).131
However, Bird’s example does not give us reason to think that we are unreliable at
describing the cases that I appealed to above in support of the conceivability argument.
Recall that I understand HD as a ban on necessary connections involving the intrinsic
natures of objects; HD is the claim that any way of rearranging duplicates of objects
corresponds to a possibility. But if Bird is right about salt, then the property of being salt
is not preserved across duplicates. For if the fundamental laws are contingent, then we
could have a duplicate of an actual pinch of salt, but in a world where the fundamental
laws are different it would not count as salt. Since the property is not preserved under
duplication, it isn’t relevant to the cases that I’m appealing to. His example only applies
to cases involving properties that are not preserved under duplication.
Crucially, this makes use of the key claim that the fundamental laws are
contingent. To be sure, this claim is controversial. But we can also conceive of the
fundamental laws being different, so considerations of conceivability support the
contingency of the fundamental laws as well.

While we may not be sure of the

fundamental laws, we have reasonable hypotheses, and we can imaginatively reason
about how the world would be if different fundamental laws governed. When we
conceive of violations of non-fundamental laws, those situations may also constitute
violations of the fundamental laws. Perhaps some violations of non-fundamental laws
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are consistent with the actual fundamental laws, but many may also require a violation of
the fundamental laws.
Importantly, Bird’s argument doesn’t extend to the fundamental properties
governed by the fundamental laws. His case crucially depends on the manner in which a
non-fundamental law is grounded in a fundamental law. So his argument only rebuts the
conceivability argument if there is independent reason to hold that the fundamental
properties necessarily obey the actual fundamental laws.

1.3 Does Hume’s Dictum Undermine Our Modal Knowledge?

Let’s consider a second objection. Jessica Wilson (2010a: 622-634 and 2010b)
has raised a serious challenge to the attempt to support HD on the basis of a
conceivability argument. Her argument is that the Humean has no good account of the
basis of our knowledge of the necessities that the Humean accepts, and so HD
undermines our modal knowledge. If accepting HD undermines our modal knowledge,
then it is epistemically self-defeating to defend HD on the basis of a conceivability
argument.
Wilson makes the case that the best account of our knowledge of the necessities
that the Humean accepts presupposes necessities that the Humean rejects. She gives the
following examples of necessities that the Humean should accept:

(N1) Necessarily, anything that is scarlet is red.
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(N2) Necessarily, anything having a certain mean molecular kinetic energy (MMKE) has
a certain temperature.

(N3) Necessarily, anything that is an electron is negatively charged.

Assuming these necessities don’t involve distinct existences, the Humean could
accept N1-N3. Of course, whether or not the Humean will accept these necessities will
depend on how the Humean understands the properties involves, and later we’ll consider
some specific accounts. But in principle the Humean can accept these necessities. While
we might reject these necessities on other grounds, HD should be neutral with respect to
these issues. So we can justifiably believe N1-N3. But what explains our epistemic
access to the facts that ground N1-N3? According to Wilson, the non-Humean can give
an illuminating account of our epistemic access to these facts, whereas the Humean
cannot.
Here’s the non-Humean explanation that Wilson develops. First, we determine
that the actual causal profiles of the properties involved overlap one another.

A

property’s causal profile characterizes the effects the property produces when in the
appropriate circumstances. We can think of a causal profile as a function that maps
circumstances to effects. Property P’s causal profile is contained in property Q’s causal
profile just in case any effect P produces in some circumstances, Q also produces in those
circumstances. So we can determine the actual causal profiles of the properties involved
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in N1-N3. Furthermore, we individuate these properties on the basis of their causal
profiles. We determine whether property P and Q are identical or not by way of their
causal profiles.132
A certain kind of non-Humean will hold that these causal profiles are modally
stable, and so they necessarily overlap. These causal necessities ground N1-N3. The
non-Humean can also explain our epistemic access to this fact. Wilson (2010a: 627)
accounts for this with the following principle:

Default Assumption Our terms and concepts for the associated properties
incorporate individuation conditions that apply not just through space and time,
but also modally.133

Wilson holds that this assumption is justified on the grounds that it is the simplest
and most straightforward extension of our actual methods for individuating broadly
scientific properties to modal contexts. So given that we actually individuate these
properties on the basis of their causal profiles, the default assumption allows us to
justifiably individuate them modally on the same basis. This accounts for our epistemic
access to the facts that ground N1-N3.
However, Wilson argues that the Humean has trouble accounting for our
epistemic connection to the facts that ground N1-N3. The Humean cannot use the same
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Presumably, we appeal to other considerations too. For example, we might appeal to whether a particular way of
individuating properties allows for a simple formulation of the laws.
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Note that Wilson restricts this principle to individuation conditions that we uncontroversially have epistemic
access to.
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story as the non-Humean, for the Humean doesn’t hold that every property’s causal
profile is modally stable. So how can the Humean explain our knowledge of N1-N3?
One strategy for N1 would be to hold that color properties are derivative
properties and their causal profiles are built into their definition. For example, one might
hold that what it is to have a particular color is to be disposed to cause certain sorts of
appearances in perceivers. This would allow the color properties to have modally stable
causal profiles. In this case, the Humean can tell the same story as the non-Humean.
However, this strategy depends on a controversial account of color. It would be better to
be neutral. Moreover, Wilson argues that this strategy doesn’t extend to N2 and N3.
Wilson (2010a: 630 and 2010b: 202-206) argues that the only other available
strategy is to appeal to quiddities. A quiddity is the primitive identity of a property,
analogous to the haecceity of an individual.

The Humean can posit necessary

connections between the quiddities of the properties involved in N1-N3, perhaps
explaining the connection in terms of identity or overlap between the quiddities.
However, Wilson objects that our grip on the notion of a quiddity is too thin for this
explanation to be metaphysically informative. Moreover, she argues that there is no
plausible epistemological story of how we know about the relations between these
quiddities. She argues that we do not perceive quiddities; for she takes quiddities to be
non-causal on the Humean view, and perception to require a causal connection.134
Further, there is no plausible non-perceptual story of how we have epistemic access to
quiddities. Wilson concludes that the best account of how we have epistemic access to
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N1-N3 makes use of causal necessities; whereas the Humean doesn’t have a good
account of this access.

Given that we accept some necessities like N1-N3, there is

pressure to further accept causal necessities, contra the Humean conception of modality.
However, the Humean has other strategies available that Wilson hasn’t discussed.
Rather than appealing to relations between the quiddities’ of properties, we can appeal to
relations between the properties themselves. I’ll argue that the Humean can account for
our knowledge of N1-N3 by appealing to our knowledge of relations between the
properties, rather than in terms of the properties’ quiddities. This allows the Humean to
sidestep worries about our epistemic access to quiddities; whether or not quiddities are
non-causal, the Humean will hold that the properties themselves are causal.
Let’s start with N2. We can explain the truth of N2 by holding that the particular
MMKE is identical with the particular temperature. Given that these properties are
identical, there is no mystery why N2 holds, since identity is necessary.
This grounds the necessity, so the question is how the Humean has epistemic
access to the identity. But it doesn’t seem that the Humean faces any special problem
here. Some philosophers might hold that a reference-fixing description is associated with
the predicates that refer to these properties, and this description is a priori accessible. If
we know the reference-fixing description for a particular temperature, and that of a
particular MMKE, then we can discover that they are identical by discovering that the
same property satisfies both descriptions.
Other philosophers might be skeptical of a priori available reference-fixing
descriptions. But other approaches are available. By noting that there is a systematic
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overlap in the causal profiles of the properties, we can employ an inference to the best
explanation to conclude that the properties are identical.135 For example, given that a
particular MMKE and a particular temperature have the same causal profile, we get a
simpler explanation of the relevant phenomena if we identify the two.136
It might be objected that this account of N2 is too partisan, requiring that we
identify the particular MMKE with the particular temperature. So let’s consider the case
where the Humean rejects the identity between the particular MMKE and the particular
temperature. Instead the Humean could take temperature to be a functional property,
understood in terms of the tendency to cause a particular sensation of heat or cold. In that
case, the Humean will reject N2. For the Humean holds that a particular MMKE’s causal
profile could differ so that it would not cause the corresponding sensation of heat or cold.
137

So the most plausible view on which the Humean accepts N2 is when the particular

MMKE and the particular temperature are identified, and as I’ve argued, if the properties
are identical, then the Humean can explain our knowledge of N2.
Let’s turn to N3. To start, let’s suppose that both the property of being negatively
charged and the property of being an electron are fundamental properties. On such a
view, what should the Humean think about N3? Clearly, the Humean should reject N3,
for HD says that fundamental properties can be freely recombined. HD implies that it is
possible for an object to instantiate either property without the other. So any Humean
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that accepts N3 should not hold that both properties are fundamental. Rather, the
Humean should hold that the property of being an electron is somehow partially
grounded in or analyzed in terms of the property of being negatively charged. On this
view, part of what it is for something to be an electron is to be negatively charged. This
gives us an account of what grounds the necessity. So the question becomes: what is our
epistemic access to this fact? Now, it is no small matter to give an account of the
epistemology of analyzing or grounding properties in terms of others. But I don’t think
the Humean is on particularly bad footing.
There are different ways of understanding the epistemology of analysis or
grounding. For some, it is largely an a priori matter. Perhaps it relies heavily on
conceptual or linguistic understanding. Some philosophers may opt for synthetic a priori
knowledge. Alternatively, some may hold that our knowledge of analysis relies heavily
on a posteriori matters, perhaps appealing to explanatory considerations or modelling
their account on Kripke’s a posteriori necessities. What’s important here, is that there is
no bar to the Humean making use of these accounts.
N1 can be treated in the same way as N3. If all color properties are fundamental,
and in particular, both being red and being scarlet are fundamental, then the Humean
should reject N1. However, it’s more natural for the Humean to analyze some color
properties in terms of others. The standard approach would analyze determinables in
terms of determinates. This allows the Humean to ground N1 by holding that the manner
in which being red and being scarlet are analyzed guarantees the necessary connection.
Indeed, it is natural to hold that being red is analyzed as the disjunction of all of its
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determinates, including being scarlet, which would guarantee N1. On this approach, our
knowledge of N1 is a matter of our knowledge of how properties are analyzed, as in the
previous case involving N3.138
To sum up, in each of these cases we see the same result. On a view where the
Humean cannot explain our knowledge of the alleged necessity, the Humean would
independently reject the necessity. Moreover, on a view where the Humean would accept
the necessity, the Humean has a plausible account of our knowledge of the necessity. The
Humean can safely reject Wilson’s objection that HD undercuts our modal epistemology.

5.4 Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?

A final objection to the conceivability argument is to simply deny that
conceivability is a guide to possibility. When I developed the conceivability argument
above, I mentioned that I set aside a general modal skepticism; according to which, we
have no epistemic access to modal facts. In the context of an investigation of modal
metaphysics, I take it that such a view can be reasonably set aside. Rather, a more
interesting objection denies a conceivability-based modal epistemology, but replaces it
with another modal epistemology. I’ll look at two important proposals.
Bob Fischer (2017) has recently developed a theory-based modal epistemology.
Fischer distinguishes between the ordinary modal claims made in ordinary life, and
extraordinary modal claims of interest to philosophers. Simply put, on his view, we are
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only justified in accepting an extraordinary modal claim when we are justified in
accepting a theory according to which that modal claim is true. Fischer understands
theories as classes of models, and we can understand the modal content of these theories
in terms of the models they permit; a claim is possibly true according to a theory which it
is true in a model permitted by the theory.
For the sake of argument, let’s agree that the Humean modal claims are
extraordinary modal claims.

In that case, Fischer’s modal epistemology seems to

undercuts my argument. For conceiving of Humean situations provides no evidence that
these situations are possible. In order to properly evaluate this challenge from Fischer’s
epistemology, we need to further develop his account. The first question that needs
answering is how we handle cases where theories conflict in their modal content. For
example, some claims may not be possible according to the theories of biology that we
accept, but they may be possible according to theories of physics that we accept.
Fischer’s answer is to defer to the more general theory.139 But then a worry arises that
logic is the most general theory that we accept, and so whatever is logically possible is
absolutely possible. Since the Humean possibilities appear to be logically possible,
Fischer’s account would seem to imply that they are absolutely possible.
Fischer does develop two strategies for denying that a claim is absolutely
possible, even though it is logically possible. Both strategies build off of the key claim
that when we treat logic as a theory that gives us modal content, we should think of it as
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primarily applying to propositions, rather than sentences. While this characterization is
controversial, I won’t challenge it here.
The first strategy that Fischer develops appeals to cases where the claim expresses
an a posteriori impossibility.140 Even though a sentence that express the impossibility is
consistent, the proposition expressed by the sentence may not be, and it may be that the
only way to determine that a sentence expresses a logically impossible proposition is
through a posteriori means. But the general model for a posteriori impossibilities is the
broadly Kripkean model that we discussed in the earlier section.

The moral we

concluded was that this response only served to undercut the argument if there was
independent reason to reject the Humean possibilities.
The second strategy that Fischer develops proceeds by way of semantic
indeterminacy.141 A consistent sentence may exhibit semantic indeterminacy so that it is
indeterminate which proposition the sentence expresses, where some of the candidate
propositions are logically possible, but others are not. While we might simply stipulate
how to make the sentence more precise, Fischer argues that this would simply change the
subject matter, rather than revealing anything about the original modal claim under
discussion.
So now we must ask whether semantic indeterminacy applies in the Humean
cases. But these cases do not seem to bear the marks of the sort of indeterminacy that
Fischer has in mind. Moreover, the fact that we can coherently reason about these cases
in as much detail as we like seems to be evidence these cases don’t involve this sort of
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semantic indeterminacy. I conclude that in the absence of an independent reason to reject
Humean possibilities, Fischer’s modal epistemology supports the possibility of Humean
situations.
Alastair Wilson (2013) defends a different modal epistemology that dispenses
with conceivability. He defends the strongest form of law necessitarianism. On his view,
the actual laws of nature are both necessarily true, and they necessarily govern, in the
sense that rejects the possibility of alien properties that obey other laws. Wilson denies
that the imagination is any guide to possibility, taking this to be an advantage of his
strong version of law necessitarianism. Rather, on his view modal epistemology goes by
way of knowledge of the laws of nature. There’s no need to accept an evidential
connection between what we can imagine and what’s possible.
However, there are two problems with this view.

First, the view fails to

completely dispense with relying on imaginative reasoning in determining possibility.
Second, the view fails to accommodate how ordinary people gain modal knowledge.
Let’s consider these problems in turn.
According to Wilson (2013: 664-665), the advantage of the view is that it allows
modal epistemology to be continuous with the epistemology of science. But imaginative
reasoning comprises a part of the epistemology of science in the form of counterfactual
reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning plays a key role in science with respect to both
explanation and confirmation.

As Kment (2014: 244-271) persuasively argues,

counterfactuals are an important guide to explanatory relations. The basic idea is that the
counterfactual dependence of one event on another, or the counterfactual dependence of
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alterations to one event on alterations to another event, is evidence that there is an
explanatory relationship between the two events. This epistemic connection is partly
why counterfactual analyses of causation and other explanatory notions are attractive,
even if those analyses ultimately face serious problems. Since determining explanatory
relationships is a key part of the scientific project, so is counterfactual reasoning.
Counterfactual reasoning also plays a role in the confirmation of scientific
theories. In order to test a theory in an experimental situation, we need to know various
counterfactuals of the form: if theory T were true, then such-and-such would obtain in the
experimental situation. If such-and-such doesn’t obtain, then the experiment disconfirms
the theory. As a further application, Lange (2000: 121-132) argues that confirming a
proposition

only

constitutes

inductive

confirmation

when

certain

associated

counterfactuals are also confirmed.
These cases show that counterfactual reasoning plays an important role in
scientific practice. But it might be denied that this shows that the imagination plays an
essential epistemic role in evaluating counterfactuals. One might instead hold that the
imagination merely plays a heuristic role in counterfactual reasoning, and that
counterfactual reasoning can be reconstructed as deductive reasoning. The thought is that
we know that ‘if P were true, then Q would be true’ by knowing that Q deductively
follows from P and suitable auxiliary premises. This sort of reconstruction is plausible
for some counterfactuals; such as: if I had not won the race, then I would have lost it.
But it doesn’t extend to all cases. Williamson (2007: 141-155) makes the case that this
isn’t plausible as a general account of the epistemology of counterfactuals, and that, in
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general, the epistemology of counterfactuals proceeds by way of the imagination. Of
course, this wouldn’t be plausible if the imagination operated in a completely
unconstrained manner. But Williamson makes use of a conception of the imagination
where it is disciplined through experience, skill, and theoretical commitments.
Aside

from a general epistemology of counterfactuals, reconstructing

counterfactual reasoning as deductive reasoning doesn’t extend to the cases in scientific
practice that I appealed to above. Consider the use of counterfactuals in determining
explanatory relations. We want to know if P is part of the explanation for Q. But not just
any deduction of Q from P with some auxiliary premises will convince us of this. If Q is
among the auxiliary premises, then we can deduce Q from any antecedent. Some
restriction on the allowable auxiliary premises is needed. But the prospects of being able
to provide the needed restrictions are not promising, for this leads to Goodman’s (1983)
classic and difficult problem of cotenability.
Further, in many cases of explanation we will be able to made a deduction from P
to Q using auxiliary premises, but those same premises will allow for a deduction from Q
to P. Thinking through a classic counterexample to the deductive-nomological account
of explanation is instructive here.142 Consider a flagpole with a shadow cast by the sun.
Given some background assumptions, one can make a deduction from the height of the
flagpole and the position of the sun to the length of the shadow. But one can also make a
deduction from the position of the sun and the length of the shadow to the height of the
flagpole. Moreover, one can make a deduction from the height of the flagpole and the

142

See Salmon (1989: 47) for discussion.
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length of the shadow to the position of the sun. Which way do the explanatory relations
go? Appealing to counterfactuals can help. If the height were different, then the length
of the shadow would be different. So the height of the flagpole helps explains the length
of the shadow. But if the height were different, the sun’s position would not be different.
So the height of the flagpole does not help explain the position of the sun. On the other
hand, if the length of the shadow had been different, then the height might be different,
but the position of the sun might also be different as well. Importantly, either might be
different, but it’s not the case that either would be different. So the length of the shadow
does not explain either the height of the flagpole or the position of the sun. In this case,
knowing how the counterfactuals go is epistemically prior to knowing which auxiliary
premises should be used to derive Q from P.
Consider also the use of counterfactuals in confirming scientific theories. We
want to know what would happen in an experimental situation if some theory were true.
In some cases, we can know these counterfactuals simply by making a deduction from
the theory. But this isn’t plausible in every case. Often the theories we’re interested in
are less than fully comprehensive and contain ceteris paribus clauses.

Moreover,

evaluating these counterfactuals often depends on implicit background conditions that we
are unable to explicitly formulate.

In these cases, we won’t be able to make a

straightforward deduction. So it isn’t plausible that the counterfactual reasoning used in
science can be reconstructed as deductive reasoning. Rather, I think that Williamson is
right here, and these counterfactuals are often known by way of the imagination.
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Therefore, a modal epistemology based on the epistemology of science does not dispense
with the imagination playing an epistemic role.
The second problem with Wilson’s proposal is that it does not give us an adequate
account of the epistemology of modality. I take it as part of our evidence that ordinary
people know various modal claims. They know what actions they can and can’t take.
They also know what would happen were some proposition true, in order to know if what
in fact happens confirms or disconfirms the proposition. This plays a central role in our
practical, moral, and epistemic lives. Any adequate theory of modal epistemology needs
to allow for this. But Wilson’s account of modal epistemology cannot apply to ordinary
people. Ordinary people might not know anything about the laws of nature; in fact, they
might have any number of false beliefs about the laws. If ordinary people knew modal
truths by way of knowing about the laws of nature, then enough false beliefs about the
laws of nature would preclude knowledge of modal facts. Even if true, a person’s modal
beliefs would only be true on the basis of the lucky coincidence that situations that are
consistent with the true laws are also consistent with the person’s false beliefs about the
laws.

If we’re to give an adequate modal epistemology, it needs to be capable of

applying to ordinary people, and Wilson’s account doesn’t do that.
The preceding considerations push us to hold that the imagination is a guide to
modal and counterfactual truths.

But on its own that doesn’t establish that the

imagination is a guide to the sorts of cases that I’m appealing to in support of HD. My
opponent could draw a distinction between the uses of imaginative reasoning in the
sciences and ordinary life and my uses of it in support of HD, and hold that it is reliable
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guide to possibility in first kind of cases, but not the second kind. Bird suggests just such
a distinction. On Bird’s view, the imagination is only a reliable guide to possibility when
it deals with “the near-at-hand world of middle-sized dry goods, variability of which does
affect our lives” (Bird 2007, 187). Since these possibilities make a difference to our
practical lives, it is easy to see why there would be an adaptive link between what we can
imagine and what’s possible for these cases.

The adaptive link explains why the

imagination is a reliable guide to modal and counterfactual truths for ordinary objects of
everyday life, but importantly, the explanation does not extend to the uses of the
imagination that I’m appealing to in support of HD, for they don’t seem to make a
difference to our practical lives.
However, this response faces two challenges. First, it’s true that there is no reason
to think that there is an adaptive link between what we can imagine and what’s possible
when the possibilities under consideration aren’t relevant to our practical lives, but a
reliable link could be a knock-on effect of the use of the imagination in cases that do
affect our practical lives. Consider the case of mathematical reasoning. There is clearly
no adaptive advantage to the sophisticated reasoning employed in advanced mathematics
or mathematical physics.

However, this sophisticated mathematical reasoning is

reasonably reliable, with the proper training, because it is an extension of basic
mathematical reasoning, the reliability of which does have an adaptive advantage.
Obtaining modal knowledge by way of imaginative reasoning could be much like this.
There’s an adaptive advantage to a reliable imagination for possibilities that have
practical relevance, but the general reliability of the imagination might be a knock-on
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effect of the reliability in the practical cases. Williamson (2007: 134-178) and Kroedel
(2012) develop an account of the epistemology of modality based on this key idea. On
their view, modal knowledge is an extension of counterfactual knowledge. They further
argue that there is an adaptive advantage to counterfactual reasoning in some cases, but
the reliability of this ability extends to cases that have no practical relevance.
Importantly, we haven’t seen a reason to reject this claim. Moreover, if HD is true, then
there is a ready explanation for the general reliability of our imagination.

Since

possibility is governed by a combinatorial principle, if our imagination proceeds in a
combinatorial manner, then it will be reliable. Now, there’s an adaptive advantage to
having a reliable imagination for cases with practical relevance, but an easy way to
secure this is by way of an imagination that functions in a roughly combinatorial manner.
Of course, this would have as a knock-on effect a reasonably reliable imagination for a
wider array of cases. To be clear, I’m not using HD as a premise to argue that the
imagination is reliable for the cases of interest. For it would be circular to then defend
HD on the basis of the imagination. Rather, I’m making salient that there are views on
which the general reliability of the imagination for determining possibility is a knock-on
effect of its reliability for cases with practical relevance.

So claiming that the

imagination is only reliable in cases without practical relevance is unprincipled without
an independent reason to reject these views.
A second problem for the proposal is that there’s an argument from the claim that
imagining is a reliable guide to possibility in cases with practical relevance to the general
reliability of imagining. The argument parallels the argument I gave in section 3 for HD
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from the possibility of a wide array of Humean situations. The basic claim was that HD
is the most natural and elegant extension of the basic stock of Humean situations. We can
apply that reasoning here as well. The general reliability of imagining is the most natural
and elegant extension of the reliability of imagining in cases with practical relevance. As
before, there are different ways we could spell out this idea. We could spell it out in
inductive terms, in that the general reliability of imagining is inductively confirmed by
cases with practical relevance. We could also spell it out in explanatory terms, in that
best explanation for the reliability of imaging cases with practical relevance is the general
reliability of conceiving.
Both of these problems could be addressed if there was independent reason for
thinking that our conceiving is unreliable for the cases that I appealed to in support of
HD. But demonstrating this would be to demonstrate that the situations that I claim are
possible on the grounds that we can conceive of them are not, in fact, possible. This
would amount to an independent reason to accept a necessary connection. So this fits
with our ongoing theme. The conceivability argument can only be rebutted if there are
independent reasons to reject HD.
Of course, many of the philosophers that reject the conceivability argument do put
forward independent arguments against HD. However, the relation between these other
arguments and the conceivability argument has gone unrecognized. Further, the success
of these arguments is far from uncontroversial, and many have objected to them. To
briefly conclude, while the conceivability argument for HD can be rebutted, in the
absence of independent reason to reject HD the argument gives us reason to accept HD.
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The argument gives HD a kind of default status; by default it is the most plausible view
and the burden is on detractors to argue otherwise.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ARGUMENT FROM PLENITUDE

In this chapter, I develop a novel argument for HD. As I’ve mentioned earlier, an
important role that HD plays is as a principle a plenitude. It is a principle that governs
absolute possibility, generating possibilities in a non-arbitrary way, ensuring that we have
no arbitrary or ad-hoc restrictions on absolute possibility. This leads to one important
reason for accepting HD.
I’ll argue that HD should be preferred over its rivals because HD, unlike its rivals,
allows us to uphold:

No Arbitrariness There are no arbitrary or ad-hoc restrictions on absolute
possibility.

Why accept No Arbitrariness? There are both intuitive and theoretical reasons.
Let’s begin with the intuitive considerations. A paradigmatic way for arbitrariness to be
143

reflected in the space of possibilities is by exhibiting unacceptable gaps or cut-offs.

Here’s an example of a gap: suppose we had a range of possible worlds with different
dimensions of spacetime. We have a world with a two-dimensional spacetime, one with a
three-dimensional spacetime, one with a four-dimensional spacetime, one with a
six-dimensional spacetime, and on up as high as you like. But there is no world with a
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On gaps see Lewis (1986: 86) and Bricker (1991: 610-611). On cut-offs, see ibid, 611.
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five-dimensional spacetime. This is a gap in the space of possibilities. It is an arbitrary
fact that we are missing any worlds with five-dimensional spacetimes, though we have
worlds with four-dimensional and six-dimensional spacetimes. This arbitrariness is
problematic. It involves an arbitrary constraint on possibility. Another way to think
about it is by focusing on the change from world to world. If we accept that the change
in the number of dimensions of spacetime usually preserves possibility, then it is arbitrary
that the change to five dimensions does not preserve possibility. The intuition I have, and
that I hope you share, is that the space of possible worlds is not like this. If we know
something about possibility, we know it does not have arbitrary gaps like this.144 This is
not to say that we know there is a world with a five-dimensional spacetime. Only that we
know that if there are worlds with spacetimes with the other numbers of dimensions, then
there is a world with a five-dimensional spacetime.
Now consider a case involving an arbitrary cut-off. Suppose we have a range of
worlds with every number of dimensions of spacetime up to 17, however there is no
world with more than 17 dimensions. This is an arbitrary cut-off. It’s hard to believe that
the space of possible worlds has this range of spacetimes that suddenly cut-offs at 17
dimensions, so that a world with a higher number of dimensions is not possible. The
space of possibilities does not have arbitrary cut-offs like this. Again, think about it in
terms of changes to the worlds. It’s arbitrary to accept that adding a dimension to
spacetime sometimes preserves possibility, but not at 17 dimensions.

144

It isn’t just modal intuition that’s doing epistemic work here, but also our mathematical knowledge that there’s
nothing mathematically incoherent about a five-dimensional space. For example, a regular polyhedral with four
sides is possible, as is one with six sides. But not one with five sides. However, we can know this by way of
mathematical reasoning, on the grounds that a five-sided regular polyhedral is mathematically incoherent.
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These cases of gaps and cut-offs are clear cut cases of arbitrary restrictions on
possibility. Many philosophers are convinced that there can be nothing arbitrary about
the extent of absolute possibility. According to Cian Dorr, “that there are no arbitrary
145

limitations on the space of possibilities is one of our firmest modal intuitions.”

David

Chalmers and Joseph Levine deny brute necessities on the grounds that the bruteness
would involve an arbitrary constraint on possibility.146

An adequate account of the

plenitude of possibility must avoid these sorts of arbitrary restrictions.
But beyond mere intuitive cases, there also theoretical reasons for accepting No
Arbitrariness. Here’s a line of thought from David Lewis:

For when something seems arbitrary, we are apt to think that it might well have
been different. If the restriction is an arbitrary feature of the totality of all possible
worlds, then we are apt to think that this totality could have been different. But if so,
then there is a possible way for it to be which differs from the way it actually is - and we
are back to thinking of the worlds not as genuine alternative possibilities, but as parts of
147

one big disunified actuality.

Spelling this argument out a bit more, the idea is that if something is arbitrary,
then we are inclined to think it is contingent. But there can’t be anything contingent
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Dorr (2004: 188).
As Chalmers puts it: “such “metaphysical necessities” will put constraints on the space of possible worlds that are
brute and inexplicable. It may be reasonable to countenance such brute, inexplicable facts about our world, but the
existence of such facts about the space of possible worlds would be quite bizarre. The realm of the possible (as
opposed to the realm of the natural) has no room for this sort of arbitrary constraint,” Chalmers (1996: 137). Note
that the sense of ‘metaphysical necessity’ that appears in the quote is not just any necessary truth, but certain sorts of
brute necessities. See also Levine (2001: 39-43).
147
Lewis (1986a: 103).
146
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about the space of possible worlds. This argument presupposes that S5 modal logic holds
of absolute possibility, which implies that every proposition’s modal status is necessary.
While a popular view, it is controversial whether S5 governs absolute possibility.148
Nevertheless, given S5, to the extent that arbitrary features are a sign of contingency,
there can be nothing arbitrary about the extent of absolute possibility.
A second theoretical reason for accepting No Arbitrariness is based on the idea
that absolute possibility is a genuine modality that carves out a joint in logical space. If a
modality carves out an objective joint in logical space, then the worlds that are possible
according to that modality objectively go together. This is analogous to the way in which
objects that have the same mass objectively go together. When a modality carves out a
real joint in logical space, worlds that are possible according to that modality are more
similar to one another than any of them are with a world that is impossible with respect to
that modality. If there were an arbitrary or ad-hoc constraint on absolute possibility then
that would violate the idea that the absolutely possible worlds are more similar to one
another than they are to any absolutely impossible world. For the mark of an arbitrary
constraint on is that it distinguishes between worlds that do not differ in any significant
way. The cases of arbitrary gaps and cut-offs we considered above illustrates this well.
They involve a series of possibilities that seem to be missing possibilities. They seem to
be missing possibilities because the worlds that are impossible in the series don’t
relevantly differ from the worlds that are possible in the series. Without a relevant
difference, the impossible worlds are just as similar with the possible worlds as they are
148

Though, perhaps not as controversial as is commonly thought. Williamson (2017: 454-459) gives an argument
that S5 governs absolute possibility (he uses the term ‘metaphysical possibility’). He argues that some philosophers
that deny S5, such as Salmon (1981), are talking about a different notion of possibility.
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with one another, violating the thought that the absolutely possible worlds objectively go
together. This gives us another reason to accept No Arbitrariness.
The argument of this chapter is that we should accept HD because HD allows us
to uphold No Arbitrariness, whereas its rivals do not. HD’s rivals all involve arbitrary
constraints on possibility. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to criticizing HD’s rivals.
But first let’s discuss HD’s relationship to No Arbitrariness. The first thing to note is that
HD does not guarantee No Arbitrariness all on its own. This is because HD only
generates a plenitude of possibilities in conjunction with principles of possible structure
and contents. So the claim is not that HD rules out all violations of No Arbitrariness,
rather the claim is that HD, on its own, does not allow for any violations; further, in
conjunction with a satisfactory account of the plenitude of possible structures and
contents it can allow for a conception of possibility that satisfies No Arbitrariness. HD
does not involve any violations of No Arbitrariness by guaranteeing the possibility of any
arrangement whatsoever. Arbitrariness could only arise if one of the constraints that
arrangements must satisfy involve arbitrariness, since HD does not guarantee the
possibility of worlds that recombine assignments that fail to satisfy these constraints.
However, on inspection, these constraints do not involve any arbitrariness. Let’s consider
them in turn.
First there is the matching constraint that requires that when an object is assigned
to a place in a structure, the relations between the object’s parts match the relations
between the place’s parts. But this requirement is well motivated for there seems to be a
non-arbitrary distinction between worlds where objects match their places and worlds
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where objects do not match their places. The matching constraint does not introduce an
arbitrary constraint on possibility.
Next consider the consistency constraint which requires that when objects are
assigned to overlapping places, the parts of the objects that are mapped to the place of
overlap are duplicates of one another. This constraint also does not involve an arbitrary
constraint.

Consider an assignment that violates this constraint, so the assignment

involves two objects that are not duplicates of one another being assigned to the same
place in the structure. A world that recombines this assignment would need two different
objects occupying the same place. But there’s nothing arbitrary about a ban on allowing
different objects in the same place. Moreover, this constraint is also optional. In the
appendix to chapter 3 I showed how to formulate my framework in a way that allows that
more than one object can occupy a place in a structure.
Finally, consider the third constraint; the completeness constraint. This requires
that an arrangement assign an object to every place in a structure, either implicitly or
explicitly.

This constraint merely functions to ensure that HD does not place any

constraints on the plenitude of possible structures. Without the completeness constraint,
HD would allow us to recombine objects in a structure without filling every place in that
structure. This would give us a world where not every place in the structure is occupied;
so the structure is not instantiated at that world, instead a substructure of that structure is.
Without the completeness constraint, HD would imply that any substructure of a structure
is possible. Adding the completeness constraint is merely a decision to have this decided
by a principle of possible structures, not by HD. So I don’t think we have an arbitrary
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constraint. Moreover, if we independently accept the principle that any substructure of a
possible structure is possible, then the completeness constraint will not place any
constraints on possibility.
Recall that I considered restricting HD so that it must respect ontological
categories. Does this threaten to lead to arbitrariness, or unduly weaken HD? I don’t
think there is much threat that a restriction to categories will lead to arbitrariness. This is
because I think there is a close match between our judgments about arbitrariness and
those about categories. If we accept a category, then we won’t be inclined to take
constraining possibility in a way that respect this category as arbitrary. Likewise, if we
take a constraint on possibility as arbitrary, then we won’t be inclined to take the
corresponding category as arbitrary.
So HD does not involve any violations of No Arbitrariness, and HD can fit into a
full account of plenitude that satisfies No Arbitrariness. In the rest of this chapter I’ll
argue that HD’s rivals all violate No Arbitrariness. I divide HD’s rivals into two kinds.
First are principles of plenitude that take the same form as HD, but restrict it in some
way. Second, are conceptions of plenitude that depart more radically from HD. In both
cases I argue the rivals are committed to arbitrary constraints on possibility that violate
No Arbitrariness. Let’s begin by considering weakened versions of HD.

6.1 Weakened Versions of HD

6.1.1 Spatiotemporal HD
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Some formulations of a Humean recombination principle characterize the notion
of distinctness in terms of spatiotemporal overlap.149 On this approach, if two objects
spatiotemporally overlap, then they are not distinct, and so they cannot be freely
recombined. Co-located material objects cannot be recombined, nor can an object and
the spatiotemporal region that it occupies.
Often these formulations are made for convenience, so they may not be rivals to
HD but merely weaker principles that are easier to formulate. Alternatively, these
formulations may be made on the basis of a prior commitment to super-substantivalism,
where an object is identified with the spatiotemporal region that it occupies. On this
view, there cannot be distinct but co-located material objects, nor can an object be
distinguished from the region it occupies. So on these views, if we set aside objects that
are not spatiotemporally located, characterizing objects as compositionally distinct or as
spatiotemporally distinct will come to the same thing.
However, it’s interesting to consider a restricted recombination principle as a
genuine rival to HD and see how it fares as a principle of plenitude. This will prove to be
a useful warm-up exercise for my argument, as it’s easy to see that HD is a much more
attractive principle of plenitude. But first let’s go about formulating a recombination
principle based on the idea that spatiotemporally overlapping objects are not distinct.
The idea behind this restriction is that it only allows us to recombine
spatiotemporally distinct parts of worlds, rather than compositionally distinct objects.

149

For example, see Lewis (1983b: 73-77) and Wasserman, Hawthorne, and Scala (2004).
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Define a spatiotemporal part of a world as the fusion of a spacetime region and
everything that occupies that region. A Spatiotemporal Arrangement or S-Arrangement
is an arrangement that assigns spatiotemporal parts to places in a structure. We can then
formulate our principle of plenitude as:

Spatiotemporal-HD (S-HD) For any S-Arrangement there’s a world that
corresponds to that arrangement.

As I’m interested in S-HD as a genuine rival to HD I will assume the two are not
equivalent; that is, I assume that supersubstantivalism is false and that there could be
coincident objects. Given this assumption, I think that S-HD fares poorly as a principle
of plenitude compared with HD. First, it is entirely unmotivated to place this restriction
on HD if the only reason is to avoid a commitment to HD. Without an independent
motivation it is ad hoc.
Second, there are possibilities that S-HD cannot guarantee. I’m located at a
spatiotemporal region, but I have a possible duplicate located at a different region. Yet
S-HD is unable to guarantee that this is possible. There may be co-located objects, such
as bosons, that have possible duplicates that are not co-located. S-HD cannot guarantee
this possibility. A companion principle will need to be put forward that generates these
possibilities.

Further, some principled justification will need to be given for why a

Humean principle is accepted for spatiotemporally distinct objects, but not HD in its full
force, and instead this companion principle is accepted
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Accepting S-HD without accepting HD amounts to a kind of arbitrariness. We
already accept a degree of modal freedom between a material object and the region it
occupies; the object could occupy a different region. Furthermore, S-HD allows for
complete modal freedom between spatiotemporally distinct objects.

But why not

complete modal freedom between a material object and the region it occupies or for
co-located objects?

It is arbitrary to allow complete modal freedom between

spatiotemporally distinct objects, but not between compositionally distinct but
spatiotemporally overlapping objects. I conclude that S-HD fares poorly at upholding No
Arbitrariness.

6.1.2 Concrete HD

We considered applying HD to theories involving states of affairs, universals, and
the magical ersatzer’s worlds. Those who wish to avoid these results may choose to opt
for a rival to HD that is restricted so as to not allow for these applications. The next two
rivals that I consider are attempts at this. First, we might restrict our principle so that it
only applies to concrete particulars and not abstract entities.150 Such a restriction would
allow us to avoid the objection to states of affairs, structural universals, and the magical
ersatzer’s worlds. To formulate this restriction, we only allow concrete particulars into
the arrangements; call these C-Arrangements. Then we have:

150

By concrete particulars I mean to exclude states of affairs and immanent properties. I count them as abstract
here. I admit that in a reasonable sense of ‘concrete’ one could regard these objects as concrete. Think of my use of
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ here as largely a stipulation for convenience.
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Concrete-HD (C-HD) For any C-arrangement there’s a world that corresponds to
that arrangement.

As before, I assume our background metaphysics is such that C-HD is not
equivalent to HD. So, in effect, we are assuming that some of the entities that are banned
from C-Assignments exist.
C-HD faces similar problems that S-HD faces, making it an unattractive principle
of plenitude.

First, without independent reason, it is arbitrary to freely apply

recombination to concrete objects, but not to abstract objects. Second, C-HD is unable to
generate possibilities involving abstract objects, so without a further principle of
plenitude we won’t have a full account of plenitude. A further principle of plenitude will
need to be put forward, and some justification will need to be given for why this further
principle is accepted rather than HD in full generality. HD provides a more attractive
account of plenitude, than does C-HD.

6.1.3 States of Affairs HD

First order states of affairs are states of affairs that do not contain other states of
affairs as constituents and contain at least one particular. A third way of weakening HD
is based on restricting it so that it only applies to first-order states of affairs and their
constituents. Such a restriction would allow us to avoid the objection to Armstrong’s
view of laws, as well as the objection to totality states of affairs. We formulate this
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restriction by only allowing individuals, universals, and first-order states of affairs into
the assignments. Call these F-Arrangements. This gives us:

States of Affairs HD (S-HD) For any F-arrangement there’s a world that
corresponds to that arrangement.

Unlike the previous rivals to HD, something very close to F-HD has been
explicitly defended in the literature. Armstrong defends a very close principle in his
(1989) and (1997: 139-147).151 Since this principle has been defended, I will spend more
time arguing that HD is a better principle of plenitude than F-HD.
The core problems will be familiar. First, it doesn’t seem principled to allow free
recombination for first order states of affairs, but not for other states of affairs. It
naturally invites the question of why allow free recombination for some entities, but not
all of them? In particular, why can some states of affairs be freely recombined with one
another, but not all? If recombination is a key principle undergirding modal plenitude,
then why restrict it for some entities? For Armstrong, first-order universals can be freely
recombined.

They don’t have a modal profile that involves necessary connections

between distinct existences, but Armstrong’s higher-order universals do. But why should
some universals have a modally rich essence, when most do not? There’s a failure of
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The key difference is that Armstrong applies recombination to the relational universals, instead of treating them
as a structure in which we can freely recombine entities. So Armstrong, unlike myself, does not permit structural
necessities.
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plenitude here. For there is a plenitude of possibilities for all first-order universals, but
not for the higher-order universals.152
Second, F-HD on its own has no way of generating possibilities for higher-order
states of affairs. So a separate principle of plenitude will need to be put forward. This
means there is work that HD does, that F-HD cannot perform. Now, the problem doesn’t
arise for the totality state of affairs that are the truthmakers for general and negative
truths. Once you’ve settled all the first-order states of affairs in a world, there cannot be
any variation in the totality state of affairs. But we do have the problem for states of
affairs involving nomic relations between universals. Armstrong holds that the laws
could be different than they actually are, but restricting recombination in the way that
F-HD does leaves us unable to generate further possibilities about how the laws hold.
Even worse, a very natural way to generate further laws of nature given Armtrong’s view
of laws is to apply a combinatorial approach to the laws. We can hold that every pattern
of instantiation of the laws between properties is possible. But applying recombination to
the laws makes it even harder to see why we don’t simply accept HD. It seems like we
are accepting recombination just so long as it doesn’t raise a problem for one’s favored
view.
So F-HD is a less attractive principle of plenitude compared with HD, and there is
a cost to accepting F-HD rather than HD. Now, Armstrong does give arguments for
positing higher-order states of affairs. He argues that we must include totality states of
affairs as well as states of affairs involving the nomic relation holding between universals
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Bird (2007: 96-97) and Handfield (2005) raise a similar complaint.
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in our ontology. Now is not the place to evaluate those arguments, though it goes without
saying that they have not gone unchallenged.

Nevertheless, I here leave open the

possibility that Armstrong’s arguments overcome the cost of adopting a less attractive
principle of plenitude. For present purposes, I’m primarily interested in establishing that
considerations of plenitude give us reason to prefer HD over its rivals, leaving open that
this may be overcome by other pieces of evidence.

6.2 Necessitarianism about Laws and Causation

Let’s now turn to philosophers that hold that the laws and causal relations are
somehow necessary; in other words, we’ll turn to law necessitarians. This involves a
much more radical shift away from the Humean conception of modality, however that
may be more promising to find a better principle of plenitude. The previous principles of
plenitude were problematic because they were merely a restricted version of HD. A more
radical shift away won’t take the form of a restriction on HD, and so will avoid this
problem.
There are many ways of holding that the laws of nature are necessary; let’s first
consider views that are based around identity of indiscernibles theses. Later I’ll consider
other types of law necessitarianism.

6.2.1. Identity of Indiscernibles
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An identity of indiscernibles thesis says that, necessarily, there are no distinct
entities indiscernible in a particular respect.153 Given a general, schematic notion of
indiscernibility, call it ‘indiscernibilitys’ we have a schematic version of the identity of
indiscernibles:

Schematic Identity of Indiscernibles Necessarily, if x is indiscernibles from y, then
x=y.

We get different identity of indiscernibles theses by restricting the kinds of
entities that x and y are and by spelling out the notion of indiscernibility. The most
well-known thesis understands indiscernibility in terms of sharing qualitative properties
and relations, in a sense that excludes non-qualitative properties such as being identical
with Socrates, being the President of the U. S., or being five feet from Aristotle. While
often not explicit, most discussions of this traditional thesis focus only on particulars, and
do not consider applying it to properties or other kinds of entities. Call this thesis the
identity of qualitatively indiscernible particulars.154
This thesis rules out the possibility of a world containing only two iron spheres,
with no qualitative property or relation distinguishing the two. One might object to the
thesis on the basis of the modal intuition that such a world is genuinely possible, as in
Black (1952). However, Adams (1979) advances another objection by constructing a
continuity argument. He has us consider worlds that are much like the world containing
153

One could also consider identity of indiscernibles theses intended to be merely contingently true, rather than
necessarily true, but that lies outside of my interest here.
154
For more discussion, see Forrest (2016).
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only two iron spheres, except there is a slight difference between the spheres that makes
them discernible. For example, suppose there is a slight dent in one of the spheres. We
can imagine a series of worlds where the dent is made slightly smaller and smaller until
we get to a world where the spheres are qualitatively indiscernible. Adams argues that
the possibility of worlds with nearly indiscernible spheres pressures us to accept the
possibility of a similar world containing indiscernible spheres. His argument is intended
to carry force beyond the mere modal intuition that the indiscernible spheres are possible.
155

The thesis that qualitatively indiscernible particulars are identical is the most
well-known identity of indiscernibles thesis, but we often consider theses of this kind for
other kinds entities. For example, the set-theoretic axiom of extensionality states that if
sets x and y contain the same members then they are identical. This is an identity of
indiscernibles thesis; it says that sets that are indiscernible with respect to their members
are identical. There are similar principles for propositions. We can consider whether
necessarily co-extensive propositions are identical; in other words, whether propositions
that are indiscernible with respect to which possible worlds they are true in are identical.
We can also consider identity of indiscernibles theses for properties. But in what
respects are properties discernible from one another? In other words, what features do
properties have, in terms of which they are discernible or indiscernible? We can
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There is a strong case to be made that the identity of qualitatively indiscernible particulars is violated by quantum
mechanical phenomena, see French (2015) for details. But regardless of whether we should reject the principle on
other grounds, we can still consider how strong Adams’ continuity argument is. This is of particular interest for
comparing Adams’ continuity argument with other continuity arguments raised against identity of indiscernibles
theses applied to properties. Note that considerations of quantum mechanics only supports the possibility of
indiscernible particulars, not indiscernible properties.
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distinguish three broad categories of features. First are structural features, such as being
a monadic property or a two-placed relation. Properties also fall into families; for
example, the mass properties exhibit a certain sort of structure, whereas the charge
properties exhibit a different sort of structure (since there are negative charge properties,
but not negative mass properties). These features won’t play a prominent role in what
follows, for surely many properties are indiscernible from one another with respect to
their structural features.
The second feature we can consider is a property’s pattern of instantiation. For
simplicity, throughout I will only consider instantiated properties. So every property will
have a non-trivial pattern of instantiation.
Finally, and of most relevance here, properties have a causal and nomic role.
Properties can be compared in terms of their causal and lawlike relations to other
properties. Now, my interest is in causal essentialist identity of indiscernibles theses.
These principles say that if properties P and Q are indiscernible with respect to their
causal and nomic relations, then they are identical. I’ll argue that we can construct
continuity arguments against these theses, and that the same considerations that support
Adams’ argument also support these arguments. However, first I‘ll motivate the causal
essentialist identity of indiscernible theses.

We’ll see that accepting prominent

motivations of causal essentialism also motivate accepting an identity of indiscernibles
thesis.156

156

Adams original case only makes use of a single world with nearly indiscernible spheres, and takes this to be a
reason to accept a world with indiscernible spheres. My presentation of the argument uses a series of worlds that
leads to the world with indiscernible spheres. I think this is a stronger way to present the argument, but I admit that
this may not be what Adams originally had in mind, so this may only be an argument suggested by Adams. In an
interesting forthcoming paper, Rodriguez-Pereyra (Forthcoming) criticizes Adams’ argument, focusing on the
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6.2.2 Causal Essentialism

The core thesis of causal essentialism is:

Causal Essentialism (CE) Necessarily, for any property P, if P bears a causal or
nomic relation to another property, then P necessarily bears that relation to that
property.157

CE constrains what’s possible. It rules out possibilities where a property bears
causal and nomic relations differently from how it actually bears them. There are no
possibilities where mass fails to interact with force and acceleration in the way it actually
does. But does the causal essentialist further identify properties that are indiscernible
with respect to their causal and nomic relations? In a moment, I’ll argue that the major
motivations for CE also motivate identifying indiscernible properties. But it’s worth first
considering an initial reason to accept an identity of indiscernibles thesis that is
independent of these motivations. Given that CE is true, we now face an explanatory
burden. Why must a property necessarily bear its causal and nomic relations? For

premise that if there is a possible world with nearly indiscernible objects, then there is a possible world with
indiscernble objects. However, focusing on a series of worlds brings to light considerations in favor of the argument
that differ from the one’s that Rodriguez-Pereyra considers in his paper. I will focus on these considerations in
detail when I compare the continuity argument involving indiscernible spheres with the continuity arguments
relevant to causal essentialism.
157
For our purposes, we’re only interested in properties that figure into causal or nomic relations. Some causal
essentialists might restrict (CE) to certain properties, for example, they might not apply (CE) to spatiotemporal
relations, cf. Ellis and Lierse (1994). Such a restriction will not affect my arguments so I set it aside.
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example, why must charge repel like charges and attract opposite charges? Now if
properties are somehow individuated in terms of their causal and nomic relations then we
have a ready answer. For part of what makes a property charge is that it repels like
instances of itself and attracts opposite instances of itself. David Armstrong makes this
point. If properties are individuated in this way then the necessity is, in his words, a
“transparent and obvious necessity that holds … between property and manifestations in
suitable conditions” (1997: 251).

But, as he goes on to say, if properties are not

individuated in this way, then the necessity is a “totally opaque, totally brute necessity”
(ibid). So by endorsing an identity of indiscernibles thesis, the causal essentialist can
avoid a commitment to these totally opaque and brute necessities.
Aside from this explanatory motivation, two prominent motivations for CE
motivate an identity of indiscernibles thesis. First we’ll see how they motivate CE. In
later sections, I’ll argue that they also motivate identity of indiscernibles theses.158
The Epistemic Motivation.

Suppose it is contingent what causal and nomic

relations a property has. In that case it should be possible to switch the causal and nomic
relations that two properties bear to one another. For concreteness, let’s consider Lewis’s
(1986a: 162) example of switching one of the quark colors C with one of the quark
flavors F.159 Now consider a possible world exactly like the actual world except that C
and F have switched all of their causal and nomic relations, as well as their patterns of

158

In chapter eight, I will consider these motivations in further detail, arguing that they do not give us reason to
reject the Humean metaphysics. For now I only want to consider how these considerations motivate causal
essentialism and an accompanying identity of indiscernibles thesis.
159
There are questions about exactly which properties can switch their causal and nomic relations that I want to
gloss over. For example, Black (2000: 103) argues that the example involving quark color doesn’t work.
Nevertheless, if one isn’t a causal essentialist, presumably there are some properties that can be switched in the way
the example requires.
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instantiation. So something is C in this world iff it is F in the actual world, and likewise
something is F in this world iff it is C in the actual world. It seems like we would never
have any grounds for knowing whether we are in the actual world or the alternative
possibility. We would receive the same evidence in either possibility. Notice that in each
world, C and F are distinguished by their differing patterns of instantiation; at the very
least, they have instances in different locations. But this won’t help us know which world
we are in. For our only access to these properties is by way of their causal and nomic
role, so we’ll know that a particular causal and nomic role corresponds with a particular
pattern of instantiation, but we won’t be able to know whether C or F has that pattern of
instantiation.
Some philosophers object to this sort of unresolvable ignorance, preferring a
metaphysics that rules out these skeptical cases. If we hold that every property has its
nomic relations essentially then we can rule out this rival possibility, for it is impossible
that C and F switch their causal and nomic relations. This is the epistemic motivation.160
The Quiddistic Difference Motivation. The above example involving switching C
and F is an example of a mere quiddistic difference. This is the property-theoretic
analogue of a mere haecceitistic difference; the difference between two possible worlds
that are qualitatively exactly alike, differing only with respect to which particular bears
which qualitative properties (see Chisholm 1967). Likewise, in the case involving C and
F, the only difference between the worlds is over which property plays which causal and
nomic role and has which pattern of instantiation. However, just as some philosophers
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Shoemaker (1980) and Bird (2007: 76-79) both appeal to this motivation.
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are skeptical of mere haecceitistic differences, there are philosophers suspicious of mere
quiddistic differences, rejecting that we have two distinct possibilities. Rather, they hold
that we have the same possibility differently described; a distinction without a difference.
We can reject merely quiddistic differences by holding that every property essentially has
its nomic relations, so it is impossible that C and F switch their causal and nomic
relations.161
The rejection of mere quiddistic differences may be based on a modal intuition,
but it can also be bolstered by appeal to a general methodological principle. In a slogan,
the methodological principle is: don’t distinguish without necessity.

Hawthorne

considers this line of thought. As he puts it: “all scientific knowledge about negative
charge is knowledge about the causal role it plays. Science seems to offer no conception
of negative charge as something over and above ‘the thing that plays the charge role’”
(2001: 368). If so, why distinguish between a property and the causal role that it plays?
Admitting mere quiddistic differences involves making a distinction that science has no
need for. In the absence of outweighing reasons, we ought not to make a distinction that
science has no need for. In Hawthorne’s words, “why posit armchair distinctions that are
never needed by science” (ibid)? This is the quiddistic difference motivation.162

6.2.3 Structurally Indiscernible Properties

161

As in the case of the epistemic motivation, attempting to distinguish the properties on the basis of the location of
their instances doesn’t help, since the properties swap their patterns of instantiation between worlds. Further,
holding that their patterns of instantiation are essential seems to be a non-starter. Surely it is contingent how, say,
mass is distributed across spacetime.
162
Black (2000) argues against a Humean conception of properties on the grounds of mere quiddistic differences.
Bird (2007: 73-80) develops this into an argument in favor of causal essentialism. See also Mumford (2004:
103-104, 151-152) and Kistler (2002: 69).
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I’ll now argue that these motivations push the causal essentialist to accept an
identity of indiscernibles thesis. They require rejecting worlds where the laws have
symmetries; that is, worlds where two properties play symmetrical roles in the laws. For
example, consider a world containing all of our actual properties and laws, but also
containing properties shmass and shmorce that bear nomic relations to other properties,
forming the same nomic structure as our own laws, with shmass being symmetrical to
mass and shmorce being symmetrical to force.
It will be helpful to consider a more abstract, but precise characterization. I’m
going to simplify our discussion and assume that laws are relations between properties;
though, this simplifying assumption is not essential. Where A and B are properties, I’ll
represent a nomic relation between them as ‘AnB.’ This framework allows us to more
precisely characterize the idea of properties playing symmetrical roles in the laws. As an
example, consider a world with the following laws: AnC ∧ BnC ∧ (A ∧ B)nD (see
Hawthorne 2001, 373). Suppose as a matter of fact that A and B are distinct properties
(though, as this stage I’m not supposing that a law explicitly states that A is distinct from
B; later we’ll reconsider this). A and B play the same role in the laws; so their places in
the laws are symmetrical. This is easy to see if we Ramsify the lawbook, by replacing
each predicate with a predicate variable and placing the appropriate number of quantifiers
in front.163

Ramsifying the lawbook gives us the purely structural features of the

lawbook. This gives us ∃F1∃F2∃F3∃F4 (F1nF3 ∧ F2nF3 ∧ (F1∧F2)n F4). Notice that

163

This procedure is named for Frank Ramsey who developed it in his (1929).
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nothing about the Ramsified lawbook can distinguish A’s place in the laws from B’s
place. The sentence would be true if we replaced ‘A’ with ‘F1’ or with ‘F2,’ and likewise
for ‘B.’ Since the place in the laws that A plays is symmetrical with the place that B
plays, they play the same structural role in the laws. If two properties play symmetrical
roles in the laws, say that they are structurally indiscernible. We can more precisely
define this in terms of the notion of an open sentence obtained from a Ramsified
lawbook. If we take a Ramsified lawbook and delete one of the quantifiers, this will give
us an open sentence where one of the predicate variables is not bound by a quantifier.
For example, we can obtain an open sentence from our above Ramsified sentence by
deleting the first quantifier, giving us ∃F2∃F3∃F4 (F1nF3 ∧ F2nF3 ∧ (F1∧F2)n F4); notice
that F1 is free in this sentence.

A property satisfies an open sentence when a true

sentence results from replacing the free variable with a predicate expressing that property.
Finally, two properties are structurally indiscernible in a world iff the properties satisfy
all the same open sentences obtained from the Ramsified lawbook of that world.
Properties A and B both satisfy the above open sentence; when substituted for F1 we get a
true sentence. It turns out that A and B satisfy all the same open sentences obtained from
the Ramsey sentence, so they are structurally indiscernible.
Accepting distinct, structurally indiscernible properties is in tension with the
motivations for causal essentialism discussed above. Consider a world W1 with the
symmetrical laws just considered, and suppose that not everything that is an A is also a
B.

Now consider a second world W2 just like W1 accept we flip the pattern of

instantiation of A and B. If x is A in W1, then it’s B in W2; if it’s B in W1, then it’s A in
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W2. Worlds like this are a threat to the epistemic motivation. If we further suppose that
the world is such that the only epistemic grip we have on A and B is in terms of their
lawlike relations to C and D, then we will not be able to tell if we are in W1 or W2. We
can tell that a particular object produced an instance of C in a lawlike way, but that won’t
tell us if the object was an A or a B. Given two separate instances where a C was
produced we won’t be able to tell if the same property produced C in both cases or if
different properties produced C. So admitting these worlds runs afoul of the epistemic
motivation.

It might be objected that this skeptical case is not as worrying as the

skeptical case originally used for the epistemic motivation. But it’s hard to to see what
would justify treating these cases differently. In both cases we are threatened with
irremediable ignorance about which properties are playing which role.
As for the quiddistic difference motivation, W1 and W2 differ merely
quiddistically. They only differ with respect to where the two properties are instantiated.
So if we reject mere quiddistic differences, then we must deny that these worlds are
distinct.
Given the epistemic and quiddistic difference motivations, and the explanatory
burden to explain why a property necessarily bears its nomic relations, causal
essentialists should reject the possibility of distinct, structurally indiscernible properties.
They should accept the following identity of indiscernibles thesis:
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Identity of Structurally Indiscernible Properties (SI) Necessarily, structurally
indiscernible properties are identical.164

Aside from considering what possibilities this sort of causal essentialist rejects,
we should also consider what possibilities they accept.

I’m going to construct a

continuity argument starting with possibilities that the causal essentialist accepts, so we
need to know just what these possibilities are. So we need a principle of plenitude for the
causal essentialist. John Hawthorne (2001: 370-371) has suggested a natural principle on
behalf of the causal essentialist. The core idea is to allow that any way of defining a
lawbook corresponds to a possibility. Making use of Ramsified lawbooks works well
here. Ramsified lawbooks provide a natural way of defining possible properties and
lawbooks in accordance with the causal essentialist, for they don’t say anything about
particular properties, only generally about the structure of the laws. So they won’t say
that a particular property bears nomic relations differently from how it actually does.
Further, Ramsified lawbooks are unable to distinguish between properties that play
symmetrical roles in the laws, as we saw when we considered the Ramsified lawbook
from before. So it’s natural to say that any logically consistent Ramsified lawbook is
possible.
However, there’s a difficulty.

A Ramsified lawbook can explicitly say that

symmetrical properties are distinct from one another by including a conjunct of the form

164

Bird (2007: 138-146) accepts (SI). Hawthorne (2001) considers this view at length calling it ‘causal
structuralism.’ Schaffer (2005) also considers it, calling it ‘nomic necessitarianism.’ He classifies Ellis (2001),
Ellise and Lierse (1994), and Kistler (2002) as proponents of this view, but considers the classification as largely
indeterminate.
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‘Fn≠Fm.’ In that case, while the Ramsified lawbook cannot distinguish between the
symmetrical properties, it can guarantee that there are distinct, symmetrical properties.
For example, consider our example of symmetrical properties again. We had the laws
AnC ∧ BnC ∧ (A ∧ B)nD with the corresponding Ramsified lawbook ∃F1∃F2∃F3∃F4
(F1nF3 ∧ F2nF3 ∧ (F1∧F2)n F4). If we added the conjunct ‘F1≠F2,’ then the Ramsified
lawbook will guarantee that there are two distinct, structurally indiscernible properties.165
If any logically consistent Ramsified lawbook is possible, then our principle of plenitude
will contradict SI. To remedy this we want the Ramsified lawbook to be completely
neutral with respect to symmetries, so that the same Ramsified lawbook is consistent with
the symmetrical properties being identical or with them being distinct. That way,
whenever we have a Ramsified lawbook with different predicates playing symmetrical
roles in the laws, SI will guarantee that the predicates refer to the same property. To
achieve this, let’s define a structural lawbook as a Ramsified lawbook that doesn’t
logically imply the existence of distinct, structurally indiscernible properties.166
Given this restriction, structural lawbooks are neutral with respect to distinct,
structurally indiscernible properties, though regular, non-Ramsified lawbooks need not
be. A structural lawbook that is true at a world with distinct, structurally indiscernible
properties is also true at a world without them. Whereas there are regular lawbooks that
are only true at worlds with distinct, structurally indiscernible properties, such as a
lawbook that explicitly states that the symmetrical properties are distinct. So if we are

On the way I’m understanding the predicate for the nomic relation, the conjunct ‘(F1∧F2)n F4)’ does not imply
that F1 is distinct from F2. It is consistent with them being identical.
166
I don’t mean to make a claim about whether the laws of nature generally do or don’t explicitly say that two
properties are distinct. I’m merely providing a framework for formulating a principle of plenitude for the causal
essentialist.
165
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merely asserting the possible truth of a structural lawbook we will never be committed to
the possibility of a world with distinct, structurally indiscernible properties. We can now
state our principle of plenitude:

Structural Combinatorialism (SC) For any logically consistent structural lawbook
there is a world in which that lawbook is true.
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The combination of CE, SI, and SC gives us a clear conception of logical space.
This view rejects worlds with symmetries in the laws, so any reason for thinking that
such worlds are possible is also a reason for rejecting this version of causal essentialism.
Indeed Hawthorne (2001: 373-374) and Schaffer (2005: 12-13) take our modal intuition
that these worlds are possible to be a serious problem for this view.
However, we can also construct a continuity argument starting from possibilities
that the causal essentialist accepts that involve nearly structurally indiscernible properties
that lead to worlds involving structurally indiscernible properties.

This continuity

argument brings out further costs to rejecting worlds with distinct, structurally
indiscernible properties.
Consider a world where one property is nomically connected with nine properties,
and a different property is nomically connected with one property. Omitting the predicate
quantifiers for readability, we can put the laws as follows: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧ ... ∧ FnG9 ∧
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I have diverged from Hawthorne’s principle. He does not add my restriction to guarantee that SC will not entail
worlds with distinct, structurally indiscernible properties; instead he intends for it to have that consequence, see
Hawthorne (2001: 373).
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HnI1 (with further laws that allow us to distinguish G1...G9 from one another).

SC

guarantees that this world is possible. Imagine a range of worlds where we subtract one
property from those that are nomically connected to the first property, and add one
property to those that are nomically connected to the second property. Upon applying the
procedure, the laws in the second world in the series are: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧ ... ∧ FnG8 ∧
HnI1 ∧ HnI2. After three more applications of the procedure, the laws in the final world
of the series are: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧ ... ∧ FnG5 ∧ HnI1 ∧ HnI2 ∧ ... ∧ HnI5. If F and G are
distinct in this final world, then we have distinct, structurally indiscernible properties, for
they satisfy all the same open sentences obtained from the Ramsified lawbook of this
world.169

This contradicts SI, so the causal essentialist must hold that F and H are

identical in this final world (as well as that the G properties are identical with the I
properties).
There are a number of common features between this case and Adams’ continuity
argument that show in each case there is a serious cost to rejecting the final possibility
containing the distinct, indiscernible entities. To be clear, I’m not saying that Adams
himself draws attention to all of these features, rather I’m attempting to spell out features
that makes Adams’ case seem so intuitive, and show that they also apply to my case.
First, the cases mobilize our modal intuitions in a way that considering only the
single world doesn’t. When we consider the procedure that gives us the series of worlds,

I have in mind something like ‘G1nG2 ∧ (G1 ∧ G2)nG3 ∧ (G1 ∧ G2 ∧ G3)nG4 ...’ These laws allow us to
distinguish G1...G9 from one another, but they won’t affect the upshot of the case in the text. When we introduce
more properties to be nomically connected to H, there are also laws that allow us to distinguish those properties
from one another.
169
Assume that the laws that distinguish the G properties from one another and the laws that distinguish the I
properties from one another are symmetrical so that once there are the same number of each, the laws don’t
distinguish the G properties from the I properties.
168
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and that normally this procedure produces possibilities, there’s a strong sense that the
final world is possible too. In the two spheres case, normally making small changes to
the spheres preserves possibility; each of the worlds before the final one is clearly
possible. This produces a strong intuition that the final world is also possible. Likewise,
in the symmetrical properties case, each of the worlds before the final world is possible,
by the causal essentialist’s own lights. So the procedure normally preserves possibility.
This also produces the strong sense that the final world with distinct indiscernible
properties is also possible.
Our modal intuitions seem sensitive to the idea that if a change preserves
possibility, then, in general, that change continues to preserve possibility.170 For example,
it is possible that there could exist a single mug, or two mugs, or three mugs. This
change of adding a mug preserves possibility in these cases, so it should continue to
preserve possibility afterwards. It would be odd to hold that there is a specific, finite
maximum number of mugs. The idea underlying this principle is that the possible and the
impossible are extremely dissimilar from one another, so if two propositions differ in
their modal status then they must be very dissimilar. But if some applications of a change
are not enough to cross the divide from possibility to impossibility, then continued
applications should generally preserve possibility. This idea is, of course, defeasible and
can be overridden by other factors, but it does seem to play a central role in our modal
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See Rasmussen (2014) for one way of developing this idea.
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epistemology.171 This thought bolsters our modal intuition that the final world in each
series is possible.
One might object that Adams’ case is importantly disanalogous from my own
case. In Adams’ case we have the same spheres in each world in the series. Since the
spheres are clearly distinct in the first world, and given the necessity of distinctness, it
follows that they are distinct in the last world. This contrasts with my case because we
have entirely different properties from world to world, so we cannot apply this reasoning.
One might object that this difference makes for a strong intuitive difference between the
two cases.
However, I don’t think the difference poses a problem. While the transworld
identity of the spheres in Adams’ case may play some intuitive work, the question is
whether there is something analogously intuitive about my case. Given the necessity of
distinctness, we can’t say that the two spheres are distinct in one world, yet identical in
the final world. But we also need to make a further claim: that both of the spheres are in
the final world. We need to rule out that only one of the original spheres (or a third
sphere) are in the final world. The intuitive force of the case is that it is surely possible
for the dent in the sphere to be slightly smaller, while both spheres still exist. But is there
something analogously intuitive about my case? In my case, the key question is whether
it is plausible to hold that in the final world in the series there is the same number of
properties as there are in every other world in the series. But this seems very intuitive.
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In particular, we need to beware of changes that are disjunctive; for example, the change of adding a mug unless
there are five mugs, in which case a contradiction is made true. Clearly, this change will sometimes preserve
possibility (whenever there are less than five mugs), but it won’t always. That said, the changes made in both
Adams’ continuity argument and my own don’t involve disjunctive changes of this sort.
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Intuitively, it is possible to make a structural change to the laws without also making a
much bigger structural change in the number of properties in the laws, particularly when
this change doesn’t affect the number of properties in every other world in the series. So
while the fact that Adams’ case involves the transworld identity of the spheres is a way in
which his case differs from mine, I don’t think my case is any worse for that.
Moreover, the transworld identity of the spheres in Adams’ case is not essential.
Some philosophers, such as Lewis (1986b) reject the transworld identity of any objects.
On this view, an object inhabits only a single world. The de re possibilities for an object
are understood in terms of counterparts of that object in different worlds.172 But there is
no bar to these philosophers finding Adams’ argument powerful. Rather they can
understand the case in purely qualitative terms, where we say that there are spheres in
each world that have particular shape properties. The argument can be just as strong for
these philosophers, so the transworld identity of the spheres is not essential to the case.
Second, both series reveal that the identity of indiscernibles theses are committed
to unintuitive cases of counterfactual dependence. In Adams’ case, if the indiscernible
spheres are identical, then the number of spheres is counterfactually dependent on small
changes to the qualitative nature of the spheres. For example, in the world right before
the final world, we get the truth of strange counterfactuals like ‘if the dent on the sphere
were slightly smaller, then there would be fewer spheres’ (cf. Adams 1979, 17). There is
an unintuitive counterfactual dependence of the number of spheres on slight changes to
the qualitative features of the spheres. A change that normally does not affect the number
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For more details, see Lewis (1968) and (1986b: 192-264).
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of spheres, given that in every other world in the series, a slight change in the size of the
dent doesn’t change the number of spheres. Likewise, in my case, we also get strange
counterfactual dependence. If the structurally indiscernible properties are identical in the
last world, then the number of properties is counterfactually dependent on small changes
to the structure of the laws. In the second to last world if the structure of the laws were
changed by adding a property and removing a property in the way described, then there
would be fewer properties. The number of properties is counterfactually dependent on a
small change to the structure of the laws that normally does not affect the number of
properties, as can be seen by considering the other worlds.
Third, both series exhibit unacceptable gaps in logical space. It will be helpful to
recall the example of the kind of gaps I have in mind that we considered earlier. Suppose
we have a series of worlds containing a space with different numbers of dimension, we
have a world with three dimensions, a world with four dimensions, a world with six
dimensions, and so on.

But there is no possible world containing exactly five

dimensions. There’s a clear sense in which this series is incomplete, it is missing a
possibility. Further, there’s something arbitrary about this series; it seems arbitrary to
allow some dimensions, but not the others. Yet nothing can be arbitrary about the space
of possibilities.
It isn’t easy to say precisely what constitutes an unacceptable gap, but here’s one
way of spelling out the idea. It is natural to hold that the possible worlds form a sphere
around each possible world in the sense that for any two possible worlds w and w* and
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for any impossible world i, w and w* are closer to one another than either is to i.173 As
usual, I’m understanding closeness in terms of similarity. So in other words, any two
possible worlds are more similar to one another than either is to any impossible world.
An unacceptable gap obtains when this is violated; that is, when an impossible world is
closer to a possible world, than that possible world is to another possible world. We get
these gaps when we have a series of worlds that corresponds to a natural ordering of
similarity, but where there is a gap in the series; where there is an impossible world
sandwiched between two possible worlds. In such a case, it seems that the impossible
world is closer to the possible worlds that sandwich it, than they are to one another. A
gap of this sort suggests that the space of possibilities is incomplete, for without it, the
possible worlds don’t form a sphere around each world. This makes sense of the case
involving the dimensions of space, for the series demonstrates that an impossible world is
closer to various possible worlds than they are to each other. A world with five
dimensions is closer to a world with four dimensions and a world with six dimensions
than the worlds are to one another, other things being equal. As another example,
suppose it were possible for donkeys and dragons to coexist in any spatial arrangement,
except they cannot be exactly one mile apart. This gives us a series with a gap where we
start with a world where a dragon and donkey are two miles apart and each successive
world in the series brings them closer and closer together. We have a gap where they are
exactly a mile apart. Holding this seems unacceptable and we can make sense of that by
seeing that the gap involves a case where an impossible world is closer to two possible

173

This idea forms the basis of Kment’s (2014) theory of modality. Lange (2009) makes use of a similar idea in his
account of laws of nature.
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worlds than they are to each other. The impossible world where the donkey and dragon
are exactly one mile apart is closer to a possible world where they are just barely more
than a mile apart and closer to a possible world where they are just barely less than a mile
apart, than either possible world is to the other. This violates the idea that the possible
worlds form a sphere.
Both Adams’ series and my series demonstrate the the relevant identity of
indiscernibles thesis involves an unacceptable gap in logical space. In each case we have
a gap in a series that gives us a natural ordering of similarity, with a gap centered on the
world with two qualitatively indiscernible spheres and a gap centered on the world with
two structurally indiscernible properties. This gives us cases where a possible world is
closer to an impossible world than to another possible world. A world with distinct
indiscernible spheres stands ‘in between’ a world with nearly indiscernible spheres, and a
world with a single sphere in two locations. Likewise, a world with distinct, structurally
indiscernible properties stands ‘in between’ the world with nearly indiscernible
properties, and the world where F and H are identical. These gaps seem to show that the
space of possible worlds is not a sphere, and this gives us our problem. For it is
extremely plausible that the possible worlds do form a sphere.
It is instructive to consider how one might respond to Adams’ series.

A

prominent version of the identity of qualitatively indiscernible particulars makes use of
the bundle theory, according to which the world fundamentally consists of bundles of
properties.174 On this view, we can describe Adams’ series in such a way that it no longer
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See (O’Leary-) Hawthorne (1995) for more on the relationship between the bundle theory and the identity of
qualitatively indiscernible particulars.
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involves a gap. For the fundamental facts in each world must be expressed in terms of
bundles of properties. The fundamental facts have the following form: P, Q, and R are
bundled together and T, U, and V are bundled together. It is important to note that there
is no way of saying there are two distinct bundles of the same properties. Suppose we
said “P, Q, and R are bundled together and T, U, and V are bundled together, and P, Q,
and R are bundled together.” This doesn’t tell us that there are two distinct bundles of P,
Q, and R, rather it merely repeats the same idea two times. This statement has the logical
form of (using italic letters to represent propositions): ‘P and Q and P.’ This statement
adds no content beyond what is already in ‘P and Q.’
Let ‘S’ be the property of being spherical, and ‘S1’ some maximally specific,
nearly spherical shape property. Then the first world in Adams’ series will be a world
where S is bundled with several other properties, as is S1. In the next world we replace S1
with S2, a different maximally specific, nearly spherical shape property. This will
gradually continue until the Si properties lead to S, and we will simply have S bundled
with several properties. But there doesn’t seem to be a gap here, for there is no sense to
be made of two distinct bundles of the same properties. Given this metaphysics, there is
no impossible world that stands in between two possible worlds.
Set aside whether or not this ultimately helps defend the identity of qualitatively
indiscernible particulars.175

The important point to see is that the causal essentialist

cannot make use of this defense. Let’s consider what fundamental facts the causal
essentialist accepts. So far, I’ve been understanding causal essentialism in terms of
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Hawley (2009: 113) argues that there are difficulties with this response.
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lawbooks. On this approach, the fundamental facts involve a lawlike relation holding
between properties. But on this view, there is a clearly describable structure that the
causal essentialist rules out; namely, one that explicitly says there are two distinct
structurally indiscernible properties. This contrasts with the bundle theory, where there is
no way to describe the rejected possibility in the bundle theorist’s fundamental terms.
But let’s consider whether there are different ways of understanding causal
essentialism. A natural thought is to try to more closely parody the bundle theory. On
one prominent approach, we conceive of properties as bundles of powers, as in
Shoemaker (1980). Think of a power as telling us how two properties causally interact
with one another. For example, mass has the power to produce force when it interacts
with acceleration. We can regiment a power as (P, Q) which a property has just in case it
produces Q when it causally interacts with P. So read the first place in the pair as the
stimulus, and the second place as the result. We can now give the fundamental facts in
terms of bundles of these powers, such as: (P, Q) and (R, S) are bundled together and (P,
S) and (R, Q) are bundled together. At a first glance this achieves the same result as the
bundle theory of particulars, because there is no way of saying that there are two bundles
of the same powers.
However, there is a problem with this approach. The properties that show up in
the powers are conceived of as bundles of powers. So we need some way of saying that a
bundle of powers is itself a member of another bundle of powers. For example, P appears
in a bundle above, but P itself is a bundle of powers. For concreteness, let’s say that P is
the bundle of (F1, F2) and (F3, F4). Our description of the fundamental facts will need to
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include this bundle of powers, but it will also need to say that this bundle of powers is a
member of another bundle of powers. It seems the only way we can do that is by
referring to bundles with singular terms, or introducing some kind of abstraction device
that allows us to introduce corresponding singular terms. Once we do that we fix the
problem. We can say that P is a member of a bundle of powers, and then we can say that
P is identical with a specific bundle of powers. But this also leads to trouble, for once we
refer to bundles with singular terms, then we can say that two bundles of the same powers
are distinct from one another. For example, we can say that P is identical with (F1, F2)
and (F3, F4) being bundled together, and Q is identical with (F1, F2) and (F3, F4) being
bundled together, and P is distinct from Q. Since the language for expressing the
fundamental facts can express this possibility, we haven’t removed the gap in logical
space.
Of course a defender of SI could insist that preserving the identity of
indiscernibles thesis itself counts for similarity to such a degree that the case doesn’t
involve an unacceptable gap. The impossible world containing two distinct, indiscernible
properties fails to preserve this thesis, whereas the two nearby worlds do preserve the
thesis. This is a principled way to avoid a commitment to a problematic gap, and
preserve the idea that the space of metaphysically possible worlds forms a sphere. But
this doesn’t really address the case, for the series of worlds seems to challenge the idea
that preserving SI counts very much for similarity. Suppose one held that there was no
gap in the case involving the dimensions of space, because the impossible world with five
dimensions is very dissimilar from the other worlds on the grounds that it fails to
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preserve not having exactly five dimensions which every other world in the series
preserves. But clearly the series challenges thinking that preserving not having exactly
five dimensions counts very much for similarity. Likewise, my case challenges thinking
that preserving SI counts very much for similarity. So this response comes at an intuitive
cost. The causal essentialist may hold that it is a price worth paying, but it’s still a cost
nonetheless.
Lastly, both series involve surprising constraints on the fundamental facts. Recall
the principle of plenitude that we formulated for the causal essentialist. This provides a
natural way of defining possible laws and properties in terms of Ramsified lawbooks.
But what the series show us is that this natural way of defining possible laws and
properties leads us to a possibility that the causal essentialist rejects. Given that the
structure of the laws comprises fundamental facts for the causal essentialist, this seems to
be a surprising constraint on how the fundamental facts can be arranged. Recall that the
principle of plenitude is constrained so that it does not generate any worlds containing
distinct, structurally indiscernible properties. The series of worlds shows us that this is a
mere stipulation on the possible ways of generating fundamental facts. It doesn’t fall out
naturally from the guiding idea behind that principle of plenitude, because the guiding
idea leads to possibilities that the causal essentialist rejects. There’s a kind of mismatch
between how the causal essentialist constrains possibility and the causal essentialist’s
principle of plenitude. The simplest and most natural way to generate possibilities, from
the causal essentialist’s point of view, needs a surprising stipulation on it.
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This issue also arises in Adams’ case, though not as obviously because we don’t
have a principle of plenitude to work with. But we can see the general idea. The spheres
case shows a surprising way in which the fundamental properties of the particulars are
constrained. Normally, what fundamental properties one particular instantiates seems
independent of the fundamental properties instantiated by distinct objects, but the series
shows we cannot completely vary the properties independently, because once the spheres
are indiscernible, they must be identical. So the fundamental facts are constrained.
Turning to the bundle theory is again instructive. For when we consider the case
in the bundle theorist’s terms, there is no surprising restriction. This simply falls out of
the fact that for the bundle theorist there is no sense to be made of two distinct bundles of
the same properties. But like before, the causal essentialist cannot avail herself of this
response. As we saw above, in the analogue of the bundle theory, the bundle of powers
theory, we can make sense of two distinct bundles of the same powers. So if the causal
essentialists opts for a bundle theory of powers, there is a surprising restriction on how
the powers can be bundled together. We still have an awkward restriction on how the
fundamental facts may be arranged.
To sum up, my continuity argument brings out several costs to accepting SI, as
brought out by the four features we discussed. Now, SI constitutes a fairly strong identity
of indiscernibles thesis. Many causal essentialists prefer to accept a weaker identity of
indiscernibles thesis. Indeed, as we’ll see, this thesis avoids my continuity argument.
Let’s turn to consider that thesis.
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6.2.4 Nomically Indiscernible Properties

Let’s suppose the causal essentialist accepts worlds with symmetrical laws,
avoiding the problems in the previous section. So the causal essentialist rejects (SI),
allowing for worlds containing structurally indiscernible properties. This involves a
retreat from the motivations we discussed. But there is a weaker indiscernibility thesis
that the causal essentialist could instead endorse. Even if structurally indiscernible
properties are accepted, the causal essentialist should still reject worlds where two
properties have precisely the same causal and nomic relations. As an example, suppose
that alongside our mass properties there was also a family of properties, the mass*
properties, that are related to all the same properties in the same way as the mass
properties. Corresponding mass and mass* properties have exactly the same nomic
relations. For a more abstract case, consider the laws AnC ∧ BnC. Here A and B have
precisely the same nomic relations. If two properties bear the same nomic relations, then
they are nomically indiscernible. We can more precisely define nomically indiscernible
properties similarly to how we defined structurally indiscernible properties. However,
instead of using Ramsified lawbooks, we will use regular non-Ramsified lawbooks. We
can obtain an open sentence from a non-Ramsified lawbook by substituting every
instance of a predicate with a predicate variable, leaving the predicate variables free. So
an open sentence we get from our above example lawbook is FnC ∧ BnC. Two
properties are nomically indiscernible in a world iff they satisfy all the same open
sentences obtained from the lawbook of that world. Notice that A and B satisfy the
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above example open sentence. They also satisfy all the same open sentences obtained
from the lawbook, and so they are nomically indiscernible.176
It will be useful to compare the two notions of indiscernibility. If two properties
are structurally indiscernible, then they can be distinguished purely on the basis of the
general structure of the laws.

On the other hand, two properties are nomically

indiscernible if they can be distinguished on the basis of the lawlike relations they bear to
other particular properties. Here’s how the two notions can come apart: consider the case
of a family of properties, schmass, that are symmetrical with mass, where schmass is
related to schmorce in the way that mass is related to force. Schmass and mass properties
are structurally indiscernible from one another, for the Ramsified lawbook will not
distinguish them from one another. However, they are not nomically indiscernible, for
mass is related to force but not schmorce, whereas schmass is related to schmorce but not
force.

Note that if two properties are nomically indiscernible, then they are also

structurally indiscernible. If open sentences obtained from the non-Ramsified lawbook
don’t distinguish them, then open sentences obtained from the Ramsified lawbook won’t
either.

So the nomically indiscernible properties are a subset of the structurally

indiscernible properties.
We can now formulate another identity of indiscernibles thesis:
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This way of defining nomic indiscernibility runs into difficulties in cases where the lawbook explicitly says that
two properties are distinct. If the example lawbook AnC ∧ BnC also includes the conjunct A≠B, then A and B will
no longer be nomically indiscernible. Consider the open sentence F≠B. Only A satisfies this and not B. However,
if one holds that properties are individuated on the basis of their causal and nomic relations, then this doesn’t seem
like a legitimate way of making A and B discernible. We can handle this by requiring that when we obtain open
sentences from the lawbook, we also remove every atomic sentence involving the identity relation. But for
simplicity, I’ll set this complexity aside.
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Identity of Nomically Indiscernible Properties (NI) Necessarily, nomically
indiscernible properties are identical.177

As we saw, the core motivations for causal essentialism also motivated SI. So if
the causal essentialist rejects SI, then they can’t do full justice to those motivations. Still,
NI is a natural principle that is weaker than SI, and it manages to do some justice to those
motivations. Consider first the epistemic motivation. While the causal essentialist must
now allow some skeptical cases, accepting nomically indiscernible properties would
allow even more skeptical cases. Consider a world containing all of our actual properties
and laws, but also the family of mass* properties that have all the same nomic relations
that the mass properties have. So the mass properties are nomically indiscernible from
the mass* properties. We could have different worlds simply by substituting the mass
properties with the mass* properties, so that if something has a particular mass property,
then it has the corresponding mass* property, and vice versa. Assuming that our
epistemic access to mass is limited by its nomic relations, by how it lawfully interacts
with other properties, we would have no way of knowing which world we are in. Any
property that is nomically indiscernible from another property will generate this skeptical
worry. So if the causal essentialist wants to do any justice to the epistemic motivation at
all, she must accept NI.
Consider also the motivation from quiddistic differences. One might be willing to
tolerate mere quiddistic differences due to structurally indiscernible, but nomically
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This version of causal essentialism is defended by Shoemaker (1980) and (1998). It is considered by Schaffer
(2005), where he calls it ‘causal necessitarianism.’ See also the appendix to Hawthorne (2001).
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discernible properties. The causal essentialist might regard these worlds as a strange
quirk of logical space needed to round things out in order to avoid the problems of the
previous section. However, allowing nomically indiscernible properties leads to even
more mere quiddistic differences. Consider our two worlds from above that differ only
with respect to how the mass properties and the mass* properties are instantiated. These
two worlds differ merely quiddistically. And it can be generalized to any world that
contains a property which is nomically indiscernible from another property. So doing any
justice to the mere quiddistic differences motivation requires accepting NI.
I think it’s clear that accepting structurally indiscernible properties is a genuine
retreat for the causal essentialist since doing full justice to those motivations requires
rejecting such properties. I leave it to the causal essentialist to justify rejecting SI, while
accepting the motivations for causal essentialism that I outline above. For my purposes,
the important point is that even if the causal essentialist can’t do full justice to those
motivations, the causal essentialist should still reject nomically indiscernible properties in
order to do some justice to them.
What principle of plenitude should we pair with this version of causal
essentialism? It’s natural to extend the previous principle of plenitude that made use of
Ramsified lawbooks.

In order to ensure that this principle guarantees worlds with

symmetrical laws we lift our earlier restriction to Ramsified lawbooks that do not imply
the existence of distinct, structurally indiscernible properties. So now our principle of
plenitude can guarantee the possibility of distinct, structurally indiscernible properties.
But we also want to ensure that our principle does not imply the possibility of distinct,
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nomically indiscernible properties.

So let’s define a nomic lawbook as a Ramsified

lawbook that doesn’t logically imply the existence of distinct, nomically indiscernible
properties. We can now state our principle of plenitude:

Nomic Combinatorialism (NC) For any logically consistent nomic lawbook, there
is a world at which it is true.

So our new version of causal essentialism is the conjunction of CE, NI, and NC.
This version of causal essentialism avoids my previous continuity argument by accepting
distinct, structurally indiscernible properties. However, the current version of causal
essentialism rejects nomically indiscernible properties, and rejecting these properties also
leads to a continuity argument.
Start with a world where one property is nomically connected to ten properties,
and where a second property is nomically connected to one of the ten properties. So the
laws in this world are: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧ ... ∧ FnG10 ∧ HnG1. What’s different from before
is that F and H are nomically connected to the same property: G1. Now consider a range
of worlds where we take one of the ten properties and let it be nomically connected to the
second property. So in the second world, the second property is nomically connected to
two properties from the ten properties. In this second world the laws are: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧
... ∧ FnG10 ∧ HnG1 ∧ HnG2. After nine iterations we will have a world where both the
first and the second properties are nomically connected to the same ten properties. That
is, the laws in the world are: FnG1 ∧ FnG2 ∧ ... ∧ FnG10 ∧ HnG1 ∧ HnG2 ∧ ... ∧ HnG10.

200

The nomic relations that F and H bear do not distinguish them; they are nomically
indiscernible. So the causal essentialist cannot accept this final world if F and H are
distinct. Rather the causal essentialist must hold that F and H are identical in this final
world.
This case demonstrates the same four features that we saw in Adams’ case and my
previous case. We can be brief this time around. First, a series of worlds that leads to a
world containing nomically indiscernible properties mobilizes our modal intuitions. Each
world in the series before the world where F and H are distinct is possible, and the worlds
naturally lead to this final world, so this world also seems possible. Further, the series
involves a change that generally preserves possibility, which inclines us to hold that it
continues to preserve possibility.
Second, there are unintuitive cases of counterfactual dependence. In the final
world if F and H are identical then there are eleven properties, whereas there are twelve
properties in every other world. So in the world before the final world the number of
properties is counterfactually dependent on the small change to the structure of the laws
as described by the procedure. Further, this change normally doesn’t produce a change in
the number of properties, as can be seen by considering the other worlds in the series.
Third, we have a gap like before. The causal essentialist is committed to the
impossible world where the nomically indiscernible properties are distinct being
sandwiched between two possible worlds, the world containing nearly indiscernible
properties, and the world where A and B are identical. The world before the final world
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containing nearly indiscernible properties seems to be closer to the impossible world than
the world where A and B are identical, giving us an unattractive gap in logical space.178
Finally, the series brings out a surprising constraint on how the fundamental facts
can be arranged. This series shows us that the way of generating possibilities by defining
Ramsified lawbooks, as characterized by NC, naturally leads to possibilities that the
causal essentialist rejects. The restriction we placed in order to keep the principle of
plenitude from generating nomically indiscernible properties amounts to a mere
stipulation in order to keep the principle consistent with NI. The series shows us that this
stipulation is a surprising constraint on how the fundamental facts can be arranged. We
have a kind of mismatch between NC and NI.

6.3 Other Law Necessitarians

6.3.1 Causal Essentialism Without an Identity of Indiscernibles Thesis

We’ve seen that when causal essentialism is paired with an identity of
indiscernibles thesis, it is susceptible to a continuity argument, giving us an inadequate
account of plenitude. In response, the causal essentialist might retreat and accept worlds
where properties have exactly the same causal and nomic relations, thereby rejecting NI.
But accepting these worlds also leads to problems. As we saw, we must completely give
up on the original motivations for causal essentialism. We must allow worlds which give
178

Moreover, appealing to the bundle of powers theory doesn’t help. For the same reasons discussed above, this
approach won’t remove a gap in logical space. The language for expressing fundamental facts, on this approach,
still allows one to express the possibility of there being two distinct bundles of the same powers.
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rise to skeptical worries, and worlds that are merely quiddistically different. So even if
the causal essentialist can avoid the previous problematic cases, this leaves causal
essentialism in bad shape because there doesn’t appear to be much reason to accept the
view. Of course, the causal essentialist might have other motivations for being a causal
essentialist, but the two I’ve discussed are quite prominent.
Further, if no identity of indiscernibles thesis is accepted, then the causal
essentialist cannot explain why properties essentially bear their causal and nomic
relations. If we analyzed or individuated properties in terms of these relations, then the
reason why they bear these relations is clear. To be a particular property is to bear those
relations. But without this answer the essential natures of these properties seems to be a
brute and arbitrary modal fact.

So, causal essentialism without an identity of

indiscernibles thesis is a poorly motivated and arbitrary restriction on logical space. I
conclude that accepting HD gives us a better conception of the plenitude of logical space.

6.3.2 Strong Law Necessitarianism

So far my imagined causal essentialist opponent has responded by accepting
further possibilities as a mean of avoiding arbitrariness. But they might try a different
strategy. Instead of accepting further possibilities, they might further constrain logical
space. Let’s consider the view that the laws of nature are necessary in a very strong
sense. The slogan “the laws of nature are necessary” admits of a weak reading and a
strong reading. According to the weak reading, for any law of nature that is true in the
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actual world, there is no world at which that law is false. For example, one might hold
that there is no world at which charge fails to obey Coulumb’s law, but still accept worlds
that are not governed by Coulomb’s law because charge is not instantiated. The causal
essentialist I have been considering so far agrees with this weaker reading.
But now we’re interested in a stronger reading. According to this stronger
reading fundamental properties essentially have their nomic profiles, but further the only
possible fundamental properties are those that are instantiated in the actual world.179 So it
is not possible that there be other laws that involve alien properties, that is, fundamental
properties that are not instantiated in the actual world. The only possible laws are those
that involve actual fundamental properties, and the only laws that the actual fundamental
properties can be involved in are the laws that they are actually involved in. So the
present version of causal essentialism now includes the following claim:

No Aliens Alien properties are not possible.

No Aliens places a strong restriction on what is possible, much stronger than any
of the other views we have considered. Given how restrictive the view is, we might as
well characterize the space of possibilities in terms of whatever manages to meet this
restriction. Say that a set of propositions is nomological iff the conjunction of those
propositions is consistent with the actual laws of nature and there being only actual
fundamental properties and relations. We can now put forward a principle of plenitude:
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This view is defended by Bostock (2003) and Wilson (2013). Schaffer (2005) calls this view ‘modal
necessitarianism’ and classifies Swoyer (1982) as a proponent but regards the classification as largely indeterminate.
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Modal Combinatorialism (MC) For any set of propositions S, if S is nomological,
then there is some world where every member of S is true.

So the final theory that I will consider is the combination of CE, No Aliens, and
MC. While a few philosophers are sympathetic towards this view, it must be recognized
just how radical this view is. It is strongly at odds with our strong modal intuition that the
world could have been governed by different laws. It implies that when scientists have
proposed theories that were later rejected, those theories were not simply false, they were
impossible!
Further, the view is also committed to arbitrariness in modality. On this view, all
features of the laws are constraints on possibility. A world must satisfy them in order to
be possible. This implies that any arbitrariness in the laws will correspond to arbitrary
constraints on possibility. This is problematic, because we have every reason to think
that the laws of nature contain arbitrary features. First, there are the constants that show
up in the laws, such as the gravitational constant or the electric force constant. It is easy
to think that these constants are arbitrary; they strike us as brute facts that could have
easily been otherwise. Admittedly, we may not know what the fundamental constants
are. It might be shown that, say, the gravitational constant is not fundamental but
emerges from some other law. But, nevertheless, in all likelihood, there will be some
highly arbitrary constants that show up in the fundamental laws, and if there are arbitrary
constants, then this view will imply that modality is arbitrary.
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We also see arbitrariness in the form of the laws itself. For example, a law might
be an inverse square law; that is, it states that one quantity is inversely proportional to the
square of another quantity. But surely the law taking this form is an arbitrary fact. Why
isn’t the law an inverse cube law, or not an inverse law at all? It seems like the right
answer is that it is simply a brute, arbitrary fact (setting aside cases where the law
emerges from more fundamental laws).

This is a simple case involving simple

mathematics, but it is easy to imagine that the point generalizes to more complicated
cases.
One might object that we are not well positioned to determine whether or not the
view implies that modality is arbitrary, because we do not know what the fundamental
laws are. It is epistemically possible that the fundamental laws lack any arbitrary features
whatsoever, and if so, then there will not be any arbitrary constraints on possibility. But
this objection misses the mark. If we accept the non-arbitrariness intuition then we
simply won’t think that it is epistemically open whether there are any arbitrary
constraints on possibility. Whether or not there is arbitrariness in the laws is an empirical
matter, but the intuition is a priori. So holding that the laws are necessary in this strong
sense still faces the problem.

6.4 Taking Stock

We’ve seen that the core rivals to HD produce principles of plenitude that have
serious problems. On the other hand, HD fares very well as a principle of plenitude. It
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guarantees possibilities in a principled and non-arbitrary manner. It does not threaten to
introduce arbitrariness into logical space. Therefore, considerations of plenitude give us
reason to accept HD. These considerations may not be decisive. As always, there may
be outweighing considerations. But nevertheless, plenitude gives us reason to accept HD.
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CHAPTER 7
THE ARGUMENT FROM COUNTERFACTUAL STABILITY

In determining whether HD is true, we are investigating the extent of absolute
possibility. So far I have been investigating this modality independently of other kinds of
modalities. However, we also get insight by considering how absolute modality relates to
other modalities. I will argue that absolute modality’s relationship with other modalities
gives us strong reason to accept Humean possibilities; that is, possibilities that violate
supposed necessary connections between distinct existences. The argument builds off of
the idea that absolute possibility is the most expansive genuine kind of possibility, a
principle I developed all the way back in chapter one. If the Humean possibilities are in
any genuine sense possible, then they are absolutely possible. The thrust of my argument
is that it is difficult to uphold the claim that Humean possibilities are not in any sense
genuine possibilities; hence, it is difficult to deny that Humean possibilities are absolutely
possible.
Crucial to this argument is how we determine whether a modality is genuine. I
develop and defend a principle that relates genuine notions of possibility to
counterfactuals. I then apply this principle to Humean possibilities. I argue that the
Humean’s conception of possibility bears the correct relation to counterfactuals, so the
Humean’s conception of possibility is a genuine notion of possibility. Since absolute
possibility is the broadest genuine notion of possibility, the Humean’s conception of
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possibility is absolutely possible. But let’s begin by clarifying the relationship between
absolute possibility and other notions of possibility.

7.1 The Most Expansive Modality

Our first principle, familiar from the first chapter, characterizes the idea that
absolute possibility is the most expansive modality:

Expansive Absolute modality is the most expansive, objective genuine objective
modality.

It will be helpful to review the notions used in this principle. Recall that objective
modalities are sets of propositions; intuitively, a proposition is a member of a modality
just in case that proposition is necessary according to that modality. One modality is
more expansive than another just in case the former is a proper subset of the latter.
Genuine modalities are those that correspond to an objective joint in the space of
propositions.
Expansive gives us insight into the extent of absolute possibility. If P is possible
according to some objective, genuine modality, then P is absolutely possible. Likewise,
if P is not absolutely possible, then there is no objective, genuine modality according to
which P is possible. Expansive captures the sense in which if a situation is absolutely
impossible, then there is no genuine, objective kind of possibility according to which it
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could have obtained. Though it allows that there are non-objective or non-genuine kinds
of possibility that can apply to it.
Much of our investigation of absolute possibility centers around its extent. How
far does absolute possibility extend? Imagine two rival philosophers, one that holds that
absolute possibility extends much farther than the other. How should the philosopher that
holds the more restrictive view of possibility, call her Restrictor, think about the other
philosopher’s views? In light of Expansive, Restrictor cannot hold that the modality that
characterizes the other philosopher’s view is a more expansive, objective, genuine
modality for otherwise Expansive would imply that absolute possibility contains the
rival’s possibilities.

Rather, Restrictor must deny that the rival modality is more

expansive, objective and genuine. It is uncontroversial that this rival modality is broader,
that’s how I set up the case. So Restrictor must hold that the modality is either not
objective or not genuine.
Let’s make this abstract line of thought more concrete. Humeans deny absolutely
necessary connections between distinct existences.

Opposed to Humeans are

philosophers who reject this Humean conception of possibility. They accept necessary
connections; equivalently, they reject possibilities that the Humean accepts.

These

anti-Humeans are in the same position as Restrictor. The conception of modality that the
Humean is working with is broader than the conception that the anti-Humean is working
with. So given Expansive, the anti-Humean must deny that the Humean’s modality is
objective and genuine.
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Let’s start by considering whether the Humean’s modality is objective. In my
framework, an objective modality must uniquely correspond to a set of propositions.
This implies that an objective modality never distinguishes between sentences that
express the same proposition; in other words, when a modality is objective, if two
sentences express the same proposition, then those sentences share the same modal
profile for that modality. At a first pass, it seems very plausible that the Humean’s
modality is objective. Setting the propositions framework aside for a moment, at an
intuitive level, the Humean’s modality clearly seems to be an objective modality. It isn’t
an epistemic, doxastic, or deontic modality. Further, the Humean’s modality doesn’t
seem to be referentially opaque; it is not dependent on how we refer to objects and
properties.
Returning to the framework of propositions, our question is whether the Humean
modality uniquely corresponds to a set of propositions. For every difference the Humean
draws, are there distinct proposition to make that distinction? This seems very plausible.
Though it is controversial how much access a priori reasoning and linguistic mastery
give us to the individuation of propositions, these sources support thinking that the
Humean’s modality is objective. These considerations provide an initial presumption in
favor of the claim that the Humean’s modality is objective. Of course, on many views we
do not have perfect a priori access to the individuation of propositions; on these views a
posteriori or explanatory matters can play a factor.

But in the absence of

counter-weighing considerations we have reason to take the Humea’s modality to be
objective. Later when I develop the argument in favor of HD, we’ll consider and reject
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some ways of arguing that the Humean’s modality is not objective. Until then, for the
sake of argument, it seems plausible to assume that the Humean’s modality is objective.
If the Humean’s modality is objective, then the anti-Humean must deny that the
Humean’s modality is a genuine modality. From the anti-Humean’s point of view, this
modality is simply the result of deleting necessary truths involving necessary connections
between distinct existences. On their view, the Humean’s modality is a mere restriction
to necessary truths that don’t involve these necessary connections. So the key question is
whether the Humean’s modality is a genuine modality. In what follows, I’ll consider in
more detail how to distinguish the difference between genuine modalities and mere
restrictions. I’ll defend a general principle that characterizes genuine modalities, and
then argue that the Humean’s modality satisfies this principle.

7.2 Genuine Modalities

How do we determine whether a modality is genuine or not? A natural place to
look is the connection between genuine modalities and other notions. In particular, much
recent investigation has centered on the connection between modalities and
counterfactuals.180

Genuine modalities seem to uphold counterfactuals, in that if a

proposition is necessary, according to some genuine modality, then it would still be true
given a wide array of counterfactual suppositions. Moreover, this is not surprising.
Counterfactuals tend to be sensitive to objective similarities and differences between
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Important recent work is Hale (2013), Kment (2014), Lange (2005) and (2009), and Williamson (2007: 134-178).
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worlds. They tend to preserve the laws of nature, and sharing laws makes for similarity
between worlds. They tend to preserve the past, and sharing the past makes for similarity
between worlds. Likewise, genuine modalities carve out a joint in logical space; being
possible according to some genuine modality makes for objective similarity.
This is borne out by considering examples. Many common examples of absolute
necessities are preserved under a wide range of counterfactual antecedents. In particular,
these necessities would be true given any absolutely possible antecedent. For example,
suppose that it is absolutely necessary that sets exist. Is there any absolutely possible
supposition that counterfactually implies that sets do not exist? It does not seem so. No
matter what possibility obtained, sets would exist. Consider another uncontroversial
absolute necessity, the determinate-determinable relation.

It is necessary that if

something is scarlet, then it is red. No absolute possibility counterfactually implies that
this would be false.
By contrast, let’s consider a modality that is clearly not genuine. Take George
Washington-possibility. A proposition is George Washington-possible just in case it is
consistent with George Washington being the first President of the U.S. This modality is
not counterfactually robust in the way that absolute modality is.

There are many

suppositions that are possible according to this modality that counterfactually imply the
denial of something necessary according to it. For example, it is necessary, according to
this modality, that George Washington was the first President of the United States. Now
consider the counterfactual supposition that the United States wasn’t formed until the
year 1850. This counterfactual supposition is logically consistent with the truth that
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George Washington was the first President of the United States and so is George
Washington-possible, but if it were true then it wouldn’t be the case that George
Washington was the first President, rather somebody else would have.
The preceding suggests that there is a connection between genuine modalities and
counterfactuals. A natural thought is that the more a modality carves out a logical joint,
so the more genuine it is, the wider the range of counterfactual suppositions that preserve
its necessities. The widest possible range of counterfactual antecedents would be any
proposition whatsoever, even impossible ones by the lights of the modality being
considered. However, it is highly controversial whether this is true of the necessities of
any objective modality. While some philosophers have argued that this holds of absolute
necessities, there is prima facie intuitive data against this.181 Suppose it is absolutely
necessary that there are sets. It doesn’t seem like it would be true that if there were no
sets, then there would be sets. Furthermore, not only is it controversial whether absolute
modality satisfies this condition, but this condition is not useful for our purposes. At
most this condition is satisfied by absolute modality, but we want to consider a general
condition that can be applied to different modalities, in order to determine that they are
genuine. We want to consider whether the Humean’s modality is genuine by seeing how
it interacts with counterfactuals, but we can’t assume at the outset that every Humean
possibility is absolutely possible.
Given the complexities of counterfactual with antecedents that are impossible,
with respect to relevant modality, we should set them aside. Instead let’s consider the
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Hale (2013: 98-100), McFetridge (2000), and Williamson (2007: 134-178) accept that absolute modality satisfies
this condition. See Nolan (1997) for an influential case against this idea.
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widest range of counterfactual antecedents that are all possible according to the modality
in question. At a first pass, if a modality’s necessities are counterfactually preserved for
all of that modality’s possibilities, then that modality is counterfactually stable. Now, a
complexity we need to deal with is the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals. We may
assert a counterfactual in one context, but deny it in another.

To deal with

context-sensitivity we should generalize across contexts. We can now more precisely
define counterfactual stability: modality m is counterfactually stable iff in any context,
for all P, if necessarilym P, then for any Q such that possiblym Q, if Q were true, then P
would be true. I propose that we take this feature to be an indicator that a modality is
genuine:

Stability If a modality is counterfactually stable, then it is genuine.182

A couple of comments are in order. First, counterfactuals are themselves true or
false in a given world, so we can only make sense of a modality being counterfactually
stable in some world or other. Stability is not an amodal principle, but rather should be
evaluated from the perspective a particular world, typically the actual world. Second, it
is important to note that Stability is only asserting that a modality’s being
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Stability gives rise to a technical issue. For simplicity I’ve been assuming the characteristic axiom of S4 modal
logic that if P is necessary, then it is necessary that P is necessary. If we deny this, which may be plausible for some
modalities, then this raises a complexity. For some modality m suppose that P is necessarym, but that it is possiblem
that P is not necessarym. The following counterfactual seems true: If P were not necessarym, then P might not be the
case. But if it is true, then it is false that if P were not necessarym, then P would be true. It follows that m is not
counterfactually stable. So the characteristic axiom of S4 holds of every counterfactually stable modality. If we
wished to be neutral regarding this issue, we could restrict the notion of counterfactual stability. Say that a sentence
is sub-modal for modality m iff that sentence doesn’t contain any m-modal operators. We can now redefine the
notion of counterfactual stability as follows: a modality m is stable iff in any context, for any P that is sub-modal for
m, if necessarilym P, then for any Q that is sub-modal for m such that possiblym, if Q were true, then P would be true.
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counterfactually stable guarantees that it is genuine, this leaves open whether there are
genuine modalities that are not counterfactually stable.
We can better understand the notion of counterfactual stability by making use of
possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals.

On that approach, we give truth

conditions for counterfactuals in terms of the similarity between worlds. If w1 is more
similar to w2 than w3 is, then say that w1 is closer to w2 than w3 is. We can then say that
the counterfactual ‘if P were true, then Q would be true’ is true iff the nearest world to
the actual world in which P is true, Q is also true.183 This semantics implies the following
principle:

Sphere For any modality m and any m-world w, m is counterfactually stable in w
iff no non-m-world is closer to w than any m-world.184

In picturesque terms, the m-worlds form a sphere around w. Given the possible
worlds semantics, the claim that absolute modality is counterfactually stable is equivalent
to the principle that Nolan (1997: 550) calls the “Strangeness of Impossibility
Condition,” according to which for any absolutely possible world p and impossible world
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These are the truth conditions given in Stalnaker (1968). There are other truth conditions one could give in terms
of possible worlds, such as those in Lewis (1973). Adopting any reasonable truth conditions will preserve the points
made in the text.
184
Proof: Left to right. Suppose modality m is counterfactually stable at the m-world w1. For reductio suppose that
w1 is closer to a non-m-world w2 than to another m-world w3. Then, on the possible worlds semantics, it will be true
in w1 that if either w2 or w3 were actual, then w2 would be actual. The antecedent is possiblym true, but the
consequent is not so we have a violation of counterfactual stability. Right to left. Suppose that every m-world is
closer to the m-world w4 than any non-m-world, but for reductio that m is not counterfactually stable at w4. Then
there is some counterfactual true at w4 of the form ‘if P were true, then Q would be true’ where P is possiblym true,
but Q is not. The possible worlds semantics implies that there is some m-world in which P is true that fails to be
closer to w4 than the non-m-world where Q is true.
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i, p is closer to the actual world than i is. The Strangeness of Impossibility Condition is
controversial, and any objection to it is an objection to the claim that absolute modality is
counterfactually stable. If this is right, counterfactual stability will not be a useful guide
to whether a modality is genuine. Later I will discuss why I find these objections
unconvincing, but first let me give three positive reasons in favor of Stability.
The Argument from Language. The first reason is based on how modalities
typically interact with counterfactuals in a given context. In a given context, we take
various propositions to be necessary. Think of this in terms of the semantic value that the
context assigns to our various modal expressions like ‘can,’ ‘cannot,’ and so on. As
Lange (2009: 67-71) points out, in a given context, modalities tend to interact with
counterfactuals in an interesting way. The context tends to shift in such a way as to
ensure that whatever modality is salient is also treated as counterfactually stable in that
context. If P is taken to be necessary, then usually the context must change in some way
if someone asserts that if a possibility Q obtained, then P would not be true. Either the
context would shift so that P is no longer taken to be necessary, or Q would be regarded
as impossible, or the counterfactual would be rejected.185
For example, imagine the following conversation. Suppose I say “I cannot speak
Swahili.” You might reply, “but you could spend the next year learning, and if you did,
then you would be able to speak Swahili.” At this point in the conversation, the context
will naturally shift in a number of ways. One natural reply may be “true, in that sense, I
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It is important to note that I say merely that the modality is treated as counterfactually stable, rather than that it is
counterfactually stable in the context. There might be counterfactuals that are true in a context that violate a
modality’s being counterfactually stable, but they are left unasserted. The claim is that if they are asserted, then the
context tends to shift in an attempt to preserve counterfactual stability.
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could speak Swahili.” This reply indicates that the context has changed so that my
speaking Swahili is no longer considered to be impossible. Another reply could be “no, I
mean I cannot speak Swahili right now.” This reply disambiguates the claim that “I
cannot speak Swahili” as “I cannot speak Swahili right now,” and points out that this is
different from the consequent of the counterfactual. The interlocutor may retort “in that
case, if you had spent the last year speaking Swahili, then you could speak Swahili right
now.” Here is a natural reply: “but I can’t do anything about how I spent last year.” The
reply indicates that the antecedent is not possible. These are all very natural ways for the
conversation to progress, but in all of these cases, counterfactual stability of the
contextually selected modality is preserved.

In the face of a counterfactual that

demonstrates that the modality is not counterfactually stable there is contextual pressure
to either reject the counterfactual, or change the modality so that either the antecedent is
not possible or so that the denial of the consequent is not necessary.
Now this is just an observation about how context typically interacts with
modality. How does this relate to genuine modalities? The connection stems from two
key observations. The first, that I’ve defended above, is that normally when a set of
propositions are treated as necessary in a context, they are also to treated as
counterfactually stable in that context. There is an intimate connection between the two
notions. The second key observation is that for most modalities this connection is merely
an artifact of the context; for most modalities, we are choosing to treat a modality as
counterfactually stable. But contrast this with a modality that really is counterfactually
stable; this is a context invariant feature. It holds regardless of how we attempt to change
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the context. The modality’s counterfactual stability is not due to how we fix the context,
rather it holds no matter how the context evolves. So when a modality is counterfactually
stable, that is not something we are imposing on that modality. This in turn makes it
plausible that the modality corresponds to a genuine joint in the space of propositions,
rather than something we impose on the space of propositions.
The Argument from Logical Space. The second reason is based on the structure of
logical space. As discussed above, on a possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals, a
counterfactually stable modality corresponds to a special sphere in logical space. So if a
modality is stable, then it seems to correspond to a natural joint in logical space. The
worlds in the sphere form a natural set of worlds. They go together. There is an
objective distinction between worlds in the sphere and worlds outside of the sphere. This
indicates that logical space is offering up the set of worlds as a modality, rather than
being a mere restriction based on our interests. Contrast this with a modality that is a
mere restriction, such as George Washington-possibility.

This modality isn’t

counterfactually stable, as we saw above, and so it doesn’t correspond to a sphere in
logical space. This seems to show that there is no objective sense in which the George
Washington worlds go together; there’s no objective distinction that marks out those
worlds as going together in contrast with the rest of the worlds. This indicates that
George Washington possibility is something that I’ve imposed on logical space, rather
than a genuine modality that logical space is offering up. On the other hand, stable
modalities correspond to a natural joint in logical space. This gives us reason to hold that
a stable modality is genuine.
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Giving a possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals is controversial, but the
preceding point holds even if we reject this particular way of giving a semantics. The
semantics provides a useful way to rigorously make the point, but ultimately the
semantics just makes vivid what is already contained in Stability: a stable modality is one
where the worlds are grouped together in terms of the counterfactuals that are true at
them. They naturally go together. A modality that is not stable is not so grouped
together.
The Argument from Explanation.

The final reason to accept Stability is an

explanatory one. Suppose that a modality is stable. The best explanation for this is that
the modality is also genuine. It is natural to hold that if a modality is genuine, then
counterfactuals will be sensitive to it.

A genuine modality marks out an objective

distinction between worlds that are possible according to that modality, and those that
aren’t. If a modality m is genuine, then there is a clear objective difference between a
world that is possiblem and a world that isn’t. Furthermore, counterfactuals are sensitive
to these kinds of objective differences between worlds.

Laws of nature carve up

objective distinctions between worlds and counterfactuals are sensitive to this. Holding
the past fixed also carves an objective distinction between worlds and counterfactuals are
sensitive to this as well. In general, patterns of true counterfactuals are based on
objective distinctions of this sort, so we should expect such a striking pattern like a given
set of propositions being stable to have a similar sort of explanation. The simplest and
most natural explanation is that a set of propositions are stable because they correspond
to a genuine modality. If we don’t have that explanation available, if we allow that a set
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of propositions could be stable without being a genuine modality, then we have an
unattractive mystery on our hands. If the Humean modality is stable, but not genuine,
then what explains its stability?
It’s natural to wonder whether we can explain the counterfactual stability of a set
of propositions in virtue of being a subset of a counterfactually stable set. However, this
strategy for explaining counterfactual stability demonstrably fails.186 This is because not
every subset of a counterfactually stable set is itself counterfactually stable. Since a
subset doesn’t automatically inherit the superset’s counterfactual stability, we still need
an explanation for why the subset is counterfactually stable. Here’s the problem: suppose
there is a counterfactually stable set containing P and Q. Now consider the subset
obtained by removing only P and the subset obtained by removing only Q. Both of these
subsets cannot be counterfactually stable. Take the counterfactual antecedent that either
P or Q is false. This antecedent is possible for both of the subsets. Now if the subset
containing P but not Q is counterfactually stable, then it must be the case that in every
context if either P or Q were false, then Q would be false. But if this is true in every
context, then the subset containing Q is not counterfactually stable.
So these are three reasons to accept Stability. Now, how does this principle relate
to the Humean’s modality? Given Expansive and Stability, all we need to show is that
the Humean’s modality is counterfactually stable, and it will follow that absolute
possibility contains every Humean possibility.

For if the Humean’s modality is

counterfactually stable, then Stability implies that it is genuine. If we continue assuming
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This argument is inspired by several arguments that Marc Lange gives in his (2009).
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for the sake of argument that it is objective, then Expansive implies that absolute
modality includes the Humean’s modality. So is the Humean’s modality counterfactually
stable? Prima facie, it certainly seems so. The suppositions of rearranging duplicates,
violating laws of nature, and other characteristically Humean possibilities don’t seem to
counterfactually imply anything that is impossible by the Humean’s own lights. On the
face of it, this seems to be good reason to accept that the Humean’s possibilities are
absolutely possible. Now it’s not terribly surprising that from the Humean’s perspective
there is a line of reasoning to the conclusion that the Humean possibilities are absolutely
possible. What’s more interesting is to consider the prospects the Humean’s opponents
have to avoid this argument. Let’s consider various ways of responding to this argument.
First, I’ll consider more general objections to Expansive and Stability. I argue that these
objections are unconvincing. Next I’ll consider arguments for the conclusion that the
Humean’s modality is not counterfactually stable. I argue that important rivals to the
Humean cannot successfully argue for this claim. However, we’ll see that other views do
have a principled way of arguing that the Humean’s modality is not counterfactually
stable. The argument from counterfactual stability does not uniquely favor the Humean,
but it does rule out some views from the playing field.

7.3 General Objections

First, one might object to Expansive on the grounds that it requires a conception
of absolute modality that lacks nearly any interesting necessary truths. Consider the set
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that only contains the tautology proposition; call this the Tautology modality. This is an
objective modality. Further, it seems to be a natural and non-arbitrary grouping, so surely
this is a genuine modality. Since it is the most expansive objective modality, Expansive
implies that absolute possibility corresponds to this set. But this raises a problem for me.
It raises the worry that Expansive trivially rules out any rival to HD, for it seems to imply
that the only absolute necessities are tautologies. This would clearly beg the question
against the Humean’s rivals. Moreover, if Expansive implies that the only necessity is
the tautology, then it isn’t a plausible characterization of absolute possibility, for on most
views, absolute modality includes a rich array of necessities beyond just tautologies.
However, these problems can be addressed.

First, one could hold that

propositions are coarse-grained, so much so that the rich array of necessities that one
might accept all express the same proposition; the tautology. The question of whether
HD is true then becomes a matter of how coarse-grained propositions are, an issue to
which we will return in the section.
Alternatively, one might hold that the propositions are individuated in a
fine-grained manner, but still argue that the Tautology modality is not genuine. The
argument is based on the notion of counterfactual stability. Earlier, I defended the
principle Stability, which states that a modality is genuine if it is counterfactually stable.
However, consider the converse of this principle: if a modality is genuine, then it is
counterfactually stable. If one accepts this principle, then they only need to argue that the
Tautology modality is not counterfactually stable; for it will then follow that the
Tautology modality is not genuine. Interestingly, I think anyone inclined to accept
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absolute necessities more robust than the Tautology proposition is in a position to argue
that the Tautology modality is not counterfactually stable.
Here’s an example. Consider the determinate-determinable relation, which is
commonly held to involve absolute necessities. For example, it is absolutely necessary
that anything that is scarlet is also red.

Take the counterfactual supposition that

something is scarlet and not red. If this supposition does not express the contradictory
proposition, then it is possible according to the Tautology modality. But someone who
takes the determinate-determinable relation to involve absolute necessities can reasonably
hold that this supposition counterfactually implies something that is not possible
according to the Tautology modality. On the counterfactual supposition that something is
scarlet and not red, we might naturally reason that if something were scarlet it would be
red, but since it is also not red it wouldn’t be red, so it would be both red and not red.
But the consequent, that it is both red and not red, is not possible according to the
Tautology modality. So that modality is not counterfactually stable.
As another example, consider essentialist claims. For example, suppose one held
that it was absolutely necessary that I have the parents that I in fact have. Now consider
the counterfactual supposition that I was not born from my actual parents. This is
possible according to the Tautology modality. But the essentialist could reasonably hold
that if I were not born from my actual parents, then I would not be me. This consequent
is not possible according to the Tautology modality.
If we accept the converse of Stability; that if a modality is genuine, then it is
counterfactually stable, then by arguing that the Tautology modality is not counterfactual
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stable, we can deny that it is genuine. Now, I haven’t defended the converse of Stability
here. I merely want to make salient that Expansive does not require that we take absolute
modality to be the same as the Tautology modality. For there is a principled way to
accept Expansive and yet deny that the Tautology modality is the absolute modality. But
there’s no need for me here to defend the converse of Stability; for a commitment to that
principle is not needed to run my argument for HD.
Let’s now consider an objections to Stability. I’ve been assuming that absolute
modality is itself counterfactually stable.

But some philosophers have presented

counterexamples to this claim. If there are uncontroversial cases of absolute necessities
that are not counterfactually stable, then no candidate modality for absolute modality will
be counterfactually stable, since they will include the uncontroversial cases of absolute
necessities. Later, I’m going to argue that the Humean’s modality is counterfactually
stable. But if uncontroversial absolute necessities are not counterfactually stable, then the
Humean’s modality is not counterfactually stable, for the Humean accepts the
uncontroversial absolute necessities.
Here’s an example to get us going: suppose we are in a context where Kurt
Gödel’s logical prowess is salient.187 According to some, in such a context the following
seems true: If Gödel rejected the law of double negation, then the law of double negation
would not have been true. After all, given his logical insight, he wouldn’t have denied it,
unless it wasn’t true. If we accept this counterexample, then we have a counterexample
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This case comes from Lange (2005: 294-297) but he does not accept it as a genuine counterexample.
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to the claim that absolute possibility is counterfactually stable. The antecedent is
absolutely possible, yet the consequence is absolutely impossible.
In conversation, I’ve found that many people do not find this case to be very
compelling.

So one reasonable way of responding to this counterexample is by simply

rejecting the counterfactual. However, I can grant for the sake of argument that this case
is intuitive, for there are plausible ways of accommodating these intuitions that still
uphold Stability. One approach comes from Lange (2005: 294-297), who argues that this
case is not a genuine counterexample. What’s going on in the case is that once we are in
a context where the counterfactual is assertable, we are also in a context where we are not
assuming that the consequent is true. It is left open. So while the counterfactual is still
false, it becomes assertable in this context because we are not presupposing that the law
of double negation is necessarily true. One way to bring this out is by noticing that while
we can get into a context where we assert the counterfactual, it seems we cannot get in a
context where we assert “although the law of double negation is truly a law of logic, if
Gödel has rejected it, then it would not have been true.” By explicitly stating that the law
of double negation really is a law of logic, it is now a part of the context, and so
something seems wrong with asserting the counterfactual.
As Lange points out, it is often useful to leave open certain claims when
discussing our evidence for them.188 If we are considering the evidence that we have for
the law of double negation, then in that context we leave open whether or not the law is
true.

188

Once we are in this sort of frame of mind, it makes sense to assert the

Lange (2005: 295).
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counterfactual, because if we don’t know whether or not the law of double negation is
true, it would be really good evidence that it isn’t true if Gödel did not accept it. So
asserting the counterfactual is useful for capturing a kind of evidential connection. But
this doesn’t require holding that the counterfactual is true, it is merely a useful pretence in
certain contexts.
While there’s something intuitive about Lange’s take on these examples, there is a
better way to address them. Lange offers an explanation for why the counterfactuals are
sensibly asserted in a context even if they aren’t true. But we can go further and allow
that they are true, and yet still uphold the counterfactual stability of absolute possibility.
189

Recent work in linguistics has observed an important distinction between two kinds of

modals: circumstantial and epistemic modals.190 This distinction can be clearly seen in
the difference between the following:

(1) Weeds can grow here. (Circumstantial)

(2) There might be weeds growing here. (Epistemic)191
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Moreover, Lange’s response seems to conflict with prominent accounts of the norm that governs assertion. If an
assertion needs to be known, or at least true, in order for it be permissibly asserted, then we cannot hold that the
counterfactuals are false, yet permissibly asserted. Perhaps Lange would reject these norms of assertion, or hold that
these counterfactuals are sensibly asserted, though it is not permissible to do so, but it seems best to avoid being
committed to these claims.
190
This is not to say that there are only two kinds of modals.
191
See Kratzer (2012: 49-62) and Portner (2009: 144-184) for more discussion. The distinction is not always made
by using distinct words or tense. Consider the pair of examples from Williamson (2016): ‘She could run a marathon
in three hours’ (Circumstantial) and ‘Goldbach’s conjecture could be true’ (Epistemic).
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Importantly, counterfactuals show the same distinction.

They are often

circumstantial, at least those that philosophers consider often are. But there are also
epistemic counterfactuals. Here is an example from Edgington (2008: 17): ‘Why did you
hold Smith for questioning?’ ‘Because we knew the crime was committed by either
Smith or Jones - if it hadn’t been Jones, then it would have been Smith.’ This is clearly
an epistemic counterfactual.192
My claim is that the example involving Gödel an epistemic counterfactual.
Lange’s own response trades on this, since he relies on the idea that the counterfactual is
used to communicate an evidential connection.
counterfactual.

This seems intuitive for the

Generally, circumstantial counterfactuals are true in virtue of how

mind-independent reality is, whereas epistemic counterfactuals are true in virtue of some
evidential connection.

Surely there is no wordly connection between what Gödel

believed and truths about logic, but it is plausible that there is an epistemic connection.
Once

we have

the distinction between circumstantial and epistemic

counterfactuals in mind, this raises the question of how to interpret Stability. If Stability
is interpreted in terms of both kinds of counterfactuals, then it isn’t very plausible that
any modality is counterfactually stable. Epistemic counterfactuals will not generally
preserve the necessities of a given modality. Rather it is only plausible that there are
counterfactually stable modalities if we interpret Stability in terms of circumstantial
counterfactuals. Of course, this was really implicit in the discussion above since we were
working with the possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals. This semantics fits best

192

For further discussion, see Vetter (2016).
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with circumstantial counterfactuals. The semantics for epistemic counterfactuals will
more likely involve doxastic states instead of worlds.
Now that we are explicit that the only counterfactuals relevant in the definition of
counterfactual stability are circumstantial counterfactuals, we can dispense with any
counterexamples that involve epistemic counterfactuals. So long as we are careful to
only consider circumstantial counterfactuals when applying Stability, we won’t run into
any trouble.193
Let’s consider a different sort of counterexample from David Vander Laan (2004).
Suppose a student has written a computer program that carries out proofs. The program
has the command to print out a paper that says “I have proved the Gödel sentence” if the
program ever does indeed prove the Gödel sentence in the system in which it is carrying
out proofs. In such a context it would be very natural to assert “if the computer were to
print ‘I have proved the Gödel sentence’ then it would have proved something it cannot
prove.” The antecedent is possible, it is clearly possible for a computer to print that
sentence, but it is impossible for a computer to prove something it cannot prove.
However, I don’t think this counterexample works. Compare Vander Laan’s
counterfactual with the following: if the computer printed “I have proved the Gödel
sentence” then the program would not be working properly. We would only assert one of
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I think this response also handles a similar case from Nolan (1997: 550): “If intuitionistic logic came to be
thought a much more satisfactory basis for mathematics by the experts, and if intuitionistic investigations led to
breakthroughs in many areas of inquiry, and if important technological advances were made by the best minds in the
field, which they would not have come to if they had been stuck in the rut of nonintuitionistic logic, then
intuitionistic logic would turn out to be correct after all.” This counterfactual is most plausibly read as an epistemic
counterfactual, rather than a circumstantial counterfactual. This comes out especially if we note that this
counterfactual doesn’t seem to be correct to assert if right before it we assert “classical logic is the correct logic, but
if intuitionistic logic came to be thought …”
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these, and the latter counterfactual is not a counterexample. Which of these two seems
more plausible? I think we would normally be more inclined to hold that the latter
counterfactual is more plausible. In order to read the Vander Laan’s counterfactual in
such a way that it seems plausible, the antecedent must implicitly state that the program is
working properly so that it would only print the message if it indeed proved the Gödel
sentence.

Of course, this antecedent is impossible, so then we no longer have a

contradiction. So I think that if the antecedent is read so that it is not impossible, then we
wouldn’t affirm the troublesome counterfactual. The only way we affirm it is if the
antecedent is implicitly impossible. We don’t have a counterexample to the claim that
absolute modality is counterfactually stable.194
Lange (1993) has proposed an interesting test to determine when a counterfactual
antecedent implicitly includes additional content, and this test confirms that the
antecedent of Vander Laan’s counterfactual implicitly includes the claim that the program
is working properly. The test has us ask whether the alleged implicit claim would be true
if the antecedent were true. If the answer is ‘yes,’ then the claim is not implicitly part of
the antecedent, because it is held fixed by the context; there is no need to include it in the
content of the counterfactual. But if the answer is ‘no,’ then the claim is implicitly in the
antecedent of the counterfactual. Since context is not holding the claim fixed, it needs to
be included in the antecedent of the counterfactual for the counterfactual to come out
true. But recall that it is quite intuitive that the program would not be working correctly

194

Alternatively, Vander Laan’s counterfactual might be read as an epistemic counterfactual holding in virtue of an
evidential connection between the computer printing the page and it proving something that it cannot. Of course, on
this reading there is no problem for me. The upshot of my discussion of the Gödel example was that epistemic
counterfactuals don’t pose a counterexample to Stability.
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on the counterfactual supposition that the computer printed “I have proved the Gödel
sentence.” So the claim that the program is working correctly is not fixed by context, and
so it must be implicitly included in the antecedent of Vander Laan’s counterfactual.

7.4 Is the Humean’s Modality Counterfactually Stable?

We’ve seen that the objections to Expansive and Stability do not stand up to
scrutiny. Let’s now consider the prospects for arguing that the Humean’s modality is not
counterfactually stable.

I’ll begin with the prospects for arguing that the Humean

possibilities that involve violations of the actual laws of nature and causal relations lead
to counterfactual stability.
The Humean holds that properties can obey laws that differ from the laws that
they actually obey. For example, mass could fail to obey its actual laws. Do these
counterfactual suppositions lead to instability? To fix ideas, suppose that mass obeyed a
gravitational force law that was an inverse cube law, rather than an inverse square law.
At first glance, it seems implausible to think that if this were true, then a manifest
impossibility would be true. We can coherently reason about how things would be if
mass obeyed this different law. This is a characteristic Humean possibility that doesn’t
counterfactually imply a manifest impossibility. This is strong evidence that there is a
counterfactually stable modality that contains this possibility. Stability implies that this
modality is genuine, and so Expansive implies that absolute modality includes this
possibility. Further, there is nothing specific to mass in this example. We can generalize
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to all sorts of counterfactual suppositions involving mass obeying other laws, other
properties obeying different laws, alien properties obeying existing or alien laws, and so
on.

This gives us strong evidence that absolute possibility contains the Humean

possibilities involving causal and nomic relations.
Can the Humean’s opponent that holds that causal and lawlike relations are
necessary avoid this result? In order to plausibly hold that possibilities that violate the
actual causal and lawlike lead to counterfactual instability, the Humean’s opponent needs
to identify a proposition that is impossible by the lights of the Humean and argue that it
would be true were the possibilities to obtain.
The most promising strategy for doing this is to hold that a property essentially
bears and its causal and lawlike relations. The Humean’s opponent can then go on to
hold that sentences that refer to a property express the same proposition as sentences that
refer to the laws that property is involved in.195 For example, they could hold that the
following pair of sentences express the same proposition:

(3) Massive objects fail to attract massive objects.

(4) Objects with the property of attracting massive objects fail to attract massive objects.

While (3) is possible according to the Humean’s modality, (4) is impossible by the
Humean’s lights. However, it seems extremely plausible that if two sentences represent
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This strategy is inspired by Levine’s (2001) modal epistemology.

232

the same proposition then they counterfactually imply one another.196 It follows that if
massive objects did not attract massive objects, then objects with the property of
attracting massive objects would not attract massive objects. This strategy provides a
way to argue that the Humean’s modality is not counterfactually stable, since the Humean
holds that it is possible for massive objects to not attract massive objects, but that it is
impossible for object’s with the property of attracting massive object to not attract
massive objects. Moreover, the Humean’s opponent also gets the added benefit of being
able to argue that the Humean’s modality is not even an objective modality. The Humean
takes (3) to be possible, but takes (4) to be impossible. Since they express the same
proposition, there is no unique set of propositions that corresponds to the Humean’s
modality, and so it is not an objective modality. So the Humean’s opponent can hold that
the Humean’s modality is neither genuine nor objective.
While this strategy allows the Humean’s opponent to the avoid the argument, the
strategy faces a damning problem and should ultimately be rejected. The trouble is that
the strategy overgeneralizes, implying that ordinary scientific counterfactual antecedents
lead to impossibilities, which is the wrong result. Here’s a concrete case. Imagine you
are performing an experiment to test whether the kinetic theory of heat is true or whether
the caloric theory of heat is true. In order to test these theories we must counterfactually
reason about what happen in a given experimental setup were these different theories
true. A key part of the setup is that before running the experiment, we cannot tell which
theory is true. That’s the point of running the experiment. Now suppose, as is actually
196

Even more so by recalling that we are only considering circumstantial counterfactuals, as opposed to epistemic
counterfactuals. Two representations of the same situation might not epistemically counterfactually imply one
another, for one might not know that they are representations of the same situation.
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the case, that caloric theory is false. Since caloric is not actually nomically related to any
actual effects, and a property essentially bears its causal and nomic relations, then it is
impossible that any actual property be nomically related to caloric. Now the strategy the
causal essentialist used against the Humean above was based on holding that sentences
that differ by replacing a predicate for a property with a description of that property’s
essence express the same proposition. This was how the mass case worked. So the
causal essentialist must hold that the sentence that says that caloric is in this particular
setup expresses the same proposition as a sentence that is otherwise the same except that
mention of caloric is replaced by a description of caloric’s essence. But by the causal
essentialist’s lights, part of caloric’s essence is that it does not interact with any of the
actual properties in the setup; that will be included in the description of caloric’s essence.
Since the sentence that says that caloric is in the setup counterfactually implies the
sentence that includes caloric’s essence, and part of that representation is that caloric does
not interact with the properties in the setup, then the following counterfactual follows: if
caloric were in the experimental setup, then the property that essentially does not interact
with the properties in the experimental setup would be in the experimental setup. But this
counterfactually seems clearly false. It is certainly at odds with scientific practice.
Moreover, if the strategy gets such odd results for counterfactuals in ordinary cases, then
it hardly seems dialectically effective to apply it against my argument.
So the best strategy the causal essentialist has to hold that the Humean
possibilities lead to counterfactual instability gets the wrong results for many
counterfactuals. I take these wrong results to be reason to hold that the causal essentialist
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is not in a position to deny that the Humean’s modality is counterfactually stable, and so
my argument raises a serious problem for the view. But even if one does not accept this
stronger conclusion, it’s clear that these awkward results are a cost of the view, and
require that the causal essentialist have strong enough outweighing reasons to accept
causal essentialism.
I’ve argued that the Humean’s opponents that hold that the laws of nature and
causal relations are necessary cannot evade my argument. However, we’ll now see that a
different kind of rival to the Humean is in a position to avoid my argument. The unifying
feature of this family of views is that they involve positing a new theoretical entity and
the nature of this posit guarantees that the entity is involved in un-Humean necessary
connections. These views are in a position to argue that the Humean’s modality is not
counterfactually stable. To fix ideas, let’s use Armstrong as an example. Armstrong
posits a nomic relation that holds between universals that make true our statements about
laws.197

As we’ve seen in previous chapters, the instantiation of this nomic relation

involves necessary connections, in that, necessarily, if universals F and G bear this
relation, then if something is F, then it is also G. This necessary connection is clearly
un-Humean.

Let’s consider how this view relates to counterfactual stability.

The

Humean rejects this sort of necessary connection, and will instead hold that if the nomic
relation is possible, then the following counterfactual supposition is possible: F and G
bear the nomic relation, but that not every F is a G. Armstrong needs to argue that this
supposition counterfactually implies a manifest impossibility. It turns out that Armstrong

197

See Armstrong (1983) and (1997: 220-226).

235

is in a good position to argue exactly that. Armstrong can apply the same strategy we
considered above for the Humean’s opponent that takes the laws and causal relations to
be necessary. He can hold that the claim that the nomic relation holds between universals
expresses the same proposition as a claim about a law of nature. So the claim that F and
G bear the nomic relation represents the same situation as the claim that it is a law that
every F is a G. Recall our principle that if two sentences express the same proposition,
then they counterfactually imply one another. We can then say that the supposition that F
and G bear the nomic relation and not every F is a G counterfactually implies that it is a
law of nature that every F is a G, yet not every F is a G. But even a Humean will regard
the consequent as impossible. So Armstrong can argue that the Humean possibility leads
to instability.
We considered this sort of strategy in the hands of the Humean’s opponent that
holds that causal and lawlike relations are necessary. I rejected the strategy on the
grounds that it implies the truth of counterfactuals that are clearly false. However, the
strategy as used by Armstrong does not suffer from the same problem. The reason why is
that the nomic relation that Armstrong posits is a theoretical entity, so we have little
pre-theoretic sense of how counterfactuals involving this entity should come out. This is
unlike the the view where causal and lawlike relations are necessary, for the laws of
nature and the properties involved in the laws are not a purely philosophical posit, so we
have a pre-theoretic sense of the counterfactuals that involve them. In general, it is likely
that views that involve positing a purely theoretical entity can employ this strategy
without running into implausible counterfactuals.
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Even though views that posit novel entities can avoid this argument, the argument
does create a further burden for the defender of these views. The defender of these views
already take on the burden of providing justification for their posits. But in order to
avoid my argument, they must also take on the further burden of arguing that propositions
are individuated in a particular way to that allows them to avoid the argument. In the
case of Armstrong, Armstrong not only takes on the burden of arguing for the existence
of the lawlike relation, but he also takes on the burden of arguing that propositions are
individuated coarsely enough so that statements about the lawlike relation express the
same proposition as statements about the laws of nature.

So the argument from

counterfactual stability can be evaded by some of the Humean’s opponents.
Nevertheless, the argument does raise a problem for some non-Humeans. Moreover, the
argument further shapes the contours of the debate between Humeans and non-Humeans.
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CHAPTER 8
WHAT’S WRONG WITH QUIDDITIES?

In the preceding three chapters, I’ve developed three arguments in favor of
Hume’s Dictum (HD). In this final chapter, we’ll turn to three arguments against HD, all
of which focus on a specific consequence of HD. According to the Humean metaphysics,
a property ‘floats free’ from its role in the laws; that is, its nomic role. Not only could a
property fail to play its actual nomic role, but a distinct property could play that nomic
role.

If properties are modally independent of their nomic roles in this way, then

properties are not individuated by their roles; we cannot pick out a property across all
possible worlds in terms of its nomic role.

Perhaps properties lack individuation

conditions; there is nothing in virtue of which it’s the case that two properties are distinct.
198

On such a view, properties are said to have primitive identities, and the primitive

identities of these properties are said to be quiddities.199
Supposing the Humean accepts quiddities, does the Humean face trouble by
allowing that a property floats free from its nomic role?200 I’ll consider three arguments
that attempt to show that a commitment to quiddities is problematic in virtue of floating

198

To clarify, in the intended sense of individuation conditions, it is consistent to hold that properties lack
individuation conditions, but also hold that properties that are necessarily coe-extensive are identical. Intuitively,
individuation conditions are a matter of what properties and relations an entity has in a single world, and not how
that entity is across all possible worlds. A bit more precisely, individuation conditions have the following logical
form: For all worlds w, in w, X=P iff φ[X], where the expression ‘in w’ restricts all quantifiers in its scope to the
occupants of w, including the quantifiers in φ[X].
199
Usage in the literature hasn’t completely settled whether quiddities are the properties themselves when their
identity is primitive, as in Bird (2007: 97), or if quiddities are possessed by properties, something akin to
higher-order identity properties like the property of being identical with property P that property P possess, as in
Hildebrand (2016: 518).
200
The Humean might reject quiddities by holding that properties are individuated by something other than their
nomic role, but I set such a view aside here.
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free from their nomic role. But I’ll argue that only the last has any hope of having much
force against the Humean, and even then the success of the argument depends on the
results of other tendentious debates. But before proceeding to the arguments, let’s make
some preliminary clarifications.

8.1 Floating Free

What exactly does it mean to say that a property floats free from its nomic role?
It’s natural to understand this in modal terms. A property is only contingently related to
its nomic role. It is possible that, say, mass play a different nomic role. Moreover, it is
possible that a different property play mass’s actual nomic role. Plausibly, these modal
facts imply a deeper sense in which a property floats free from its nomic role; namely,
that a property’s nature isn’t given by its nomic role. This has both a transworld and
intraworld consequences.

The transworld consequence is that properties are not

individuated across possible worlds in terms of their nomic role; a property’s transworld
identity is not grounded in its nomic role. The intraworld consequence is that we cannot
describe all of the fundamental facts of the world simply in terms of which nomic roles
there are, and how those roles are distributed; we need the further facts of which property
is playing which role.
So far this a rough-and-ready description, but it’ll pay off to get more precise.
The first thing to note is that our focus must be on fundamental properties that figure in
the fundamental laws of nature. Derivative properties may be defined or analyzed in
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such a way that guarantees that they bear certain causal or nomic relations. For example,
one might hold that to believe that P is to be disposed to behave as though P is true. The
Humean should allow for these properties, and so the obvious fix is to focus on
fundamental properties.
We can now make precise the notion of a nomic role. Let L be the conjunction of
all the true, fundamental laws. L mentions all of the properties that figure in the laws.
We can obtain the nomic role of a given property from L by replacing every predicate that
expresses that property with a predicate variable, leaving that variable free. The result is
an open sentence which we can notate as L[X], indicating that X is a free predicate
variable. To play this nomic role is to satisfy this open sentence; that is, if we assign a
property to the variable, and the result is a truth, then the property plays that nomic role.
As an example, imagine applying this procedure to the predicate ‘mass.’ Consider a
simple world where the only law that involves mass is Newton’s second law of motion
that says that the force (F) acting on an object is equal to the object’s mass (M) times its
acceleration (A); in symbols: F=MA. The procedure for obtaining mass’s nomic role is
by replacing ‘M’ with a predicate variable. The result is F=XA. Since this is the only
law that involves mass, we get the full nomic role by simply conjoining ‘F=XA’ with the
rest of the laws.
To a first approximation, the Humean denies that a fundamental property
essentially plays its nomic role; that property could fail to play its nomic role. It’s
tempting to go further and say that on the Humean view any two properties could swap
their nomic roles. But this isn’t exactly right, it needs to be qualified. Properties may

240

have essential structural properties such as being a two-placed relation, being a vector,
and so on.

The Humean can allow that properties essentially have their structural

properties, as these don’t involve necessary connections between distinct existences, they
are simply a matter of how the property is in itself.201 There’s nothing un-Humean about
it being a necessary truth that mass is a monadic property. But it seems plausible that a
given nomic role can only be played by properties with the right structural features; for
example, mass’s role can’t be played by a relation. Let’s define a property type to be a
complete specification of the essential structural features of a property, whatever those
are. Let’s also say that a nomic role has a type just in case it’s possible for some property
with that type to play that role.202 With this setup, we can more precisely characterize the
idea that a property floats free from its nomic role. First consider:

Contingent Nomic Roles (CNR) For any fundamental property P and any nomic
role having the same type as P, possibly P plays that nomic role.

HD implies CNR, provided we can apply HD to fundamental properties. If so ,
then HD allows us to swap properties so that if world w contains a fundamental property
G, given a distinct fundamental property F of the same type as G we can generate a world
exactly like w, except that every instance of F is replaced with an instance of G. Does
this guarantee that F plays the same nomic role in this new world as G plays in w? That
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Perhaps we should hold that these structural properties are intrinsic to the properties that bear them, but this is a
delicate issue that we cannot enter into here. See Cowling (2016) for more discussion.
202
Note that a nomic role may have more than one type, if it’s possible for properties of different types to play that
nomic role.
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depends on whether the laws of nature supervene on the pattern of instantiation of
fundamental properties. If the answer is ‘yes,’ then F must play the same nomic role.
But if the answer is ‘no,’ then we haven’t yet guaranteed that F plays the same nomic
role. To complete the argument we need to know what we need to add to a world to get
the laws of nature; some metaphysical extra is needed. However, whatever we posit as
the metaphysical extra, the Humean will hold that we can recombine it with the
fundamental properties. For a simple example, suppose the metaphysical extra is a
fundamental relation that fundamental properties bear to one another. The Humean will
allow that we can recombine how fundamental properties bear this relation; in particular,
we can recombine F and G so that F can play G’s nomic role. Therefore, the Humean is
committed to CNR.203
Now CNR guarantees that a property can play a nomic role so that long as the
property and role are of the same type. But CNR does not guarantee us that whenever a
property plays a nomic role, a distinct property could play that nomic role. CNR is
consistent with cases where a given nomic role can only be played by a single property,
even if that property could play different nomic roles in different worlds. If we want to
rule out these cases, then we need the following:

203

Things are bit trickier if one is a primitivist about the laws of nature, and so the laws are not fundamental
relations between properties. How should the Humean apply their principle of recombination to this view? A
natural approach is to think of the primitivist view of laws in terms of a primitive operator that applies to
regularities. We can pronounce this operator as ‘it is a law that.’ The Humean will allow that we can recombine
which regularities we can apply this operator to and yield a truth. In particular, the Humean will allow that we can
recombine all the lawlike regularities that G is involved with so that F is involved instead. This gives us the result
that F plays G’s nomic role. A primitivist view of laws is defended by Carroll (1994) and Maudlin (2007).
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Nomic Twins (Twins) For any fundamental property P, if P actually plays nomic
role R, then possibly, a distinct property Q plays R.

Whether Humeans are committed to Twins is a more subtle question. Let’s first
note that we can derive Twins from CNR and the following principle:

Type Duplicates (TD) For any fundamental property P, possibly, there is a distinct
fundamental property Q of the same type as P.

From CNR and TD we are guaranteed Twins. Start with any fundamental
property P. TD gives us a property Q of the same type as P. CNR tells us that Q can
play the same nomic role as P. Hence, Twins. The important thing to see is that TD is
not a matter of recombination, rather it’s a matter of what elements are available for
recombination. Further, TD is controversial. If it ends up being the case that there is an
actual fundamental property for which there are no other fundamental properties of the
same type, then TD requires the possibility of alien fundamental properties. But some
philosophers reject the possibility of alien properties.204 However, I’m going to assume
TD, from which Twins follows. Twins allows us to make the arguments against the
Humean go more smoothly, so I’m not begging any questions by taking it on board.
Moreover, if I’m right that none of the arguments I’ll consider here are successful given
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Armstrong (1989: 54-57) rejects the possibility of alien properties. Cf. Dorr (2008: 46-47).
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that we accept Twins, it follows that these arguments don’t gives us a reason to deny the
possibility of alien properties.
I’ll now turn to consider three arguments for the conclusion that we should reject
CNR and Twins. These argument aim to show that every property essentially plays its
nomic role, and that every nomic role is essentially played by the property that actually
plays it. In short: these are arguments for the conclusion that a property does not ‘float
free’ from its nomic role. I’ll argue in each case that the arguments are unsuccessful, so
we have no reason to reject the Humean metaphysic because it implies that properties
‘float free’ from their nomic role.

8.2 The Epistemic Argument

A natural worry that arises if properties float free from their nomic role is that
those properties are beyond our epistemic access.205 It seems we only know the nomic
role that a property plays, never the property itself. Let’s develop this line of thought in
more detail. Consider a world exactly like the actual world except that two actual
properties, P and Q, have switched their nomic role and their pattern of instantiation.
Whatever causal effects that P produces in the actual world, Q produces these effects in
the other world, and the reverse also holds.206 This includes causal effects that produce
our observations. So our observations are the same in both worlds. Given that our
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This argument is made by Shoemaker (1980) and Bird (2007: 76-79).
I’m assuming here, for simplicity, that the causal powers of a property supervenes on the nomic role played by
that property. If you reject this, then add a property’s causal powers to its nomic role.
206
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observations are the same, we have no way of knowing which world we are in. In
particular, we have no way of knowing which property plays which role.
Now, we need to be careful here because, as I mentioned above, a Humean is not
committed to holding that just any two properties can switch their nomic roles.
Properties fall in types that preclude them from playing certain nomic roles. For
example, relations cannot play the same role as monadic properties, vectors cannot play
the same role as scalars, etc. This point is worth emphasizing because philosophers are
not always sensitive to it. Bird (2007: 75) constructs a case where we switch the mass
properties with the charge properties. But mass and charge plausibly have different
structural properties; charge can take on negative values, whereas mass cannot.207
Perhaps there are pairs of actual fundamental properties that are of the same type, but the
cleanest way to make the case is by appealing to Twins.208 For any property P, Twins
guarantees us the possibility of a distinct property Q of the same type as P; moreover,
Twins guarantees the possibility that Q plays the nomic role that P actually plays. A key
last step is that if there’s a world where Q plays the nomic role that P actually plays, then
surely there’s a world where Q has that nomic role as well as the same pattern of
instantiation as P. So if something is actually P, then it is Q in this possible world. The
Humean should accept this last step because it falls out of Hume’s Dictum. We can
recombine P and Q while keeping everything else the same. As a concrete example, we
can apply this procedure to mass, giving us a world much like the actual world except
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Likewise, Lewis (1986: 162) considers a case where we swap a quark color with a quark flavor. But it’s not
obvious that quark colors and quark flavors have the same structural properties.
208
Lewis (2009) distinguishes between a permutation argument, where we swap two actual properties of the same
type, with a replacement argument, where we swap an actual property for an alien property of the same type.
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that instead of mass we have an alien property schmass. In this world, schmass plays
mass’s actual nomic role, and also has mass’s pattern of instantiation. So schmass, in this
merely possible world, is distributed in exactly the same way that mass is distributed in
the actual world.
What’s of philosophical interest about these two worlds is that they seem to be
observationally equivalent. Every effect that mass produces in the actual world, schmass
produces in the merely possible world. Further, mass and schmass are distributed in
exactly the same way in the two worlds. So there’s no observation that will distinguish
between the two worlds.209
So the Humean is committed to holding that there is a sense in which we are
ignorant of which property is playing which role. Some, like Lewis (2009), accept this
consequence and deny that we have any reason to avoid the result.210

However,

opponents take this result to be a major cost of the Humean metaphysics. Bird (2007: 78)
is representative here: “this skeptical consequence … is, I suggest, a very high price to
pay for the Humean metaphysics. We do not want our metaphysics of properties to
condemn us to necessary ignorance of them.”211
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A potential exception to this style of argument is if there are phenomenal fundamental properties. It might be
argued that since phenomenal properties can be grasped by acquaintance without the need of a causal intermediary,
swapping around the phenomenal properties will produce a discernibly different world. I’ll set aside fundamental
phenomenal properties, since it’s still of interest to investigate whether the arguments are good when applied to
fundamental properties that aren’t phenomenal. Moreover, given how controversial fundamental phenomenal
properties are, I certainly don’t want to rest my defense of the Humean metaphysics on them.
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As Lewis (2009: 211) put it: “who ever promised me I was capable in principle of knowing everything?”
211
Bird has a slightly different case in mind that involves swapping two different properties for mass, both with
mass’s nomic role, but the same moral applies.
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Much has been written regarding whether this kind of skepticism really follows
from the case.212 I do not want to enter that debate here. Rather, I will argue that even if
this skepticism follows, the mere denial of the Humean metaphysics is insufficient to
avoid it. Moreover, the additional claims needed to avoid skepticism lead to quite
unintuitive consequences. The reason why is that a similar case can be constructed with
the same consequences, even if we reject CNR and Twins. Suppose, for the sake of
argument, that we hold that a property is modally individuated on the basis of its nomic
role. This doesn’t allow us to swap mass for a distinct property, because none of the
properties that are involved in mass’s nomic role could be lawfully related to a distinct
property in exactly the way they are related to mass. But suppose we have a world with a
structure of laws almost exactly like the structure of laws in the actual world, where the
only way that these laws differ from the actual laws is that there is a further property P
that the ‘mass-like’ property interacts with. In other words, the property that is analogous
to mass only differs from mass with respect to P, and there is no actual property that is
analogous to P.

So the only way that these merely possible properties can be

distinguished from the actual properties is by way of the lawful interaction between P and
the property analogous to mass. But now consider a world where P isn’t instantiated, but
contains the rest of the alien properties. Further, suppose that these properties are
instantiated in the same way that the actual properties are instantiated. So if something
has mass in the actual world, it has the property analogous to mass in the merely possible
world. Just as in the case against the Humean, it seems like the actual world and this
212

Shoemaker (1980), Bird (2007: 76-79), and Lewis (2009) argue that the skeptical consequence follows, though
differ regarding whether the skeptical consequence is one we should reject. Langton (2004) and Schaffer (2005)
argue that the skeptical consequence does not follow.
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merely possible world are observationally equivalent, so we can’t tell which world we’re
in.
A key feature of the case is that there’s a law that involves a property that isn’t
instantiated in the world. Is this problematic? First note that even if one denies the
existence of uninstantiated properties, one can still allow for the possibility of laws
involving uninstantiated properties. Consider a view where laws are a matter of a lawlike
relation between properties. As Armstrong (1983) argues, if the uninstantiated property
is a determinate of a determinable that is instantiated, then laws involving the
uninstantiated property could be understood in terms of a law involving the determinable.
Suppose a particular determinate of mass is uninstantiated, we can still account for laws
involving this particular determinate in terms of the determinable mass bearing the
lawlike relation.

We could make sense of the view above by holding that P is a

determinate of a determinable that is instantiated in the world. An alternative view,
friendly to the Humean’s opponent, is to ground laws of nature in the essential
dispositions of properties.213

A property could have a disposition that involves an

uninstantiated property, even if that property does not exist. So my opponent is not
forced to deny the possibility of laws involving uninstantiated properties.
Nevertheless, my opponent might still deny the possibility of laws involving
uninstantiated properties. But this response comes at a serious cost, for together with the
claim that properties are individuated by their role in the laws of nature it leads to some
implausible results. Since we are supposing that properties are individuated by their
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Bird (2007: 46-48) defends this approach.
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nomic role, if P can’t be involved in any laws while uninstantiated, then if P isn’t
instantiated then none of the other fundamental properties involved in those laws can be
instantiated either. In worlds where these alien properties are instantiated, this gives us
the truth of unintuitive counterfactuals like ‘if nothing were P, then all the fundamental
properties would be different.’ Moreover, without the same fundamental properties, we
would have different laws, so we’ll also unintuitive counterfactuals like ‘if nothing were
P, then the fundamental laws of nature would be different.’
There’s a second problem for the view. The laws of nature involving P might not
require that P is instantiated; perhaps the laws only allow for Ps under specialized
circumstances. Since the laws don’t rule out the possibility that P is instantiated, it is
nomologically possible, relative to those laws, that P is not instantiated. But if that is
nomologically possible, relative to those laws, then it is absolutely possible for those laws
to hold and for P to not be instantiated. This plausible line of thought must be rejected if
we deny the possibility of laws involving uninstantiated properties.214
Now it’s true that in the cases I’m appealing to, the merely possible world
contains entirely different fundamental properties, whereas in the case against the
Humean the merely possible world only contained one different fundamental property.
But I don’t think this makes a difference to the epistemology. One might hold that many
of the derivative properties in our world wouldn’t be instantiated in a world with
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Despite these problems, one might still be willing to deny the possibility of the world where P is not instantiated.
So it’s worth considering whether there are worlds where P is instantiated that we can appeal to in order to make the
problem. Suppose that the kinds of conditions required for schmass and P to interact are those that don’t allow for
anything like complex life that can observe anything; maybe they require that all matter is condensed to a
homogenous gas. In this case, in principle, no observer could observe schmass and P interact. So there may be
other cases that will work, but I won’t explore that line of thought here.
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completely different fundamental properties. Here’s a Kripkean line of thought to make
this plausible: in a world with completely different fundamental properties there wouldn’t
be hydrogen, oxygen, or carbon. But without those elements, there wouldn’t be any of
the ordinary macroscopic substances and objects of our world like water or human
beings. However, even if this reasoning is right, I don’t think it shows that we can know
that we’re in the actual world and not this merely possible world. Sure, we wouldn’t be
able to observe water in the merely possible world, but we could still observe a distinct
substance that is functionally the same as water; moreover, this substance would be
epistemically indiscernible from water. If we call this other substance ‘shwater,’ we
wouldn’t be able to tell if we’re observing water or shwater.
A different objection is that the merely possible world is too far away in logical
space to matter when it comes to our epistemic access of the fundamental properties.
Many epistemologists hold that in order to know a proposition, we don’t need to rule out
every possible world where that proposition is false; rather, we only need to rule out the
worlds that are sufficiently close.215 Moreover, surely the observationally indiscernible
world is far away, since it involves different laws and different fundamental properties.
But the Humean can say the same thing: when we swap fundamental properties, we are
changing the laws and the patterns of instantiation, and perhaps even introducing
different fundamental properties. So these worlds are ‘too far away’ to lead to skeptical
consequences. The Humean and the anti-Humean are on equal footing here. Either in
both cases the observationally indiscernible world is too far to matter or not.
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This thought underlies ‘relevant alternative’ epistemologies, as well as those that make use of safety or sensitivity
principles.
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Bird (2007: 79) does suggest a consideration that might distinguish the Humean
from the anti-Humean: “I am inclined to think that the [Humean] has such a thin
conception of properties that the addition of duplicate properties would make for only
minor differences between worlds” (by duplicate properties, he means properties with
identical nomic roles).216 But I don’t think this consideration raises a problem for the
Humean. Part of what drives the considerations of similarity that matter for when a
world is ‘too far away’ for epistemic purposes is getting us the right epistemic results.
It’s getting things backwards to complain that on the thin Humean conception of
properties, duplicate properties don’t matter much for similarity, and conclude that the
Humean cannot get the right epistemic results. Rather, we should go from the obvious
epistemic results to concluding which differences matter. If that means concluding that
changing which properties play which nomic role makes a difference that is relevant for
epistemology, then the Humean is principled in concluding that.
This methodology is a standard one used by philosophers. Consider an example
from epistemology.

A common strategy to allow us to say that we know various

propositions that are inconsistent with brain-in-a-vat style skeptical scenarios, is to appeal
to the claim that skeptical worlds are ‘too far’ away from the actual world. To fix ideas,
consider a safety constraint on knowledge, according to to which if I know P, then in all
nearby worlds where I believe P, P is true. We can avoid skepticism by holding that
skeptical scenarios are not nearby worlds, so even though I might falsely believe P in a
skeptical world, since these worlds aren’t nearby, my belief in P satisfies the safety
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He uses the term ‘categoricalist’ instead of ‘Humean.’

251

constraint.217 But part of what’s driving the claim that skeptical scenarios aren’t nearby is
getting the epistemic results that we want. Now, that doesn’t preclude giving general
principles governing how far away worlds are from the actual world, but part of what
motivates those principles is getting the epistemic results that we want.218
The important point is that there is no reason why the Humean can’t use the same
methodology. If we want the result that we know which properties are playing which
nomic role, then the Humean can accept the principle that worlds where we’ve swapped
fundamental properties are ‘far away’ in whatever sense their favored epistemology
requires. The Humean need not justify this claim on the basis of a pre-theoretic intuition
about the similarity relations between worlds, but rather use the desired epistemic results
as a guide to what sort similarity matters for epistemology.
Now for present purposes I’m neutral regarding whether these cases imply some
kind of skepticism or not. The important point that I want to make that is that the
skeptical worry still arises even if we deny CNR and Twins, and the only way of
avoiding the skeptical worry leads to serious costs. So the threat of skepticism provides
little reason to reject CNR and Twins.

8.3 The Argument From Structurally Indiscernible Worlds
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For more on the safety constraint on knowledge and skeptical scenarios, see Sosa (1999).
Another classic example of this methodology comes from the project of giving truth conditions for
counterfactuals. Lewis develops a sophisticated way of determining how far away a world is from the actual world,
for the purposes of giving truth conditions for counterfactuals, but the motivation for this account is based on the
intuitive truth values for counterfactuals. For example, Lewis’s (1979: 472) principles favor exact match in
particular fact and approximate match in the laws over approximate match in particular fact. But the motivation for
weighing things in this way is because it gets the results that Lewis wanted.
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A different objection to CNR and Twins is that they allow for distinct structurally
indiscernible worlds.219 Distinct structurally indiscernible worlds are easiest to grasp by
considering the analogous and better-known cases of distinct qualitatively indiscernible
worlds.

Imagine switching all of the qualitative properties and relations of two

individuals. Qualitative properties are ones that, intuitively, don’t make reference to any
particular individual. For example, having a particular size, shape, and mass are all
qualitative properties. These properties can be contrasted with non-qualitative properties
that do make reference to particular individuals. These are properties like being Socrates
or being Taylor Swift’s dog.220 Now suppose you and I swapped all of our qualitative
properties.

The only difference that results from these changes are non-qualitative

differences, a difference regarding which individual instantiates which properties.
Offhand, it seems that we have two distinct worlds.

One can reject this initial

appearance, and we’ll consider how later on, but for the moment let’s assume they are
distinct. When describing these worlds in purely qualitative terms, there’s no way to
distinguish the two worlds. The same purely qualitative propositions are true at each
world.

It’s worth making this more precise. Let’s say that worlds w1 and w2 are

qualitatively indiscernible iff there is a one-to-one correspondence f mapping objects
from one world to another such that, for all x1, …, xn, and for any qualitative property or
relation R, x1, …, xn bear relation R in w1 iff f(x1), …, f(xn) bear R in w2.
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This argument is made by Kistler (2002: 69), Mumford (2004: 104, 149-152), and Bird (2007: 73-76). These
cases were first considered by Black (2000), but he used them to motivate denying the transworld identity of
properties, rather than that properties necessarily play their nomic roles.
220
For more on the distinction, and an argument that we must take the distinction to be primitive, see Cowling
(2015).

253

Some philosophers reject qualitatively indiscernible worlds; so they deny that the
procedure of switching individuals around while preserving all the qualitative properties
and relations generates a distinct possible world. They must deny one of two things.
First, they could deny that the procedure preserves possibility, so we don’t get a possible
world at all. Second, they could deny that the procedure produces a distinct world, rather
it simply produces the same world re-described.
Structurally indiscernible worlds are much like qualitatively indiscernible worlds,
except they involve switching properties instead of individuals. These arise when two
properties switch their nomic roles as well as their patterns of instantiation. For example,
imagine swapping out mass with an alien property schmass, but keeping everything else
the same. So in this possible world, schmass plays the same nomic role that mass
actually plays, and schmass has the same pattern of instantiation that mass actually has.
The worlds are the same when described in purely structural terms, they only differ when
we describe them in terms of which properties are playing which roles. Intuitively, two
worlds are structurally indiscernible when they are isomorphic with respect to nomic
roles and patterns of instantiation. Making this precise takes a little more work than
qualitatively indiscernible worlds, but here’s one way to do it. First we need the notion
of the structure of laws. This is best understood in terms of a concept we’ve used earlier:
Ramsified lawbooks.

Start with the lawbook of the world; the conjunction of all

fundamental law statements in the world. Before, I defined a nomic role as the result of
changing every instance of one of the predicates to a predicate variable. To get a
Ramsified lawbook we generalize that procedure and apply it to every predicate. So we
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uniformly replace every predicate expressing a fundamental property with a predicate
variable, and apply an existential quantifier to bind each predicate variable at the front.
So all the lawbook is left with is logical, mathematical, and nomic vocabulary. A
property P plays a role in this structure of the laws just in case replacing every instance of
a predicate variable with a predicate expressing P results in a truth.
We can now define the notion of two worlds being structurally indiscernible.
Worlds w1 and w2 are structurally indiscernible iff there’s a one-to-one correspondence f
from the individuals, properties, and relation in w1 to the individuals, properties, and
relations in w2 that satisfies the following constraints:

(i) f always maps individuals to individuals, properties to properties, and relations to
relations.

(ii) For all x1, …, xn, and any property or relation R, x1, …, xn bear R in w1 iff f(x1), …,
f(xn) bear f(R) in w2.

(iii) For any property or relation R, R plays a role in the structure of the laws in w1 iff f(R)
plays that role in the structure of the laws in w2.

There’s a complication with our definition of structurally indiscernible worlds:
qualitatively indiscernible worlds come out as structurally indiscernible. This is because
qualitatively indiscernible worlds involve the same fundamental properties and relations
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playing the same role in the structure of the laws and possessing the same patterns of
instantiation.221

But we want to distinguish between worlds that are structurally

indiscernible due to switching properties and ones that are structurally indiscernible due
to switching individuals, since the case of switching properties is what’s of interest in
objecting to the Humean. So when we are considering structurally indiscernible worlds
as part of an objection to the Humean, we should focus on qualitatively discernible, but
structurally indiscernible worlds.
Just as some reject distinct qualitatively indiscernible worlds, some reject distinct
structurally indiscernible worlds. Further, just as in the case of qualitatively indiscernible
worlds, there are two strategies for rejecting distinct structurally indiscernible worlds.
When one is faced with an apparent case of two worlds that are structurally indiscernible,
one can deny that one of the worlds is possible, or one can deny that they are distinct
worlds.
The case above where we swap out mass with schmass gives us an example of
two structurally indiscernible worlds.

So, at first glance, the Humean allows for

structurally indiscernible worlds. If one rejects structurally indiscernible worlds on the
grounds that the worlds are not distinct, then one can still retain the Humean principle of
recombination.

As Lewis (2009: 208-212) notes, in order to construct cases of

structurally indiscernible worlds we need both a recombination principle and a principle
that says that recombinations guarantee distinct worlds. But we could endorse the former
without endorsing the latter. It could be the case that recombination always preserves
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I’m assuming here that fundamental properties and relations are always qualitative.
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possibility, but it doesn’t always guarantee distinct worlds. This could be true if one
opted for a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of these modal claims. On this approach,
the same possible world could represent two different possibilities that are structurally
indiscernible, and so we get different possibilities from the same world by applying
different counterpart relations.

For example, under the counterpart relation where

everything represents itself, the actual world represents the possibility of mass playing
the mass role. But under the counterpart relation where mass represents schmass, the
actual world represents the possibility of schamss playing the mass role.
Therefore, if we’re to get an objection to the Humean on the basis of structurally
indiscernible worlds it needs to be common ground that swapping properties in the way
that the case describes produces a distinct possible world, and so I’m taking my opponent
to avoid structurally indiscernible worlds on the grounds that swapping the properties
fails to produce a possible world at all.
Now, why should we reject structurally indiscernible worlds? What’s problematic
about them?

A natural thought is to make the case by analogy with qualitatively

indiscernible worlds.222 Many have an intuition against them. Further, since structurally
indiscernible worlds are clearly analogous with qualitatively indiscernible, we should
reject them too. So the Humean’s opponent wants to reject indiscernible worlds, either of
the qualitative or structural variety, and they reject them by denying that one of the
indiscernible worlds is genuinely possible. We already know how this strategy goes in
the case of swapping mass and schmass. The Humean’s opponent can hold that a
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property is individuated by its nomic role. So the only property that can play mass’s
nomic role is mass. It follows that the world where schmass plays mass’s nomic role is
impossible (recall that we are assuming that the world where schmass plays mass’s nomic
role is a distinct world from the actual world).
But how is the strategy supposed to go in the case of qualitatively indiscernible
worlds? Consider the case where you and I swap all of our qualitative properties and
relations. An easy way to deny that this swap is possible is to hold that the swap fails to
preserve essential properties of the individuals involved. If, say, my origins are essential
to me and your origins are essential to you, then we can’t make this swap, for the swap
won’t preserve our origins. Perhaps this move will work here, but the trouble is that it
won’t allow us to avoid every potential case of a qualitatively indiscernible worlds.
Consider a world containing only two distinct duplicate spheres. Let’s call them a and b.
It’s possible that one of them cease to exist, while the other continues to exist. This
possibility isn’t maximally specific because it doesn’t tell us which of the two spheres
goes out of existence, and which stays in existence. There are two ways of filling out the
possibility; in one world a is annihilated, but in another world b is instead. The two
worlds where one sphere is annihilated are qualitatively indiscernible from one another,
but there are no plausible essential properties we can appeal to that rule out these
possibilities. So the strategy of avoiding qualitatively indiscernible worlds by denying
that one of the worlds is possible isn’t successful at handling every case. If we want to
deny qualitatively indiscernible worlds we should instead deny that the worlds are
distinct. We could appeal to counterpart theory and hold that there is a single world
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where a sphere is annihilated, and under one counterpart relation a is a counterpart of the
annihilated sphere, and under a different counterpart relation b is a counterpart of the
annihilated sphere.
But this raises trouble for making an argument against the Humean by way of an
analogy with qualitatively indiscernible worlds.

The moral to draw if one rejects

qualitatively indiscernible worlds is to deny that the indiscernible worlds are distinct. So
if the argument is based on the analogy, then the moral we should draw is that apparently
structurally indiscernible worlds are not distinct, rather than deny that one of them is
possible.
So it seems that the argument from mere quiddistic differences cannot be based on
an analogy with qualitatively indiscernible worlds. The argument must be based on a
brute intuition that there are no structurally indiscernible worlds. But I’m suspicious of
putting too much stock in this intuition. For upholding this intuition requires accepting
several further controversial commitments, and it is far from clear that the strength of the
intuition is enough to justify these further controversial commitments. Second, there is a
principled way of explaining away the intuition. Let’s consider each in turn.
The first controversial commitment has to do with properties that are symmetrical.
Earlier I appealed to worlds containing two duplicate spheres where one of the spheres is
annihilated, in order to show that one cannot avoid distinct qualitatively indiscernible
worlds by denying that one of the indiscernible worlds is impossible. Before the spheres
are annihilated, the spheres are symmetrical in the sense that whatever qualitative
property or relation that one of the spheres has, the other sphere also has. We can also
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consider cases where properties are symmetrical. This obtains when there is a symmetry
in the laws. As an abstract example, consider a simple way of representing the laws
involving just a single nomic relation ‘n,’ and the following simple laws with a
symmetry: AnC ∧ BnC ∧ (A ∧ B)nD.223 Notice that A and B are perfectly symmetrical
with one another. If a structure of laws like this is possible, then we will have structurally
indiscernible worlds. Take a world where these laws hold. Now, consider another world
exactly like the first world except that A and B switch their pattern of instantiation.
These two worlds are structurally indiscernible. So if we reject structurally indiscernible
worlds, we must reject the possibility of laws with symmetries in them. Once we have
two properties with symmetrical roles in the laws, all we need is to switch the pattern of
instantiation of the properties and we have structurally indiscernible worlds. Hence,
rejecting structurally indiscernible worlds requires rejecting laws with symmetries like
this. In effect, the Ramsified lawbook must be capable of uniquely picking out each
property.
But rejecting the possibility of laws with symmetries doesn’t come without costs.
First, what if there are symmetries in the actual laws? It seems like an open outcome that
our best science could reveal these kinds of symmetries in the laws. So it is epistemically
possible that there are such symmetries. This conflicts with the a priori intuition that
there are no structurally indiscernible worlds, for the intuition requires that there are no
symmetries. Hence, the a priori intuition implies that it is a priori that there are no
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symmetries. But if it is a priori that there are no symmetries, then it is not epistemically
possible that there are symmetries.
Now this isn’t immediately damning. In the face of potential symmetries there
are moves available. In the face of a potential symmetry between positive and negative
charge, we could conceive of them as relations; we could posit fundamental relations of
the form being r times as charged as, where r is a real number. But even if these moves
can avoid a commitment to a symmetry in the laws it’s not obvious that they will also be
workable or that they will yield an attractive formulation of the fundamental physical
laws.224
Even if there are no actual symmetries in the laws, there’s a widespread modal
intuition that they are possible.225 Moreover, in chapter 6 we saw an argument for their
possibility. So the intuition that there are no distinct structurally indiscernible worlds
must be strong enough to outweigh the counterweighing modal intuition and argument.
That places some heavy demands on the intuition that there are no distinct structurally
indiscernible worlds. But let’s press on.
Let’s consider another case.

It’s similar to a case that I appealed to when

discussing the epistemic argument. Suppose properties A and B are alike in all of their
nomic relations, except they differ with respect to how they interact with C. Suppose
when A interacts with C two properties are the result, but when B interacts with C only a
single property is the result, so there is a structural difference between A and B. Consider
two worlds that differ only by swapping A’s and B’s patterns of instantiation, but,
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Note also that if a relational approach to quantities is adopted then symmetries may arise between the relations.
Hawthorne (2002: 373-374) and Schaffer (2005: 12-13) cite this intuition.
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importantly, suppose further that C is not instantiated in either world. If we only consider
the instantiated properties in these two worlds, then the worlds seem to be structurally
indiscernible. What should the philosopher who rejects structurally indiscernible worlds
makes of this case? One reaction is to hold that even though C isn’t instantiated in the
world, C still exists, and the different nomic relations that A and B bear to C make for a
structural difference between the two worlds. But it is a controversial commitment to
allow that a property exists in a world even though it is not instantiated in that world.
Moreover, as I argued in my discussion of the epistemic argument, if there can be laws
involving uninstantiated properties, then the opponent of quiddities also faces the
epistemic argument. So my opponent cannot simultaneously hold that there can be laws
involving uninstantiated properties while also appealing to the epistemic argument
against CNR and Twins.
A different reaction is to deny that the worlds where we’ve swapped A’s and B’s
patterns of instantiation are possible. The Humean’s opponent might hold that properties
are individuated by their nomic roles, while rejecting the existence of uninstantiated
properties. Without the uninstantiated property C, so the line of thought goes, there
would be no nomic difference between A and B. If properties are individuated by their
nomic roles, then without a nomic difference A and B cannot be distinct properties. Of
course, this response rests on the idea that there cannot be laws of nature involving
uninstantiated properties, and as we saw in the previous section this is also a
controversial commitment with some serious costs associated with it. This response
leads to implausible counterfactuals and denies that every nomological possibility is
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metaphysically possible. The upshot is that, whichever reaction one takes, if we are to
avoid a commitment to structurally indiscernible worlds then we’ll need to take on
another controversial commitment: either the existence of uninstantiated properties, or no
laws involving non-existent properties.
To sum up, doing justice to the intuition that there are no structurally indiscernible
worlds requires taking on some pretty controversial commitments. It requires rejecting
the possibility of symmetrical laws. It also requires either accepting the existence of
uninstantiated properties or denying the possibility of laws involving uninstantiated
properties. But these are controversial commitments, and it places a greater burden on
the intuition since it requires these commitments. Moreover, it’s surprising that there is
an argument for these views merely on the basis of an intuition that there are no
structurally indiscernible worlds. I don’t claim that this isn’t a coherent package of
views, but it’s a tall order for the intuition to justify. I think it also suggests that we have
mixed intuitions about whether there are structurally indiscernible worlds, rather than that
our intuitions unequivocally rule them out.226
Let’s now proceed to the second prong of the attack. I want to sketch a strategy
that the Humean can employ to explain away the intuition that there are no structurally
indiscernible worlds.

The key idea behind the strategy is one that the Humean’s

opponent of quiddities shares: our main way of grasping fundamental properties goes by
way of their nomic roles. Roughly, the thought is that if this is our main grasp on
fundamental properties, then something goes semantically awry when we attempt to
226
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distinctions without differences...In both cases alike, this conflict of intuitions is inconclusive…”
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consider structurally indiscernible worlds. This makes them seem impossible to us,
despite their being genuinely possible.
Before getting into the details, it will be instructive to think through other cases
where a property comes apart from the role that it realizes, but where the properties
involved are not fundamental.

Consider David Lewis’s (1980) case of a madman

experiencing pain and a Martian experiencing pain. The madman instantiates the same
physical state the rest of us are in when we feel pain, but his state has a completely
different causal role. The madman is caused to be in this state by moderate exercise on
an empty stomach, rather than cuts or burns. Further, the mad man doesn’t cry or groan,
rather his concentration fixes entirely on mathematics.

The case of a martian

experiencing pain is the reverse. The martian is in a state that has exactly the same causal
role as the state we’re in when we’re in pain, but the martian’s pain is physically realized
by a completely different state from the state that physically realizes our pain. This case
is much like cases of structurally indiscernibles worlds in that a property and the role that
it plays are pulled apart from one another. The case involves two properties: the physical
property human beings instantiate including the madman, and the physical property that
martians instantiate.

Call these the ‘human property’ and the ‘martian property’

respectively. The case involves the madman instantiating the human property but where
the human property fails to play the pain causal role, whereas the martian instantiates the
martian property and that property plays the pain causal role. So we have a case where
the human property fails to play one of the causal roles it actually plays, and where a
distinct property plays that causal role.
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This is much like structurally indiscernible

worlds, such as one involving the actual world and a world where we have schmass
playing the mass role.
A key feature of the mad pain and Martian pain case that I want to bring out is
that it isn’t the case that our only way of characterizing the physical properties involved
is in terms of the pain causal role. We can characterize these properties in other terms in
order to get a grip on them. This allows us to get a clear grip on the case, and explains
why they seem to be genuinely possible. But this feature is absent in cases of structurally
indiscernible worlds, since the properties involved are fundamental, the only informative
way of characterizing these properties is in terms of their nomic role. I will use this key
fact to develop a strategy for explaining away the intuition that there are no structurally
indiscernible worlds.
Given that our main way of grasping fundamental properties is by way of their
nomic role, it’s natural to consider the following semantic hypothesis: the terms for
fundamental properties that appear in the laws are semantically tied to those nomic roles.
So the predicate refers to whatever property plays that role in the laws, rather than rigidly
referring to the actual property playing that role. If we accept this view, then it becomes
difficult to actually describe or grasp a case of structurally indiscernible worlds. When
we speak strictly, it makes no sense to say that there is a world where a property distinct
from mass plays mass’s nomic role, because the term ‘mass’ just refers to whatever plays
that role. When describing cases of structurally indiscernible worlds, it starts to sound
like we’re saying something contradictory. Suppose we said that there’s a world much
like the actual world, except that mass doesn’t play the mass role and instead a distinct
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property, schmass, plays the mass role. On this semantic hypothesis, since ‘mass’ is
semantically tied to the mass role, it sounds contradictory to say that mass doesn’t play
the mass role and a distinct property does. If we held this semantic view, then we’re
liable to get the intuition that structurally indiscernible worlds are impossible, but we can
explain the source of that intuition in semantic terms. When we attempt to describe
structurally indiscernible worlds, we’re hearing something contradictory, but this is just a
feature of the semantics, and not a feature of the metaphysics.
What if we consider structurally indiscernible worlds in purely general terms
without using predicates to refer to the properties? Suppose we understand the worlds
simply in terms of saying that in world w1 there’s a property playing a given role, and in
w2 there’s a distinct property playing that same role. My semantic story does not apply to
this case, since the semantic story only applies to predicates for fundamental properties.
But I don’t think that this is a problem. If predicates for fundamental properties are
semantically tied to a nomic role, then it wouldn’t be surprising that this would affect our
intuitions when considering fundamental properties in general. Moreover, the intuition
against structurally indiscernible worlds is usually not elicited by considering the case in
purely general terms; indeed, I suspect the abstractness of considering the case in purely
general terms makes it difficult to have any intuition one way or the other. Rather, I think
the typical way of considering structurally indiscernible worlds that elicits the intuition is
by considering specific properties.

Further, whenever we do consider structurally

indiscernible worlds in purely general terms, I suspect we keep track of the properties
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involved by introducing predicates to tag them with, and once we do that then my
strategy can apply.
Nevertheless, this semantic story isn’t very plausible because it doesn’t merely
predict that we have intuitions against structurally indiscernible worlds; it also predicts
that we have intuitions against every possibility where a property has a different nomic
role. This is because if predicates for fundamental properties are semantically tied to the
property’s nomic role, the possibility of, say, mass playing a different nomic role will
sound contradictory. But clearly we don’t have these intuitions. If anything, we have the
opposite intuition that it is possible for properties to play different nomic roles.
So the semantic hypothesis isn’t very plausible. But once we see the basic idea
behind the strategy for undercutting the intuition that there are no structurally
indiscernible worlds, we can develop more sophisticated accounts that can undercut this
intuition without making poor predictions about other modal intuitions.

Suppose

fundamental predicates ambiguously express both a nomic role as well as the realizer of
that role. Of course, in non-modal contexts this ambiguity never matters, but it will in
modal contexts. Consider a simple modal claim that the laws governing mass could be
somewhat different. It’s easy to resolve the ambiguity so that ‘mass’ refers to the realizer
of the mass role rather than the role itself, because mass’s actual nomic role does not
appear in the lawbook in this world. But consider a case of structurally indiscernible
worlds. When we consider a world much like the actual world, but where mass has been
replaced by schmass, it’s difficult to resolve the ambiguity.

Since schmass is, by

stipulation, a distinct property from mass we’re being pulled in the direction to say that it
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isn’t mass. But since it plays the same nomic role as mass, that pulls us in the direction
to say that it is mass. Since the ambiguity is difficult to resolve, we get the intuition that
there are no structurally indiscernible worlds, but the intuition is sensitive to the
semantics rather than the metaphysics.
Alternatively, the strategy can be implemented in a two-dimensional framework,
where every term receives two meanings.

For terms in fundamental theories, one

meaning captures the nomic role, whereas the other meaning captures the property
playing the role. However, this is a sophisticated theoretical apparatus that our intuitions
are not sensitive to.

This explains our confusion when we consider structurally

indiscernible worlds that pull the two meanings apart, which in turn explains our intuition
against structurally indiscernible worlds. So on either approach, there are resources to
explain away the intuition that there are no structurally indiscernible worlds.
Let’s sum things up. We’ve seen that making the argument by way of an analogy
with cases of qualitatively indiscernible worlds fails, for it motivates denying that the
indiscernible worlds are distinct, rather than denying that one of the worlds is possible.
The argument must rest on a brute intuition that there are no structurally indiscernible
worlds. But I’ve argued that we shouldn’t rest too much on this intuition. Upholding the
intuition requires a controversial commitment to the impossibility of symmetries in the
laws, and an acceptance of either the existence of uninstantiated properties or the denial
of laws involving uninstantiated properties.

Further, there is a viable strategy the

Humean can employ to undercut this intuition by explaining it away in semantic terms.
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8.4 The Methodological Argument

Let’s finally consider a methodological argument against the Humean conception
of properties. While the epistemic and structurally indiscernible worlds arguments are
not ultimately persuasive, one might argue that the swapping cases these arguments
appeal to demonstrate that the Humean has unattractive commitments that we should
avoid on methodological grounds. One might argue that the swapping cases show that,
on the Humean’s conception, fundamental properties are explanatorily idle, we only need
the nomic role to explain the world and not the property itself. But we ought to prefer
theories without explanatorily idle features to theories with that structure. A bit more
precisely, the following methodological principle seems extremely attractive:

Ockhamism If all else is equal, we ought to prefer theories that do not include
explanatorily idle structure over ones that do.

If it’s true that the Humean conception is committed to explanatorily idle
structure, then Ockhamism tells us to prefer a theory that is otherwise equally successful
that lacks this structure. But in order to tell whether the fundamental properties are
explanatorily idle, we need to get a clearer idea of the notion of explanation.
There’s a popular account of what it is to be explanatorily idle in the philosophy
of physics. This account ties the notion to the laws of nature. It will be helpful to
consider a well-known and fairly uncontroversial application of this account. Consider
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the Newtonian theory of space, according to which space is a substance independent of
material objects that persists through time. A key piece of structure that this theory
includes is that every region of space exists through time.

This means there is an

objective fact about whether an object is at rest or moving, irrespective of the reference
frame in which we are observing the object. This is a matter of whether, in a given
interval of time, the object remains in the same location or is in different locations.
On the relevant notion of explanation, these facts about absolute rest and motion
are not explanatory. Given the Newtonian laws, uniformly changing the absolute motion
of everything in the universe preserves all facts about relative motion. For example,
consider a world that differs from the actual world only with respect to how fast and in
what direction the entire universe is moving.

It’s a consequence of the laws of

Newtonian mechanics that this uniform change will preserve all the other basic facts
posited by the theory; that is, relative positions between objects will be the same, their
mass will be the same, etc. Since the Newtonian theory allows us to change facts about
absolute rest and motion without changing anything else, it seems that facts about
absolute rest and motion are explanatorily idle; they fail to explain anything in the theory.
Many philosophers find this to be a compelling reason to search for a theory that
is otherwise as good as the Newtonian theory of space, but without structure that allows
for absolute rest and motion. As it turns out, there is an equally good theory known as
the Neo-Newtonian (or Galilean) theory of space. The key way this theory of space
differs from the Newtonian theory is that a region of space exists only at a single moment
in time, so we cannot make sense of an object being located at the same region of space
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through an interval of time. This theory does not allow for absolute rest and motion, but
it can otherwise account for everything that the Newtonian space accounts for. Since the
Neo-Newtonian conception is otherwise equally good, our methodological principle tells
us to prefer it.227
Once we see the style of argument, it’s not hard to run it for many different
theories.

For example, this argument has been wielded against a more general

substantival conception of spacetime in the context of the General Theory of Relativity in
the form of the famous hole argument.228 It has also been wielded against an absolutist
conception of quantities in favor of a relational conception.229
It’s natural to think that the Humean’s conception of properties falls prey to this
sort of argument. Can’t we switch the properties around and preserve everything else?
Not quite. A key feature of the argument above is that we were holding fixed the
Newtonian laws, and noting that given a change to the facts about absolute motion, the
law didn’t require a change to any other facts. But if we change the nomic role of the
properties, then clearly we aren’t holding fixed the laws of nature.
Once we see the point, it’s not hard to see that on the Humean conception
properties are clearly not explanatorily idle in the way that absolute rest or motion is in
the Newtonian picture.
Given the laws of nature, mass explains all sorts of facts, even on the Humean
view. For example, the mass of some objects explains the positions of those objects
relative to one another. There’s nothing about the Humean view that rejects this idea.
227

For a nice discussion of this issue, see Maudlin (2012: Ch. 3)
See Earman and Norton (1987) and Earman (1989: Ch. 9).
229
See Dasgupta (2013).
228
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Perhaps there is another sense in which, on the Humean conception, fundamental
properties are explanatorily idle. However, merely appealing to the fact that there is a
world with different fundamental properties, but is observationally equivalent with our
world, isn’t a promising way to make the case that on the Humean view fundamental
properties are explanatorily idle. By parallel reasoning, the external world would come
out as explanatorily idle in virtue of there being an observationally equivalent world
where the external world is radically different, as witnessed by skeptical thought
experiments. So this argument wouldn’t bring out a problem that is specific to the
Humean.
But perhaps there’s an interesting difference between the swapping cases we’ve
been considering and skeptical scenarios.

On typical skeptical scenarios, such as

brain-in-a-vat or evil demon scenarios, the causes of our experiences are quite different
from their causes in the actual world. But at first glance, this isn’t so when we swap the
fundamental properties. One might hold that we can have all the same causes of our
experiences, even if we swap around the fundamental properties.
However, I don’t think this way of making the argument will work. On the most
natural way of understanding the causes of our experiences, fundamental properties can
be involved. For example, suppose I have the experience of an object moving. Part of
the causal chain of that experience will include the facts about the mass of the moving
object. If mass is a fundamental property, then a fundamental property will be involved
in the causes of my experience. This result will hold generally if macroscopic objects can
bear fundamental properties and relations. For those properties and relations will be
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causally relevant to the objects’ behavior, and so those properties and relations will be
causally relevant to our experiences of the behavior of those objects. One might put
forward the hypothesis that the fundamental properties and relations are only instantiated
by point-sized objects. But it’s not so clear that this hypothesis is true; what are these
fundamental properties that can only be instantiated by point-sized objects?

Many

properties instantiated at the micro-level can also be instantiated at the macro-level such
as mass and charge. Further, even if the fundamental properties are only instantiated by
point-sized objects, it is far from obvious that these properties cannot be involved in the
causes of our experiences.
There is a very flat-footed sense in which the Humean’s view of properties are not
explanatorily idle when compared with the Humean’s rival that rejects CNR and Twins.
The Humean’s rival individuates properties in terms of their nomic role.

So the

Humean’s opponent doesn’t need fundamental facts about the identities of properties,
whereas the Humean does. Call these fundamental facts about the identities of properties
quiddistic facts. From the point of view of the Humean’s rival, quiddistic facts are
something extra that aren’t needed in order to explain everything. We get a more
parsimonious theory if we avoid a commitment to quiddistic facts. Of course, this
argument doesn’t single out anything in particular that is uniquely objectionable about
quiddities; this is merely an objection that we can explain the world just as well without
them.
At first glance it might seem that Ockhamism tells us to prefer a theory that
rejects CNR and Twins over the Humean theory that accepts them. But remember that
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Ockhamism only applies when all else is equal. Is all else equal between the Humean her
rival? No, because even though the Humean accepts quiddistic facts and her rival does
not, the Humean’s rival accepts fundamental facts that the Humean does not. The
Humean grounds laws and other nomic facts in terms of the overall pattern of
fundamental properties and relations. Of course, if we ground the laws in the properties,
then we can’t in turn ground the properties in terms of the laws.
If this argument is to be successful we need some additional reason for thinking
that grounding the properties in the laws is to be preferred to grounding the laws in the
properties. Here we will need to look to reasons for rejecting the Humean’s conception
of laws of nature. Of course, the Humean view of laws is very controversial and many
have objected to it. If one was convinced on independent grounds that we should reject
the Humean view of laws, then objecting to CNR and Twins on the grounds that they
require a commitment to quiddistic facts is promising. But the Humean’s opponent needs
to tread carefully here. A common argument against the claim that the laws of nature are
grounded in the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties is based on the modal
intuition that there are possible worlds with the same pattern of instantiation of
fundamental properties but with different laws.230 But our modal intuitions can also be
used to argue that properties are not grounded in their nomic roles, by appealing to the
modal intuition that a property could play a different nomic role. Can’t we clearly
conceive of a world where mass obeys different laws? So merely appealing to modal
intuition does not seem to pose a serious problem for the Humean. However, I believe

230

Carroll (1994) is the classic source for these arguments.
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this is the most promising line of thought for attacking CNR and Twins. If one could
successfully argue that the Humean’s attempt to ground laws in the pattern of
instantiation of fundamental properties fails, and that the project of grounding
fundamental properties in their nomic roles is successful, then the argument may have
some force. But those are big ‘ifs,’ and it’s not clear that either project will succeed.
Nevertheless, evaluating these projects lies outside the scope of this chapter.
While I’ve argued that the other objections to CNR and Twins are unconvincing,
this line of thought is the most promising, and suggests where future work should focus.
The focus should be on the prospects for grounding the laws of nature in the pattern of
instantiation of fundamental properties and the prospects for grounding fundamental
properties in the laws of nature. Determining whether these grounding theories are
successful is the most promising approach to determining whether there is something
methodologically unattractive with accepting CNR and Twins.
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